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Abstract
The explosion in popularity of online social networks has led to increased interest in
identity resolution from security practitioners. Being able to connect together the multiple
online accounts of a user can be of use in verifying identity attributes and in tracking the
activity of malicious users. At the same time, privacy researchers are exploring the same
phenomenon with interest in identifying privacy risks caused by re-identification attacks.
Existing literature has explored how particular components of an online identity
may be used to connect profiles, but few if any studies have attempted to assess the
comparative value of information attributes. In addition, few of the methods being
reported are easily comparable, due to difficulties with obtaining and sharing ground-
truth data. Attempts to gain a comprehensive understanding of the identifiability of
profile attributes are hindered by these issues.
With a focus on overcoming these hurdles to effective research, this thesis first
develops a methodology for sampling ground-truth data from online social networks.
Building on this with reference to both existing literature and samples of real profile data,
this thesis describes and grounds a comprehensive matching schema of profile attributes.
The work then defines data quality measures which are important for identity resolution,
and measures the availability, consistency and uniqueness of the schema’s contents. The
developed measurements are then applied in a feature selection scheme to reduce the
impact of missing data issues common in identity resolution.
Finally, this thesis addresses the purposes to which identity resolution may be applied,
defining the further application-oriented data quality measurements of novelty, veracity
and relevance, and demonstrating their calculation and application for a particular use
case: evaluating the social engineering vulnerability of an organisation.
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ACID A framework defined by Goga et al [83] for understanding the reliability of
identity-resolution systems.
ACU The availability, consistency and uniqueness model presented in Chapter 4, which
builds upon and refines ACID.
API An application programming interface, defining subroutines for use in software.
Used here to refer to such interfaces offered by web services.
FOAF Friend-of-a-Friend: an online ontology system and project for describing people.
NB Naive Bayes, a probabilistic classifier with strong feature independence assumptions.
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The explosion in popularity of online social networking services over the past decade
has led to increased interest in identity resolution from security practitioners. With
many different platforms recording different information about a person’s life, efforts at
data fusion – connecting together these strands of information – tend to centre on the
identification of which online profiles refer to the same person. In turn, these methods are
powering security analytics for tracking malicious or criminal behaviour, and providing
powerful insight into the privacy protection necessary for users of online social networks.
For example, data releases from scientists studying social networks have demonstrated
how anonymising their contents is more challenging than simply removing classical
categories of “personally identifying information” [258].
Existing literature has explored how particular components of an online identity may
be used to connect profiles in the absence of ground-truth: researchers have demonstrated
that content ratings [155], friends lists [128], writing style [154] and other incidental
data [83] can be used to link online accounts that correspond to the same person. However,
few if any studies have attempted to assess the comparative value of information attributes
for this purpose. Questions about which of the many kinds of profile elements are more
useful cannot yet be answered outside of individual cases on particular datasets and tasks.
The field is lacking a grounded understanding of the important dimensions by which data
can be judged suitable for identity-resolution purposes, and exploitable profile elements
may be being missed as a result.
2In addition, few of the methods being designed and published are easily compara-
ble, due to difficulties with obtaining and sharing ground-truth data which necessarily
reflects personally identifiable information about its subjects. Where these methods
have been reproduced, there are indications that methods underperform compared to
original results [84], in part due to the sparsity of real ground-truth data, and in part due
to differences between ‘messy’ raw data and the more idealised datasets used in prior
studies. Attempts to gain a comprehensive understanding of the identifiability of profile
attributes are hindered by these issues.
Such deficiencies in comparative understanding and replication are becoming in-
creasingly critical as identity resolution matures as a research area. The use of these
technologies by law enforcement relies upon their methodology being defensible in a
court of law, which requires in the long term comparative standards of evidence and
reproducible results. More broadly, identity-resolution technologies relate directly to
privacy risk for social network users, and being able to prioritise and quantify privacy-risk
behaviour in a reliable manner could be critical to preventing harm.
The central position of this thesis can be understood as being that, ongoing develop-
ments notwithstanding, the field of identity resolution will be hindered until the problems
of data quality – in both theoretical understanding and practical quality control – are
properly addressed.
As an illustration of some of the potential applications of this work, consider the
following motivating identity resolution scenarios:
1. A police officer has a suspect for a physical crime such as theft or vandalism.
In questioning, the suspect has presented activity on one of their friends’ online
accounts as an alibi. The officer is suspicious that this activity is misleading, and
wants to check other online accounts from this individual to see whether they
corroborate the story or provide evidence contradicting it. They don’t want to
give said individual the chance to hide any such evidence. Simply searching for
the name on the given profile brings up a large number of profiles on other social
networking services. What should the officer compare between the volunteered
3profile and these hits, to find the right individual? More broadly, what should a
tool being built to support this activity do to handle this problem, and which social
networking sites should it target?
This is a one-to-many identity resolution problem. There are a number of possible
online services on which the individual in question might hold an account, and
they may hold multiple accounts, or conversely may not necessarily hold any.
2. An administrator of an online community is looking to identify potential disruptive
elements in their large user-base. They have a database of profiles for known
misbehaving users from another online community, and want to match any of
their own community’s profiles that appear to belong to the same individuals, to
flag them for monitoring. What are the important features they should compare
between their own data and the misbehaving profiles from their competitor?
This is a many-to-many identity resolution problem. While the number of datasets
to search is constrained, there are multiple profiles that may have multiple matches
in the community database.
3. A credit rating agency is tasked with identifying documents and debts associated
with an individual, based on a few personal details, across a range of databases stor-
ing records of debt and financial obligations. This check could well be instigated
by the subject themselves, aiming to verify a particular claim about themselves
(e.g., that they have no debts) to a third party. Which details should the agency
value most for performing this matching?
4. A maintainer of a university department’s internal bibliographic database is up-
dating their system and merging records with the institution-wide database. They
need to identify which authors in both datasets are the same individuals. How can
they understand which fields are likely to be useful for this matching? Which fields
should they make mandatory in their new system to best preserve the linkability of
the dataset in the future?
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5. A corporation’s HR department is performing a review of staff security habits.
They are concerned about staff use of social media, and want to compare the
internal staff directory to online social media and see whether any of their staff are
visibly engaging in risky security behaviours. There are a large number of staff, so
they want a program to attempt identity resolution between the staff records and
online profiles, and then report on security risks. How can this tool best choose
which features to use and online networks to check? How can the tool judge which
profile attributes carry the most ‘risk’, to feed back into policy guidance?
It should be noted that these motivating scenarios are not what is known as adversarial.
That is, specifically, they do not assume that profile owners are attempting to disguise a
connection between profiles (e.g., using different names, pictures, etc.). Nor, however,
are the subjects attempting to help identity resolution – the purposes for which it is
being applied are not in all cases aligned to their interests, and in some cases may well
be contrary to their interests. The area addressed is a broad spectrum lying between
the cases where identity resolution is voluntary, and subjects might willingly provide
connections, and where it is undesirable and they are able and/or precognisant enough
to act to prevent it. In the first two examples, the profile owner would likely benefit
from such an action, but are unlikely to have anticipated the need, or found it pressing
enough to outweigh other benefits from non-adversarial use of social platforms. The
methods discussed in this thesis could well be adapted to adversarial use cases (e.g.,
amongst professional criminals’ profiles on underground fora) but particular attention
would have to be paid to potential differences from general population identity resolution,
and different data sources would be required as a basis of estimates.
1.1 Limitations of the State of the Art
A broad survey of data mining for law enforcement purposes, presented in Section 2.1,
suggests that technology and methodology for handling online identities – such as
linguistic de-anonymisation through authorship attribution methods – is one of the most
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fruitful areas for practically assisting security efforts. This review also suggests that
methods combining different data types (such as text, images, video, and structured data
from online social networks) may be relatively scarce in the context of direct application
to law enforcement. As online social networks (OSNs) are of large and growing interest
to law enforcement, and present a broad selection of heterogeneous data types as features,
this area is of particular interest.
Further investigation reveals a number of works which do integrate multiple data types
in this form of OSN identity resolution. However, this research area appears hampered
from fully forming as a research community. Novel methodologies are proposed and
evaluated for identity resolution, but these results are rarely comparable to prior work.
This limitation stems in part from a lack of reliable ground-truth data sources, meaning
that most authors use different sources, which are rarely available to others at a later date.
A resulting lack of replication efforts leads to a reduced reliability of published results
on ‘real’ identity-resolution datasets with realistically challenging candidate sets and a
high incidence of missing profile data [84, 222].
Most importantly, however, few if any publications working on identity resolution
in modern web data show an awareness of the foundational theories of probabilistic
record linkage, for the most part positioning their work in a general context of machine
learning classification problems. Much of the work exists in isolation, with methods not
only failing to compare with alternatives attempting the same goal, but lacking even a
framework for expressing results about the identification value of approaches in the same
language as other work.
It is at these areas of identity resolution – the practical and theoretical grounds that
are hampering the cohesion and comparison of valuable research – that this thesis aims
its contribution.
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1.2 Thesis Objectives
A solution to the ground-truth problem in identity resolution
Identity resolution research is being hampered by a lack of readily-available ground-
truth data which can be shared between researchers. All identity-resolution datasets
by definition contain personally identifiable information, and the scale required for
developing reliable methods does not permit the solicitation of individual consent for its
release. This thesis will approach the problem from the perspective of sampling theory,
aiming to show that certain sampling methods can resolve this conflict by allowing
researchers to draw comparable samples from social networks.
A model enabling comparative assessment of the identification value
of all common profile attributes
The lack of a common framework for understanding the identification value of profile
attributes is a hindrance to identity resolution research, with results left in isolation,
improperly comparable. This thesis will build up an abstract model of online profile
attributes, and develop a model for understanding the value of each attribute, along with
initial estimates of the values of these attributes, grounded in both the available literature
and original measurements. An additional target of exploration is understanding the
value of attributes for the purposes of applying identity resolution to some particular task,
(such as, for example, identifying a company’s employees in online social media), an
activity which raises related but distinct concerns.
Improving the reliability of identity resolution methods on real datasets
Drawing upon these measurements, this thesis explores how concrete gains in perfor-
mance and reliability might be obtained. One data quality problem of significance for
identity resolution is missing data in data sources such as social networks. An exami-
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nation of missing data mitigation strategies was carried out, complemented with novel
methodology which is drawn from domain understanding of data quality measures.
1.3 Approach & Contributions
It is the contention of this thesis that knowing how to measure certain qualities of personal
profile information, and thus compare and contrast different identity-resolution systems,
is of paramount importance. Armed with knowledge about the important qualities of
profile attributes and their similarity measures, researchers can create measurements
for their populations of interest, find profile attributes which are useful features, build
upon insights drawn in each others’ papers, and produce more accurate and reliable
identity-resolution systems. In turn, these more reliable approaches would improve the
accuracy and reliability of security and privacy research relying on such systems.
Survey of data mining research for law enforcement
To situate this thesis in the wider context of data mining for security practice, a literature
survey is carried out. Following recent adoption in software engineering, which mirrors
longstanding conduct in medical research, this survey is carried out as a systematic
study, with a reproducible method. Further background material pertinent to this thesis is
surveyed in a more traditional manner.
Matching schema
To begin understanding the value of information in online profiles, it is first important to
understand what types of information even exist in the relevant population. Accordingly,
this thesis presents a well-grounded matching schema for online profile information.
Coming to a standardised model of what information might be found in online profiles
is not necessarily a simple task, given the broad and rapidly-evolving nature of social
media. An inclusive approach is taken, drawing a schema from multiple highly-ranked
websites which might contain user profiles, referred to hereafter as profile networks.
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Data quality measures for identity resolution
The schema is then used as a basis for applying and grounding six key data quality
measures. The first three of these – the availability, consistency and uniqueness of
information items – are based on developments of fundamental theory in the related
statistical field of record linkage, and relate directly to the value of information for the
purpose of resolving identities. The full definitions and background to each measure are
developed in the relevant chapters, but in brief:
• Availability is the degree to which the presence of an information item on profile
networks can be expected.
• Consistency reflects whether a given user presents the same value for this informa-
tion item across different profile networks.
• Uniqueness reflects the diversity of values that an information item might take in a
population.
Data quality measures for identity resolution applications
The remaining three, the novelty, veracity and relevance of information, measure the
value of information for the end purpose of any particular identity-resolution system.
They are developed in a separate chapter, with a case study to demonstrate application.
Again, in brief:
• Novelty brings in the question of context, valuing information based on contrast to
a prior set of information.
• Veracity measures how likely it is that this item is accurate as it pertains to the
person who made the profile.
• Relevance refers to the usefulness of an information item to the end-goal of an
attempt at identity resolution.
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Sampling ground truth data
In addition to addressing the value which can be ascribed to profile attributes, this thesis
makes other contributions to improving the comparability and reliability of data for
identity-resolution systems. The first focuses on the notable data-collection and sharing
obstacle within the field, where a solution is proposed based on comparable sampling
strategies from ground-truth resources. By providing a common reference point for
ongoing research, results can be more readily compared.
Handling missing data
The second practical contribution focuses on an aspect of data processing which is often
overlooked – the handling of missing data. The profile data used in identity resolution
is often high-dimensional, and real-world data from social networks routinely presents
missing values. Naive approaches to handling this data are likely to bias results and reduce
reproducibility in application. This thesis provides an exploration of mitigation methods,
including novel approaches grounded in the previously developed measurements of the
domain.
In combination, these contributions aim to improve both the core understanding of
identity resolution, and the standard of replication and comparability within the field.
1.4 Structure of this Thesis
From this point on, the thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 presents a summary of the systematic survey which situates the field within identity
resolution, followed by an overview of the field of identity resolution. This starts
with relevant background in the field of probabilistic record linkage and works up
to the modern day applications in an online social networking context, highlighting
contributions which move towards an understanding of information value.
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Chapter 3 tackles the problem of data collection and sharing, covering the situation facing
identity-resolution researchers and proposing and evaluating a solution.
Chapter 4 forms the core of the thesis, and sets out the basis for the availability, consistency
and uniqueness quality measurements, followed by a common schema for online
profile information, and concluding with detailed literature-based estimates and
original measurements of these properties.
Chapter 5 then addresses the problem of missing data in identity resolution, and makes
use of the measured attribute properties to generate a novel solution, alongside
observations about trialled mitigation approaches.
Chapter 6 outlines the novelty, veracity and relevance measures and applies them to a partic-
ular application in social engineering vulnerability detection.
Chapter 7 concludes by discussing the impact of this approach to privacy preservation, and
outlining directions for future work.
1.5 Publications Emerging from this Thesis
All work presented in this thesis, unless otherwise indicated, is that of the author. Some
of the work presented in this thesis has been previously published in various venues, with
occasional support from other authors, as described below.
1. The matching schema for online profile information, described in Chapter 4,
Section 4.3, has been previously published under the title A service-independent
model for linking online user profile information [68], by the author and his
supervisors.
[68] Edwards, M., Rashid, A., and Rayson, P. (2014). A service-
independent model for linking online user profile information. In
Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE Joint Intelligence and Security Informat-
ics Conference, pages 280–283. IEEE Computer Society.
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2. The systematic survey of literature pertaining to data mining for security informat-
ics purposes, described in Chapter 2, Section 2.1, has been previously published
under the title A systematic survey of online data mining technology intended for
law enforcement [69], by the author and his supervisors.
[69] Edwards, M., Rashid, A., and Rayson, P. (2015). A systematic
survey of online data mining technology intended for law enforcement.
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 48(1):15.
3. The sampling mechanism to enable replication in identity resolution studies, de-
scribed in Chapter 3, has been previously published under the title Sampling
labelled profile data for identity resolution [70]. Alongside the author and his
supervisors, Dr. Stephen Wattam provided insight and statistical expertise in
evaluating the methodology.
[70] Edwards, M., Wattam, S., Rayson, P., and Rashid, A. (2016).
Sampling labelled profile data for identity resolution. In Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Big Data. IEEE.
4. The social engineering vulnerability detection case study, given in Chapter 6, is
based on a publication by the author and others, titled Panning for Gold: Automati-
cally analysing online social engineering attack surfaces. The case study relates
to the application described in the paper, and is partially founded on data drawn
from that study, but the paper does not describe the measurement of relevance,
novelty or veracity. The authors Robert Larson and Benjamin Green carried out
and reported on the interviews which ground the relevance items, and Dr. Alistair
Baron was the instigator of the project.
[67] Edwards, M., Larson, R., Green, B., Rashid, A., and Baron, A.
(2017). Panning for gold: Automatically analysing online social engi-
neering attack surfaces. Computers & Security, 69:18–34.
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5. In addition, reporting on the availability of profile attributes, in combination
with an outline of the ACU model, an exploration of the impact of missing data
on identity resolution performance and the development of the a-priori and a-
posteriori models for feature selection, all form a publication which is currently
under review, and may be published while this thesis is under consideration.
Edwards, M., Rashid, A., and Rayson, P. (unpublished). Hunting




This chapter reviews the background to this work from three perspectives. In Sec-
tion 2.1 immediately below, a report is made of a systematic survey of data mining
literature targeted at law enforcement professionals, reviewing the problems addressed
and methodology employed, and scoping out areas for valuable contribution within this
broad domain. Having identified such an area in multi-attribute identity resolution, the
chapter continues in Section 2.2 by outlining the foundational background of identity res-
olution as a probabilistic technique, along with an illustrative example of some common
issues in the field. Section 2.3 then concludes with an overview of research from the last
decade or so which approaches identity resolution in the context of the web and social
media, these being the immediate context which this thesis addresses. A short summary
then recaps the chapter and the situation of the thesis against the covered material.
2.1 A Systematic Survey of Security Informatics
This section aims to situate this thesis, which focuses on identity resolution, in the wider
application context of data mining for the support of law enforcement. The increasing
fusion of digital and physical life presents two key challenges to law enforcement
agencies: the population’s online presence means law enforcement must learn to adapt to
crimes taking place only online, and at the same time digital interaction also provides a
valuable evidential resource for officers investigating both physical and online crimes.
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Understanding and connecting identities online emerges as a crucial aspect of this field,
but it is helpful to understand also the methodologies, opportunities and problems across
the domain.
With Internet accessibility widening and ever more crime taking on a digital aspect,
online investigation is becoming a critical tool for law enforcement organisations, and
scientific examination of such processes becomes ever more a key issue.
With manual inspection of online information being labour-intensive and the un-
precedented scale of information online, law enforcement agencies seek to optimise
their surveillance or investigation of online data sources through the use of various data
mining technologies. This behaviour has diverse implications, including raising social
and ethical questions about privacy and the role of state surveillance as well as posing
unique technical challenges for the data mining technologies being employed.
The field of computer science, particularly data mining research, has a key role to
play in shaping the future of these investigations. This section aims to support that role,
by identifying within the literature some open research problems and highlighting a
research agenda for the community at large. While the broader aim is to survey the
literature for gaps, guiding questions were developed to help target the extraction of
information:
1. What are the problems (crimes, investigative requirements) which are being ad-
dressed in the literature?
2. Which online data sources are being used?
3. What are the methods (data mining techniques) which are being employed to
provide solutions?
4. Are studies making use of multiple data sources?
5. Are studies validating their contribution’s utility to law enforcement practitioners?
These questions are answered through a comprehensive search for and evaluation of
peer-reviewed computer science studies concerning the mining of digital data sources for
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law enforcement purposes. The study is aimed at examining the visible state-of-the-art
with regards to both techniques and the criminal activities being addressed.
Taking inspiration from a recent trend towards evidence-based practice in software
engineering, the survey takes the form of a systematic mapping study (SMS), with
the intent of producing a survey which not only covers the available literature and has
replicable results, but also can be methodologically examined for deficiencies.
It is an important part of a review’s design to make clear not only the scope of the
survey, but the intended purpose. The primary concern is that the results of the survey
identify gaps in the published research regarding data mining of online sources for crime
detection or investigation purposes. The results of the study can then be used to inform
ongoing work in this area.
Two terms should be considered as key here. Firstly, the specification of online
data sources, meaning data which can be gathered from examination of Internet-based
sources. This distinction separates this study from other areas of research such as work
which makes use of restricted criminal records or other police databases, as well as
distancing the study from many areas of digital forensics which focus on the investigation
of hard disks or active machine memory. Secondly, the specification of data mining
with application in crime detection. While many data mining methods have plausible
application in this domain, only publications which make an explicit reference to such
employment are considered. For purposes of scope, data mining which is performed for
purely Information Security reasons is excluded, thus leaving aside a mature literature
on Intrusion Detection Systems and related work which has already been surveyed [15].
2.1.1 Method
A systematic literature review (SLR) attempts to provide answers to a specific research
question through a transparent and objective approach to the collection and synthesis
of existing scientific literature on the topic. This method can be contrasted with non-
systematic literature reviews, whose contents may be unrepresentative of a field of
research due to, for example, narrative-driven distortion, where reviewers include only
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papers whose findings support their line of argument; or narrowness of study, where
reviewers are unaware of a large number of relevant publications because they were never
personally exposed to them.
The design of this survey drew heavily on the work of [163], which recommends an
explicit eight-step system to SLRs. Certain key deviations from this procedure adapted
the process to a systematic mapping study (SMS). A description of the main features
of SMSs is provided by [36], but the key distinction between the two types can be
summarised as an SMS being an SLR which aims to more broadly survey the available
literature rather than answer specific research questions.
The search process, carried out between December 2012 and January 2013, was
designed as an automated search, targeting four key computer science publication
databases: IEEExplore, The ACM Digital Library, SpringerLink and ScienceDirect.
In each database, 24 queries were carried out1, as defined in Table 2.1 and the resulting
papers’ metadata collected. In total, 13,246 unique results were collected.
The title and abstract of each result were then examined by a reviewer and classified
as either relevant or irrelevant to the study according to the following criteria. If the
answer to any of these questions was no, then the study was not included.
1. Does the study appear to address or make use of online data — that is, types of data
which may be discovered online (either on the Web or otherwise)? Specifically
excluded are data such as disk images from a crime scene and restricted databases.
1These were identified through a series of pilot searches to determine the relevance and effectiveness
of particular search strings.
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2. Does the study have a stated or heavily implied application in law enforcement,
crime detection, monitoring or investigation? For the purposes of this study, studies
dealing primarily with attacks against computer infrastructure (intrusion detection
systems) are specifically excluded.
3. Does the study appear to have a methodology which involves either fully automated
or machine-assisted processing of data?
Following the screening process, all references were gathered from each of the 116
accepted papers, along with all papers identified by Google Scholar as having cited the
accepted items. These were also put through the screening process above.
Following the search and screening stages, the full text of each accepted paper was
obtained, along with a full citation. Items for which a full text could not be located, those
which turned out to be in a non-English language or which on review of the full text did
not meet the screening criteria, were discarded. This resulted in a final included list of
206 accepted papers. Each paper was examined to answer specific questions regarding its
quality. Each paper was given a value of 0, 0.5 or 1 for each of the following points, with
0 being a negative response, 0.5 being a partial positive response and 1 being a positive
response. The overall quality rating for each item is the sum of its individual scores on
these responses.
1. Does the paper outline its method in a replicable manner?
2. Does the paper make its evaluation replicable?
3. Where evaluation is qualitative, does the evaluation make use of domain experts?
4. Where evaluation is quantitative, is an appropriate statistical assessment of results
carried out?
Alongside the quality analysis, questions related to this review’s main aims were
answered for each paper.
1. What problems are being addressed?
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2. Which data sources are being used?
3. What methods are being employed?
4. Does it make use of multiple data sources?
5. Does it validate the contribution’s utility to practitioners?
All examination was carried out by the same examiner, making use of a predefined
data extraction form made up of these questions. Papers were categorised according to
whether papers were addressing a similar problem and whether they were using the same
methods or data sources.
2.1.2 Papers surveyed
Identification with computer vision
Identification tasks in computer vision mostly rest on visual identity, a troublesome
concept in an environment where a new face – or no face at all – is so simple to obtain.
The majority of the uncovered literature looks at a particular subset of visual identity
– recognising the visual representation of a person in a particular online environment,
such as the game Second Life. The challenges here have significant overlap with the
development of facial recognition systems in general, including automating adequate
pre-processing to find comparable facial images and minimizing the runtime of any face-
matching system. Additional problems are raised by the possibility of ‘different worlds’
where the same person may use a different visual identity, something not generally
possible in the real world. Some authors posit that avatars made by the same person may
be consistent across different services, or in some way connected to their actual visual
appearance, but this appears unproven.
[240] discuss the application of computer vision to the facial recognition of online
avatars, justifying the research topic with reference to criminals and especially terrorist
groups using virtual environments — particularly the online game Second Life — as
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training simulators, and studying two key applications. The first of these involved inter-
reality avatar-to-photograph matching, where avatar faces generated from photographs
were matched against other photographs of the same subject. Off-the-shelf face recogni-
tion technology sufficed here, given that the avatar was generated automatically from an
actual image of the target. While a useful result, this merely suggests that their automatic
avatar generation system preserves key information for facial recognition, and not that
users will do so when crafting their own avatars. Addressing this, the second application
used a collection of actual Second Life avatars and attempted to match different images
of these avatars. The authors discovered acceptable classification accuracy, although
they reported a performance bottleneck in face and eye detection, with significant im-
provement in accuracy coming from manual eye location. A remaining question left
unanswered is whether avatars can be recognised across different digital platforms.
[17] introduce a new method for avatar facial recognition, employing wavelet trans-
forms alongside a hierarchical multi-scale local binary pattern (HMLBP). The authors
build on other developments in this area, including earlier propositions of the use of
wavelet transforms and local binary patterns. The study focuses on re-detecting avatars
from Second Life and Entropia — another online world — from pictures in different
poses. While the results show improvements over earlier work, the method still relies on
correctly-cropped input, achieved in the dataset through manual effort. This hurdle must
be addressed for a completely automated system for detection and recognition of avatar
faces.
[149, 150] both continue with the use of wavelet-based local binary patterns, for
re-detecting avatar faces, but with new variations, one making use of Eigenfaces and the
other making use of directional statistical features. Both experiments re-used the Second
Life and Entropia datasets presented in the previous publications. In the first of these two
publications, the authors mention the design of a fully automated system for addressing
the cropping problem as a target for ongoing work. In the second, the authors include a
comparison of the classification time for a number of leading techniques, an important
consideration for any near-realtime detection and recognition system.
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In summary, this niche area of facial recognition has shown significant development
with regards to the core task of re-identification of avatars from within an online envi-
ronment like Second Life or Entropia. Still awaiting research is meaningful deployment
of these classification systems, with work evaluating automated cropping and exploring
usable interfaces to the online environment appearing on the horizon. In crossing realities,
some initial work evaluating the traceability of the results of automatic avatar generation
has been undertaken (e.g. [240]), but it remains to be seen if links between a user’s
visual appearance and virtual avatar can be determined, or indeed if avatars are consistent
across online environments.
Other computer vision work on identification includes that of [250] and [231]. [250]
focus specifically on image spam — spam emails which make use of text presented
as images in order to avoid text-based filtering techniques. They cluster spam images
by visual features, and report a high success rate with respect to a manually-identified
ground truth. Their approach analyses images for evidence of various types of template
being reused by spammers, as divined by layout, colour and texture. What they do
not report in this paper is whether typical spam filtering, or indeed linguistic analysis,
can be applied to text extracted via optical character recognition. [231] describe a
more general spam-origin toolkit which makes use of website image comparison (from
following links in spam emails) as one tool in its arsenal, alongside WHOIS and IP
lookup information and more typical email attributes such as subject lines. While their
analysis of a researcher-gathered dataset appears to reveal interesting clusters of spam,
and the utility of the website image comparison in particular is demonstrated by all but
one cluster centring on one website image, an evaluation against manually-identified
ground truth would be stronger justification of the method’s validity.
Computer vision and crimes against children
Computer vision’s role in preventing crimes against children is mostly connected to the
recognition of child abuse imagery in an online population of images. This can be either
searching for known child abuse imagery in order to filter it or identify distributors, or else
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identifying new examples. A common problem in the second domain is distinguishing
between ordinary adult pornographic material and images of children in pornographic
context, which is highly visually similar.
[92] present the FORWEB system, which focuses on forensic applications of existing
signature analysis and web-crawling systems, the key motivation of the authors being to
automate the search and discovery process involving networked servers. They clearly
distinguish their approach from established storage media analysis tools like EnCase in
much the same way as this review separates these areas of study. Their file-fingerprinting
scheme aims to identify images based on properties which are much less likely to
be affected by the simple alterations which throw off hash-based file comparisons, and
combined with the spidering bot this becomes a useful tool for detecting known malicious
images. Like all such tools, this relies on the existence of an up-to-date database of known
suspect files (a resource which may in itself bring significant performance overhead) and
does not address the aim of identifying unknown media of a suspect nature.
[99] takes a quite different approach, detailing a method whereby image files are
identified on the network, reconstructed and then classified as either child abuse media
or not by both a machine learning system and an image matching system similar to
FORWEB’s fingerprinting scheme — the intent being that such a system would be
installed on network boundaries to filter child abuse material. Aside from concerns
about network performance, a major weakness of their trial of the system is that for legal
reasons their system only attempted to distinguish between nude and non-nude images,
which is clearly a far easier task than distinguishing child features from adult ones.
This also applies to [220], which opens with a motivation of preventing child abuse,
but in a sudden switch focuses on identifying pornographic video scenes as a proxy.
The paper neither provides an implementation nor an evaluation of the system, merely
outlining methods to be explored.
This more difficult child-recognition task is tackled by [110]. They focus on detecting
child exploitation material on social networks, but contribute an algorithm which could
equally apply to P2P networks. Their skin detection technique is specifically tuned for
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the detection of child skin tones, and they also suggest techniques which help detect
pornographic context. While these proposed methods are indeed critical research areas
for computer vision in child protection, the authors do not provide the results of an
evaluation or even a completed system.
Also attempting this task, [198] aim at detecting child abuse material on the network
level, as an alternative to manually searching suspicious venues or application-layer
networks. Their classification system, consisting of a stochastic learning weak estimator
combined with a linear classifier, was trained and trialled on a sanitised dataset provided
by Candian law enforcement, a rare example of child abuse imagery being available for
training. Notably, the classifier was tested on partial as well as whole images, taking
into account likely fragmentation of images over a network link. While valuable for this
alone, the classifiers being trialled still produced less-than-ideal rates of false positives
for a tool to be deployed at the network level. Estimations of the base rates for child
abuse material versus adult pornography suggest that alerts generated may be mostly
incorrect – though this does not invalidate the utility of the classifier as a tool for network
monitoring, given appropriate human supervision.
Computer vision and threats or harassment
There is a specific use-case for computer vision in detecting visual (as opposed to verbal
or written) forms of harassment in video communication. As these systems are intended
to be deployed on large video-streaming populations, performance is critical to creating
a deployable solution. The particular misbehaviour discussed in these papers has some
particular visual challenges regarding lighting and the potential detection of faces.
[236] outline an unusual problem specific to the anonymous video-pairing site Cha-
troulette – users exposing themselves to strangers. They stress that a considerable
proportion of Chatroulette’s userbase would be classed as minors, and that site policy
on age restriction and obscenity is difficult to enforce due to the anonymous nature of
the service. The authors note that de-anonymising the service could solve this issue,
but would damage one of the site’s key features in the process, and so turn to video-
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analytic approaches for detecting offensive users. Their key observations include that
misbehaving users usually hide their faces, and that misbehaving users’ images differ
from pornographic images in that they often stay partially clothed and only expose their
genitals. Their system therefore focuses on detecting user faces as a key feature in mak-
ing a decision about the probability of misbehaviour, along with a novel skin detection
system which takes into account the abnormal context of webcam images. While they
evaluate their classification accuracy, they do not report on performance speed, an issue
which would appear critical for their problem domain, as extra delay in connection would
impair the appeal of the Chatroulette service.
[48] refine this first approach into a fine-grained cascaded classification solution
which filters out easily disambiguated images earlier in the process for the sake of
efficiency. They also integrate new work on gathering contextual information from
webcam images and a new fusion system for combining probabilities of misbehaviour.
The improved system is evaluated against their older system and other contenders,
showing significant improvement, particularly in regard to the previously unaddressed
matter of classification latency.
Computer vision and terrorism/extremism
A limited deployment of computer vision techniques in counter-terrorism is seen in the
context of the analysis of propaganda videos released by jihadists. The problems they
address are of coding the content of the videos in a pseudo-automated fashion, where
correct identification can be an aide to intelligence work.
[192] present an exploratory study of jihadi videos which attempts to highlight the
research and intelligence need for automatic exploration of jihadi video content, and
produce a tool to support manual coding of videos for this purpose. The results are
demonstrative of the effectiveness of their analysis on a set of terrorist videos and not
that of the performance of their coding toolkit.
[193] provide an extended version of the same research, again with more focus on
the content analysis than on the support tool. In both cases, while the authors’ work
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is presented as a stage towards automated video content analysis, the requirements for
progression from manual intervention are not fully detailed.
Computer vision and financial crime
Computer vision has seen deployment in anti-piracy efforts. The systems in this section
are attempting to detect copies of restricted material from being distributed online by
comparing content to a stored visual fingerprint of pirated material – techniques also
deployed in detecting known child abuse media. The problems addressed in these
publications are primarily infrastructural, attempting to resolve detection efforts with
minimal impact on legitimate traffic.
[97, 248] describe a system for large-scale online monitoring at the Content Distribu-
tion Network level, wherein videos are fingerprinted based on certain visual cues and
compared to a blacklist of pirated material. Their system is particularly notable due to
the fact that it was actually deployed on a large CDN, although the evaluation presented
seems to be from laboratory results rather than real-world performance. Nonetheless, it
would appear that their system is resilient to minor tampering such as is common with
pirated material. Notably for a system to be deployed at a large scale, the performance
overhead is quite significant, with fingerprinting and search time together incurring a 40
second delay, raising questions about usability.
[98] address problems linked to the computational and networking overhead of
this large-scale video processing by deploying server clusters closer to the user in the
content distribution network and distributing tasks between nodes based on proximity
and computational load. This results in reduced processing time as compared to existing
approaches, but still requires well over a minute to perform detection on movie-length
items. It would appear that, despite ongoing work to address this issue, there is scope for
improvement in the efficiency and scalability of video copy detection.
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Other computer vision applications
[95] target the detection of pornography, but do so with reference to illegal or offensive
activity — whether the authors suspect that pornography is illegal, or target illegal
pornography particularly but work with proxy data, is unclear. Their method addresses
not only image recognition, but also the text processing of suspected pornographic web
content, combining this information in their classifier. Their contour-based detection
method appears to perform better than region-based skin detection, specifically with
regard to false positive rates including bikini or face-focused images.
[226] describe existing general-purpose information filtering systems which they
suggest could be used to defend users against various types of information, insult or
crime. A range of methods and systems for information filtering are outlined, but neither
methods nor systems are subject to a great deal of scrutiny. How information filtering
technologies such as those presented can be linked to the prevention of crime is also not
clearly outlined.
SNA and terrorism/extremism
As a set of tools for analysing communities and graphs, social network analysis has seen
particular deployment in counter-terrorism context, where the analysis of groups can be
useful in identifying key nodes and group behaviour. Particularly, it is applied to graphs
which are mined from online forums and blogs, where relationships between individuals
can be determined structurally from links.
[40, 237], focus on mining and analysing online communities in blogs, specifically
communities of blogs frequented by hate groups. These two studies both make use of
the same 28 anti-black blogrings from the Xanga blogging platform. While the studies
include semi-automatic detection of hate groups as a key aim, the selection process
presented relies on manual filtering of search results. A more automated means of
selecting hate groups could aid in making their approach generalisable.
[185], is the first of a number of studies making use of the Dark Web Forum Portal
collection. The authors focus on detecting overlapping communities by using latent
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dirichlet allocation to detect topics, with a positive evaluation on an English-language
forum from the Dark Web Portal. The treatment of networks as allowing members
to be part of more than one community is perhaps a useful model, but whether topics
of conversations reflect actual networks rather than simply ideological leanings is not
clarified.
[131] focuses on the process behind online radicalisation. This work includes a
well-written motivating example, and a review of current theory related to online radical-
isation, but most importantly for this review it also includes a social network analysis
using forum data from two Dark Web fora, one from the middle-east and one from
Europe. Interestingly, the author reports technical issues with a module of the Dark Web
Portal. The analysis suggests that radicalisation is happening between the most involved
members of the community, as identified by several measures of centrality.
[241] gathered discussion data from MySpace, using the DBSCAN algorithm to
cluster topics as points for a social network visualisation tool. While the level of detail
in the description of the algorithm is adequate, the authors’ choice of example in their
demonstration of the tool is the only link specifically to terrorism. Further detail on
what may constitute interesting patterns within the network resulting from their clustered
topics would make the tool’s utility to terrorism investigators clearer.
[171] describe the Dark Web Attribute System which applies content and link at-
tributes to items from the Dark Web collection, calculating measures of technical sophis-
tication for various linked terrorist websites. The evaluation lacks rigour, however, and
doesn’t effectively demonstrate what might well be useful annotation work.
[41] describe the application of SNA techniques as part of a system for identifying
and monitoring terrorists at the ISP level, also advocating their system’s use for targeted
disruption of terrorist networks through identifying key nodes. The paper describes
only a theoretical system and provides no evaluation. Most pressingly for a paper
advocating large-scale surveillance, they include no discussion of the likely rate of false
positives. Their baseline is also likely to be misleading, as they base their threshold of
typical terrorist behaviour on only terrorist content, ignoring the possibility that terrorist
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individuals may access other sites. A more behaviourally sound model of terrorist web
usage would be of use in improving such a system.
[157] describe a method utilising social network analysis for detecting changes in a
group’s behavioural patterns, as observed via email communications. They particularly
highlight homeland security and intelligence applications of this method. They do not
provide an evaluation in this paper, but discuss their ongoing development of a simulated
email dataset for that purpose. As they discuss, their current model does not handle
dynamic social networks such as those they expect in real data, an area which needs
redressing. A key limitation of any such simulation would be its validity as a predictor
of performance on a real email network – it would seem more advisable to work with
real email datasets in developing the analysis methods outlined, even where this means
working with proxy data rather than actual terrorist network data.
[213] analyse YouTube’s social graph to discover extremist videos and communities.
Their system works from a seed list of videos to discover YouTube videos which are
hate speech and users advocating acts of aggression. The authors discuss the network
properties of the connections they found – including the different types of YouTube
network – alongside brief topic analysis of user comments. The main contribution here
is the development of search support tools for an intelligence analyst, adding structure
and ranking content, but there is limited comment on the scope of the approach.
In summary, social network analysis has been applied to a number of terrorism-related
datasets with some success, but current studies tend to present either toolsets which, due
to the nature of terrorist content, often cannot be evaluated easily, or else exploratory
analyses of a particular network which demonstrate some value but do not generalise.
A theme common to a small number of papers has been using topic analysis of text to
better subdivide communities of interest, but it would appear that this approach has yet
to be validated in a meaningful manner.
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SNA and police intelligence
As with terrorist organisations, social network analysis has been applied to online infor-
mation about criminal organisations, often mined from news reports or other unstructured
text documents. This provision provides for opportunities – additional information on
time or space of interactions may be available – but also additional challenges in that
relationships are not necessarily correctly represented in such secondary sources.
[176] provide a case study where link analysis – with links in the form of webpage
co-occurrence – is used to trace a notorious violent criminal, producing link charts
for known members of his gang and related individuals. The method presented relies
on Google search results to identify relevant web pages, which may lead to narrowed
results due to personalisation if countermeasures are not taken. A comparison with other
methods for identifying web sources could prove useful.
[94] provide a review of web mining for input into criminal network analysis, and
propose a framework which integrates the identification of crime hot spots and criminal
communities into the workflow of a web crawling agent. Detail on how the more relevant
tagging modules will be implemented is omitted.
[219] focus on term networks, presenting a novel algorithm for key term extraction,
and presenting a case study similar to that of [176] where news related to a particular
gangster was gathered and mined to describe relationships between gangsters. The term
model presented appears more powerful than simple entity collocation, but the study
presented does not make a convincing case for the utility of this method, demonstrating
only simple relationships as could be found through more traditional means.
From this sample, the area of web mining criminal networks, like terrorism network
analysis, appears to suffer from a lack of rigorous evaluation. Identification of a means
of better evaluating the performance of information-gathering agents such as these could
help focus research efforts. A standard marked dataset suitable for evaluation could be
considered an initial step.
[129] describe attempts to discover the social networks of criminals by mining
spatio-temporal events such as web usage. A detailed explanation of the problem and
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algorithmic approach are given, and the theory is validated against a data set collected
from a university campus’ wireless network. While their system appears technologically
sound and is well-presented, the intended deployment scenario is not clear.
[117] discuss integrating SNA concepts into common digital forensics practice for
investigation of email. The validating case study involves transforming the Enron email
dataset into a form suitable for social network analysis and highlighting key actors from
within that dataset. As the thesis itself acknowledges, social network information is
not ‘hard’ evidence which can be considered directly in court, being instead useful in
guiding further investigation. The analysis of the Enron dataset presented does show
some utility, but it is worth noting that the analyst’s interpretation of results seems likely
to be informed by previous knowledge of the dataset’s context. A blinded study would
mitigate such issues.
[64] makes use of Twitter data and geolocation for building a social network based on
ongoing terrorist events, and then provides a modifiable visualisation to aid interpretation.
Several areas for ongoing development are highlighted, including incorporation of
temporal and sentiment dimensions into the visualisation tool.
[22] theoretically demonstrates a means of detecting hidden friendships — rela-
tionships in a network which are not formal connections. While a potentially valuable
intelligence tool, the paper does not provide an evaluation of this method’s efficacy.
[209] use SNA as part of a range of tools for investigating email data for various
crime-related purposes. The social network analysis component is only one part of the
tool, which is described only very briefly and not evaluated.
[9] describe the process of mining and analysing criminal networks from collections
of unstructured text documents, in an approach which relies on the recognition of named
entities and the detection of prominent communities of connected names. Their approach
was validated in a case study from a real cybercrime investigation, with an instant
messaging database provided by law enforcement and their investigation being compared
to an expert’s manual analysis of the chat logs. It is notable that the analysis was
guided by the researchers’ own identification of suspicious information – while fully
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automated analysis is not necessarily desirable, for purposes of evaluation it is necessary
to distinguish the performance of the support tool from the performance of the authors.
A blinded study with a number of analysis engine users compared to a number of manual
analysis users would provide more objective assessment of their network-mining engine’s
utility.
SNA and cybercrime
[136] focus on the construction of social networks from email and blog data linked
specifically to cybercriminal activity. The paper refers most often to cybercrime as its
motivation, but also to terrorists who ‘upload obscene pictures’. The degree to which
authorship identification techniques were applied is unclear.
[160] apply SNA techniques — as part of a toolkit with other subsystems — to help
identify cybercriminals from email data. They appear to have implemented their system
and even gathered a dataset (Enron) to trial it on, but provide no evaluation in this paper.
SNA and financial crime
[90] address financial crime through application of social network analysis in mining
corporate emails to prevent fraudulent transactions. Taking the approach that data outside
the accounting information system should help protect against fraud involving senior
management figures, they strive to mine both the textual content and social networks of
email data. They provide a competent review of relevant work and use the Enron email
dataset as an illustrative example.
[170] also use SNA in detecting fraud, but as applied to transaction data from online
auctions. Their method, working as a third-party service, applies Markov Random Fields
to model the networks and belief propogation to detect fraud within the network. Their
positive evaluation includes both a synthetic dataset and a transaction dataset scraped
from the popular auction network eBay. A third-party approach such as this would appear
to allow their system to adapt to a number of auction platforms, but with a risk of being
rendered ineffectual by changes to site templates or APIs.
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SNA and identification
[91] turn SNA methods to forensic (i.e. identification) analysis of temporal email data.
The SNA component of this mostly text-mining tool is employed to provide behavioural,
temporal and geographic modelling information. A partial evaluation of a different
module of the toolset is provided using the Enron email database, but the SNA component
is presented merely as a useful analytics and visualisation workbench.
SNA and crimes against children
[77] examine the structure of online child exploitation networks, building networks of
websites based on their links and a set of predefined bad keywords, with the ultimate goal
of identifying the major nodes whose removal would most disrupt online exploitation.
They demonstrate their deployment on four networks crawled from websites identified
through search results, identifying the key nodes through the top 10 values for in-degree
and for severity of content as identified through keywords. They also find that centrality
does not correlate with severity of content, but severe websites were highly linked to
each other, suggesting scope for targeting subnetworks of the most extreme material
where law enforcement resources are scarce.
Information extraction in terrorism and extremism
A variety of information extraction techniques can be applied in analysis of terrorists and
extremism, including topic mining and summarization. Websites and forums frequented
by these groups are particularly rich source of information. The main body of research
tends to focus on either white supremacist groups in the US or Islamic fundamentalists.
[141] describes a system called ProfileMiner for combating cyberterrorism. This
system amounts to an interface or series of interfaces to a database of online information,
the compilation of which is left unspecified but appears to be tied to a commercial
product called MAVIS. No evaluation is provided, nor is it clear whether the interface
was actually constructed rather than simply designed.
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[254] briefly outline the motivation for and design of the Dark Web Portal, a resource
used in several papers addressing information extraction from terrorist and extremist sites.
[255] describe a semi-automated system for collecting and analyzing information on
‘Dark Web’ sites, and apply this to a selection of United States extremist web sites. Their
results and methodology are subjected to an expert evaluation with a positive outcome.
While their automated collection stage (outlined in more detail itself in [253]) appears
effective, their approach to filtering the results of said searches involves manual filtering
of hundreds of URLs followed by a second stage of search to manually bulk out the
results. If value over that of a typical search engine is to be added in a semi-automated
collection and filtering system, it must be to reduce such loads on the analyst. The work
by [42] appears to be linked, in which a case study is carried out to collect and analyse
examples of Arabic fora. The same levels of expert evaluation and manual workload are
evident, suggesting that the only key difference in the two works is the community being
analysed.
[43, 183] take a similar approach in what may be a continuation of the same line of
research. A coding system referred to as the Dark Web Attribute System is developed to
look specifically for signs of technical sophistication and content richness in the design
of the websites of extremist groups. The first paper uses this framework to compare
terrorist sites to those of US government agencies while the second compares the internet
presence of extremist organisations drawn from three geographical regions. The latter’s
detailed analysis of these technical indicators highlights how relatively innocuous details
can be of interest when examined at scale. A combination of this attribute system with
an automatic collection system could prove useful in identifying new groups that show
above-average sophistication, perhaps thus better helping identify key emerging threats.
[81] report on the observed typical behaviours of those holding supremacist or
separatist beliefs, as determined through an examination of 157 purposefully-selected
extremist sites. Their findings include interesting results such as disavowal of racism and
a low rate of direct incitement to violence. The authors also comment on the utility of the
internet to widely-scattered extremist groups. Though their motivation is given in terms
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of extremism generally, their sample appears focused particularly on a certain group of
white supremacist sites, with Islamic extremists appearing only in an ‘Other’ category.
[243] describe how web crawling technology is integrated with NLP techniques to
extract common topics from websites hosted by extremists or terrorists. Though their
evaluation does include an attempt to assess the compactness of topics, a notable problem
with their LDA results is the generation of several reasonably similar topics. A means
of better combining (or representing the distinction between) such groups could be
considered an area for study in the field of topic extraction in general.
[242] relate how a clustering opinion-extraction method targeted specifically at
opinions expressed in online discussion is trialled on a corpus drawn from Myspace,
including discussions about terrorism. Their clustering method attempts to overcome
some limitations with the DBSCAN clustering mechanism, focusing on a distance-
base clustering method. More detail on the TFIDF mechanism by which web opinions
can be represented as a vector of core concepts could help generalise their method to
non-clustering applications.
[114] describe a process of mining hyperlinks from terrorist web pages as part of link
analysis. However, only a simulation of output from a toolkit is provided.
[102] focus on gathering open-source information about terrorism via summarisation
of web-based news articles. Though some details appear obscured by poor translation,
the authors seem to find support for an ontological approach to detection of terrorist
events, comparing this approach to a gazetteer and some form of grammatical parser in
an evaluation on Thai news articles.
Of additional interest to this problem topic and method is an information extraction
tool which is designed for general intelligence use [201]. It makes use of terrorist subjects
as an illustrative case study. The network study of blogging sites [237], which focuses
on extremist hate groups, is also relevant.
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Information extraction and police intelligence
Information extraction can be applied to online sources for intelligence on organised
criminal activity. That the core of this is a collection of web-mining toolkits suggests
common research interest around synthesis of web-based news articles for intelligence
purposes, heavily reliant on named entity recognition techniques, with some recurring
problems including the identification of relevant articles for processing and the reliance
on a domain lexicon for identifying key information.
[80] focus on extracting ‘story’ patterns from web-based news articles as part of open-
source intelligence efforts, with pattern-matching begun by the detection of trigger words
indicating certain events. Their system is demonstrated on a collection of Chinese news
articles on the 2008 Mumbai attacks, but what their published results show is unclear.
Their system’s reliance on trigger words seems to suggest that individual implementation
will either require existing domain knowledge, reducing utility for emerging events, or
else be general terms which may not fully capture specific narratives. The question of
how appropriate news articles are gathered for processing is also critical for deploying
such a system.
[127] focus on extracting crime information – in the form of key phrases – from
narrative reports, which is applied primarily to police and witness reporting, but is noted
for potential application to web news. Similarly to the previous study, their approach
struggles with a scalable system for managing a crime lexicon, which they resolve with
manually-created lists supplemented by dictionary resources.
[14] also describe efforts to gather structured knowledge from web-based news
articles for EU security purposes, clustering articles based on textual similarity and
geographical location, then applying other event extraction tools. There is a lack of detail
on the operation of these tools.
[232] discuss an extension of the Encase forensics toolset to allow analysis of web
pages regarding some form of illegal gambling activity. They attempt to mine not only
entities, but also the relationships between entities, in an unsupervised manner. However,
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their approach to information extraction appears to be overly tailored to their chosen
problem domain for it to generalise to other scenarios. No evaluation is provided.
[201] focus on the problem of gathering novel information about a topic, relative
to a specified set of existing knowledge. They make use of web search engine results
regarding the known topic and use these web pages to form new queries based on
prominent nouns, clustering the results based on descriptive nouns. Their ATHENS
approach is trialled on terrorism topics, but could equally apply to other law-enforcement
or defense uses. Their method for selecting descriptive nouns compares the frequency in
the web pages under review to the frequency in the British National Corpus, a standard
English corpus. While this approach is domain independent, strict comparisons are likely
to lead to spurious noun-phrases being identified, so it would be better to search only for
nouns whose frequency is significantly greater than in the reference corpus in order to
prevent common variations diluting search terms. In the same vein, the BNC relies on
texts now well over a decade old, and is not likely to include a number of now-common
proper nouns. A different reference corpus, perhaps drawn specifically from web sources,
might make a more suitable baseline.
[228] use Twitter as a source of general crime prediction, drawing on automatic
semantic analysis, event extraction and geographical information systems to map crime
hotspots. In an evaluation on actual hit-and-run crime data, their system outperforms a
baseline uniform model. While there may be scope for improvement in the predictive
technique, more interesting developments are likely to be found in modification of the
model for deployment on a streaming Twitter feed. [227] do so, using Twitter data
to model criminal incidents geographically. They apply a spatio-temporal generalised
additive model to a combination of geographical and demographic features of an area
and textual features extracted from the Twitter feed of a news agency, evaluating their
performance against actual crime incidence rates. Their analysis shows that the textual
features provided by the Twitter data improve prediction accuracy as compared to a
previous model only using geographic and demographic information.
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[82] aim at gathering information in extreme events, describing an approach to
open-source intelligence which was applied in an artificial competition environment
(searching for red balloons), and how experiences in the challenge may relate generally
to intelligence-gathering, particularly with regard to false-reporting. Their overview is
high-level and rather specific to their challenge, but includes reference to a number of
techniques and technologies not otherwise captured by this review.
[64] focuses on the detection and analysis of ‘dark networks’, with specific focus on
visualisation tools for handling networks parsed from Twitter and placed by geolocation.
No formal evaluation is provided, but the paper discusses trial usage on real networks of
interest.
[115] look at finding relationships between unstructured law enforcement texts
(emails) and using said relationships to help augment information of interest, analysing
the semantic relatedness of documents and linking identified entities. A demonstrative
application is presented, acting on a sanitized corpus of real law enforcement emails.
Given appropriate consideration of scalability, this information linking tool would appear
to be an impressive resource for augmentation of police intelligence.
Information extraction and crimes against children
Information extraction techniques are sparsely deployed in child protection, mostly aimed
at child sexual trafficking. Their aims include identifying children known to be missing
by monitoring trafficking networks and chatrooms for mentions of their names or other
identifying details.
[224] present an approach to combating the sexual trafficking of children through
examination of open sources such as classified advertisement sites and bulletin boards.
They examine such resources for evidence of trafficking networks and introduce tech-
niques to search for victims under aliases and misspelt names. Though the authors do
not present an evaluation, they discuss ongoing trial deployment, highlighting challenges
specifically related to anonymisation of the toolkit’s interactions with sites to prevent
counter-intelligence, and with scaling their approach to wider monitoring.
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[187] approaches the same problem from a different angle, applying intelligent agents
to identify missing children on the internet by connecting information in open databases
of missing children with web crawling and IRC chat monitoring. The approach was
partially implemented as the SADIE system at the time of publication. The proposed
ecosystem of agents dealing with specific data sources appears flexible, but the exact
means of calculating results’ similarity to a short query – a very key detail for any of the
agents – is left unspecified.
A common theme to both these sexual trafficking technologies is the integration of
information from multiple sources, but both publications appear to focus on different
sources for their information. This may, in part, be due to the large time gap between the
two papers. The SADIE system outlines a high-level approach to multiple data source
integration, but leaves many implementation matters unresolved.
[142] attempt to extract crime information (Who, Where, When, How, What, Why)
from chat logs, drawing on published examples of sexual abuse from adult dating and
scam interactions as their data source. Tokenisation and part-of-speech tagging of the
data is discussed. Classification accuracy results for their crime information categories
are also presented, though how these results were derived is unclear. While mining
instrumental crime information as would fit the given categories could well prove useful
to investigators, the paper does not present a coherent solution for the purpose.
Information extraction and cybercrime
Cybercriminal activity has also been mined from online data sources, the primary source
being fora where they sell or exchange information.
[203] uses an XML framework to mark up relationships extracted from hacker fora,
essentially mapping the social network of said fora for usage by police. The paper
focuses heavily on the choice of technology and representation for the task – XPath
queries on tidied HTML source of the fora – with no real evaluation of the value to law
enforcement. Furthermore, the approach relies on manual exploration of the XPath query
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space for page sources, a process which could, at the least, have been guided through
generated templates.
[257] present a study of the cybercriminal economy on the Chinese web, attempting
to model the extent of this black market and the amount of malicious code involved in
its constituent websites. In addition to these contributions, the authors offer detailed
description of a cybercriminal infrastructure. Their estimation of the value of cybercrimi-
nal assets, and particularly their attempt at breaking down these totals by classification
allows law enforcement and cyber-security vendors to focus their efforts where greatest
impact can be effected.
Additionally, some papers discussed earlier fall into this category.[136] construct
networks of cybercriminal activity from email and blog data while [141] describes a
system designed for fighting cyberterrorism through handling of collected intelligence
sources.
Information extraction and finance
[27] address a financial criminal matter (money laundering) by helping track financial
services through web mining. Their tool crawls the web, identifying online financial
trading sites through a generalised linear model applied to textual features. While
the presented accuracy appears impressive, the results were obtained via an artificially
balanced dataset wherein roughly a quarter of all websites were actually OFT (Online
Financial Trading) sites – a situation which is unlikely to be the case when the system is
deployed on the web generally.
Information extraction and online identification
[7, 19, 256] all cover various aspects of an email de-anonymisation workbench built on a
set of mature UNIX tools. This UnMask toolkit focuses specifically on detecting and
countering spoofing attempts within email messages, examining email bodies and headers
particularly for examples of spoofed links, forms and headers, and storing evidence in a
manner suitable for law enforcement use. Their aim of achieving this through combining
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a variety of pre-existing tools is laudable for its software reuse, but there is a lack of
rigorous analysis of the performance of the anti-spoofing components. The papers,
however, do include a case study demonstrating potential uses of the toolkit during an
investigation.
Other information extraction applications
[32] describe a study aimed at improving the analysis of forensic network traces from
investigations, presenting a high-level packet analysis tool which has been developed
and compared to existing tools, but not formally evaluated.
[11] cover the detection of ‘suspicious’ or ‘deceptive’ emails. They do not provide a
clear definition of what that may mean, but an ominous reference to national security.
They apply a series of classifiers to an insufficiently explained dataset, and report high
classification accuracies, particularly for the IBk decision tree.
Machine learning and online identification
Machine learning techniques have been applied in online identification tasks, often
working with email data, attempting in particular to identify scammers and phishers from
their campaign output.
[8] present the ScamSlam project. It focuses on identifying the common origins
of scams, particularly advance fee fraud, through the use of unsupervised hierarchical
clustering on scam emails detected with a Poisson filter. Their method appears to detect
a small number of scammers (20) sending most of the advance fee fraud messages in a
corpus of 534 such scams, but they are unable to verify this result. It is not clear how
broadly their system may be applied, as the advance fee fraud they focused on has a
fairly large text body, which may be atypical of scam email.
[204] cover the same use-case, but make use of email headers to build clusters of
scam originators using WHOIS data. Using this approach, they identified 12 email
addresses which were key in registering spam-origin domains. Such an approach holds
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benefits in that it may be applied to many scam or spam emails without requiring specific
additional feature in the body of the scam, but also risks vulnerability to email spoofing.
[246] present an approach looking at profiling rather than simply detecting phishing
attacks. Their study makes use of hyperlinks from the body of an email as well as
structural features and WHOIS information in a pair of classifiers. They profile phishing
emails by having the classifiers apply multiple labels to each email regarding the pres-
ence of scripts, images, etc. and the apparent legitimacy of linked sites from WHOIS
information. The strength of the paper lies in its clear formulation of the problem of
profiling phishers rather than merely detecting phishing.
[58] present a combined approach for profiling large volumes of phishing email. The
results of several independent unsupervised clustering algorithms working on a random
subset of a large dataset are combined with a variety of consensus algorithms and, in
turn, used to train a number of fast classification algorithms for use on the whole dataset.
This approach of using unsupervised clustering to prime supervised clustering would
appear to work well for classification of emails into clusters detectable in the training set,
but may suffer in a deployment where new clusters of phishing email begin to appear.
The other identification studies using machine learning more generally address
the identification of criminals from email data. The approaches discussed below are
somewhat unusual as compared to the more standard classifiers discussed in the later
NLP section, but contain some overlap.
[108] make use of an existing speaker recognition framework from the field of speech
processing in an attempt at authorship analysis, using several classifiers. The frame-
work is evaluated against the Enron email dataset with results indicating a competitive
approach, although the requirement of 200 training emails per author is not insignificant.
[195] explores the application of associative classification to authorship attribution of
text, in an approach which requires the extraction and amalgamation of rules. However,
the system performs poorly on a multi-author dataset, with a best classification accuracy
of 50% on only 10 possible authors.
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[205] covers authorship attribution in a trial dataset of an online newsletter. The
approach uses classifier ensembles, demonstrating how a range of diverse classifiers can
be constructed through exhaustive disjoint subspacing, and showing that the approach
outperforms a simple SVM model using word frequencies. The author goes on to enhance
the model with a cross-validated committees technique.
Machine learning and terrorism and extremism
Machine learning is deployed both in detecting terrorism-related activities and in identi-
fying terrorists from their online footprint.
[49] explore microblogging within the terrorism informatics domain. They perform
an observational analysis of the Twitter network’s response to two real-life terrorist events,
and use this as inspiration for the design of an information-gathering framework. They
later apply the framework to a synthetic dataset of events which share some properties
with terrorism events. They also apply a variety of common machine learning analyses
to their dataset in an exploratory manner.
[191] link streams of Twitter data to other resources through Open Data mechanisms.
They apply named entity recognition to the content of Tweets. They mention the terrorism
domain, their aim being to allow for structural links to entities to be be imposed on
unstructured Twitter data to better allow law enforcement to parse and respond to events
detected via Twitter. However, the implementation of this is relegated to future work.
[161] evaluate a number of machine learning methods (the ID3 decision tree algo-
rithm, logistic regression, Naive Bayes and SVM) for the purpose of detecting suspicious
emails. As well as developing a terrorism-related email dataset for the purposes of
this comparison (including real messages gathered from newsgroups), they develop a
feature selection system that provides consistent improvement to the results of all of
the tested classifiers. They report that for their application, logistic regression and ID3
outperformed the Naive Bayes and SVM classifiers.
[197] use a qualitative formalism as the basis for a fuzzy analysis, applying this
to link analysis and the determination of aliases. They evaluate their system against
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unspecialised unsupervised learning systems on a constructed terrorism dataset gathered
from web articles, an author publication dataset (DBLP) and an email dataset. Their
system appears to outperform a number of similar link-based algorithms.
[71, 72] employ web usage data to identify terror-related activities, training a classifier
on the web usage of ordinary users and a collection of known terrorist web sites. The aim
is to deploy a system which monitors the web access of users (at an ISP or organisational
access provider level) and raises alerts whenever a user accesses abnormal content. The
civil liberty implications of such a mass-monitoring system could rightly be challenged,
but more practical issues may prevent adoption. Their detection system reached an AUC
of 91% on their experimental dataset, rising to 99.7% with additional components. Given
the large number of normal users and relatively tiny number of real, detectable terrorist
usages of actual networks, even such a classifier would produce an unreasonable volume
of false alerts for every true event it captured. This issue is not unique to the work of
these authors, but applies to all systems of this kind. Nonetheless, these two papers
consist of a coherent description of the development of a high-performance classifier for
web usage data.
[218] suggest a self-organising map approach to classifying web users from usage
data. They provide no evaluation or appraisal of their proposed system, and indeed
minimal description of its proposed operation.
[73] have developed what they term an intelligent search procedure for webmining
cyber-terrorism information, feeding a vector representation of 600 articles, half related
to cyberterrorism, into a self-organising map, the results of which they then briefly
dissect. Their presentation of the SOM as a heat-coloured grid seems ill-suited for law
enforcement analysts.
[244] focus on identifying extremist content in social media sites, drawing their design
inspiration from biological immune systems. They build a mathematical representation
of lymphocytes which incorporates lexical, sentiment and syntactic features of text as a
precursor to a semi-supervised classification system. In an evaluation of this system on
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violent messages scraped from a white supremacist web forum, their system outperformed
two benchmark labelling systems.
Machine learning and harassment
Machine learning can be deployed to detect threatening textual communications, the aim
in most cases being to produce a classifier which separates threatening messages from
normal communication.
Appavu and Rajaram [10] compare a decision tree classifier with SVM and Naive
Bayes classifiers, using two email corpora and two different feature selection mechanisms
(information gain and term frequency variance). They find decision trees to outperform
SVM and Naive Bayes in detecting examples of threatening email. A follow-on pa-
per [12] repeats this analysis, but includes the Ad Infinitum algorithm, which outperforms
the other methods. [21] later revisit this work, looking also at the detection of threatening
emails. The authors compare the data of Appavu and Rajaram to their own Naive Bayes
approach, which makes use of different features (single and multiple keywords as well as
weighted keywords with context matching). Measuring the accuracy of results with the
F1-score rather than simple percentage accuracy, they find that their weighted multiple
keyword system with context matching performs in a manner competitive with the better
methods from Appavu and Rajaram’s analysis. They do not make a direct comparison
due to the different datasets underlying results, but a review of F1 scores indicates that
some of the methods presented by Appavu and Rajaram may be better classifiers.
[239] identify emotions common in cyber-bullying, and develop a training procedure
to help recognise these emotions from text without reference to a labelled training set.
They evaluate their zero-label-trained SVM system on a labelled Wikipedia corpus,
finding that it has lower cross-validation error than three baseline methods. They also
apply it to Twitter traces involving bullying, finding that only a relatively small proportion
of said traces showed emotion, and that where emotion was detected it did not necessarily
reflect severity or sincerity. [247] instead focus on a supervised learning approach to
detecting cyber-bullying, using term frequency as a primary measure, and supplementing
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it with sentiment and contextual features. Their model performs fairly poorly on their
web datasets, with the best F1-measure accuracy being less than 50%.
[225] take inspiration from biological immune systems in much the same manner as
[244], also integrating term frequency into their mathematical adaption of it. Though
they claim ‘good results’, there is no evidence of any evaluation.
[196] turn to a more conventional Naive Bayes classifier, testing it on a small corpus
and a bag-of-words feature set which appears to be extended with some user-level
attributes. The presentation is somewhat ambiguous, describing classification rules for
detecting a ‘threat’ class of message, but presenting classification results for ‘movie’
‘food’ and ‘travel’ topic classes, none of which are alluded to a-priori.
Machine learning and crimes against children
A small number of rule-based systems have been generated to help with detecting
predators in textual exchanges.
[93] present a knowledge-based system for detecting sexual predators, with a Naive
Bayes subsystem with reasonable classification accuracy. Interestingly, their hand-coded
rules for predator characterization were originally written in and for Spanish, but were
automatically translated to apply to English, and appear to still be effective in identifying
the main predation phases.
[144] compare previously-developed rule-based classifiers to decision tree and a
k-nearest neighbours classifiers. They find that the machine learning systems improve
classification of predation when working with specific transcripts, but fail to reject the
null hypothesis in a more general case comparison against their rule-based system. The
average accuracy of their rule-based classifier is 68%.
[174] move away from rule-based systems, applying and combining two separately-
trained SVM classifiers in a weighted manner. They achieve an F1-score of 0.9 for the
task of classifying authors as predators, but much lower accuracy for detecting specific
grooming posts.
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Machine learning and financial crime
[148] use SVMs and Random Forests to detect advanced fee fraud scams in an email
dataset. They report high classification accuracy on a synthetic dataset where roughly
a third of all mail was advanced fee fraud messages, and find that their SVM classifier
outperformed the Random Forests classifier. An evaluation more comparable to real
deployment base rates would be preferred.
[223] focus on click fraud prevention using web usage data. They detail a multi-level
data fusion mechanism which takes input from a click map module, an outlier detection
module and a knowledge-based rule module, and stores levels of suspicion regarding
specific IP addresses, referrers and countries. They provide a detailed analysis of the
results of their system as applied to publicly-available click-through data.
[27] track online financial services through web mining, gathering textual features to
reach conclusions about the probability of a site being an online financial transaction site.
Their evaluation against human subjects shows demonstrable benefits in terms of speed,
and generally high precision.
Machine learning and police intelligence
[51] studies appropriate machine learning systems for categorising temporal events col-
lected from web data. Using a case study involving web articles related to an incident of
domestic terrorism, the performance of Naive Bayes, SVM and neural network methods
at applying temporal group labels across a range of feature set sizes is demonstrated. The
results show that while all three systems performed in a satisfactory manner, SVM and
Naive Bayes increased in accuracy as the number of features increased, while the neural
network peaked at 70 features.
[211] describe the application of a general-purpose email-mining toolkit to be-
havioural analysis, with a case study in detecting viral emails in an archive of the
emails provided by 15 users. The system performs well when introduced to sudden
and abnormal flows, but struggles to detect slow campaigns for the delivery of email.
The degree to which virality can sensibly be detected from such a small user corpus is
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debatable. The paper also provides a lengthy demonstration of the overall capabilities of
the email-mining toolset.
Other machine learning applications
[62] approach the problem of pornographic web page identification with two classifier
components. One component classifies web pages into various predefined categories,
which can then be used to filter these web pages from access. The other component
analyses the behaviour of users with respect to the category of sites accessed. They test
their system – with a variety of classifiers – against commercially-available web filters,
and find that their best classifier outperforms them.
[217] focus on the effect of pornography on young people as their motivation. They
note failures of strict rule-based and keyword-based systems for filtering undesirable
information, and propose a system which gathers a broader range of features from a page
to assist in classification. They do not evaluate the performance of this proposed system.
[132] attempt to detect abnormal patterns of email traffic using a hierarchical fuzzy
system. They develop three different system architectures, and trial these systems on a
selection of threads from the Enron email dataset, finding that all three agree with each
other in the ranking of abnormality of communication links. Whether such a test holds
external validity is hard to determine.
[25] apply machine learning to recognise the traits of key actors in hacker commu-
nities. Their regression analysis of the social structure of hacker fora from the United
States and China, determines that involvement in a number of threads, total message
volume and number of attachments uploaded are the major factors which explain the
reputation score of members of the community. While the paper focuses on cybercrime
as a domain, its results could be said to apply more to certain online forum communities,
of a criminal or otherwise nature.
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Authorship attribution and online identification
Authorship attribution is naturally tied closely to the problem domain of online identifica-
tion, and a wide range of techniques have been applied on a number of datasets. Typical
problems for such studies include deciding upon the most appropriate feature set to use
in classification, and finding appropriate methods for different data sources. Other for or
highly related to this field include authorship verification, authorship similarity detection
and stylometric comparison, with different clusters focusing on either the conflation
of author identities or the assignment of specific texts to an author, but the technical
challenges of both tasks are expressible within the same framework.
[138] apply authorship attribution specifically to phishing emails, aiming to cluster
messages based on othographic features using an adapted form of the K-means algorithm.
They reason that the semantics of phishing emails are often too similar to be useful for
disambiguation. They provide an evaluation on a collection of 2048 known phishing
emails, with several differing initial parameters for their clustering algorithm and grad-
ually refined feature sets. While their method appears to produce reliable clusters, a
validated dataset would be useful for verification purposes.
[59] make use of both structural and linguistic features and an SVM classifier. They
validate their approach on a collection of emails to particular newsgroups, finding high
accuracy in most cases. They additionally investigate the use of word collocation and the
dimensionality of function words in a bid to improve classification accuracy. However,
this does not improve performance.
[252] compare decision trees, neural networks and support vector machines on a
corpus drawn from English email messages and both English and Chinese BBS postings.
The best results are for SVM classification of the English newsgroup postings, with
neural network performance lagging slightly behind. They note a drop in performance
in their Chinese dataset, which they ascribe to fewer style features for that language.
A follow-up paper [251] makes use of an extended set of features and the same set of
classifiers, again finding that the SVM classifier outperforms the C4.5 decision trees and
the neural network.
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[53] also covers the reduction of authorship attribution to a pattern of certain writing
features, applying this approach with an SVM classifier to public-domain books, theses
and the author’s own email collection, with good results in each case. The results show
that function words appear to make the best features.
[216] suggest the use of an SVM classifier for authorship attribution on emails,
explaining the operation of the classifier and listing some structural features of email
which might be useful, but providing no evaluation. Given the prior existence of work
such as [59], this would appear to be of at best explanatory value.
[205] explores authorship attribution via an ensemble of SVM classifiers and a feature
set subspacing approach. Exhaustive disjoint subspacing is compared with the k-random
classifiers method of ensemble construction, finding that the former outperforms the
latter and also outperforms an SVM classifier when small subset sizes are chosen.
[206] covers the class imbalance problem in authorship attribution, where the volume
of available training text for some candidate authors is extremely low. A new method
for handling imbalanced datasets through variable-length sampling of training data is
presented. The method is compared against a re-sampling variant to the existing under-
and over-sampling methods, making use of both English and Arabic datasets. The results
show that the method resulting in the best net improvement to the accuracy of an SVM
classifier trained on the resulting training set is the random re-sampling of text from the
available training data.
[3] provide a useful review of the state-of-the-art and go on to demonstrate a classifi-
cation method which makes use of individual author-level feature subsets from a large
feature space. They compare this method to an SVM classifier with a feature set drawn
from previous literature and to an ensemble of SVM classifiers with an extended feature
set, using a range of online text forms (the Enron email dataset, eBay comments, posts
from an online forum and chat logs). Their system outperform both competitive methods
on the email, comment and chat datasets, but not on the forum messages, where the
ensemble of SVM classifiers performed best. Alongside the identification experiment,
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they also distinguish the task of detecting similarity, and perform a similar evaluation for
that purpose, finding their method outperforms the competitive baseline methods.
[56] focus particularly on blogs, covering the ethical debate over why bloggers may
legitimately seek anonymity, and why law enforcement may wish to circumvent this
barrier of anonymity. The paper covers technical approaches to stylometry only briefly
and at a high level. [63] explores the same topic with more technical detail, creating
a baseline model of authors based on frequency of characters and words, and using
individual deviation from this baseline as the features for classification. Both Naive
Bayes and SVM classifiers are evaluated, finding low average accuracy across all authors,
but that certain authors were extremely well-predicted.
[135, 137] focus on applying authorship attribution to Chinese online texts. The first
paper focuses on authorship attribution in email, covering issues such as the lack of
explicit word boundaries in Chinese text and the selection of sequential patterns from
texts, passing said patterns to an SVM classifier. In their evaluation they provided 30
training examples for three authors, and had 20 further emails classified as belonging
to one of these three authors, with a classification rate of 90%. In the second paper, the
authors also apply their classifier to blog and BBS messages, drawing a comparison
between three classifiers, one of which uses linguistic features, another which uses
structural features, and one which uses both. They find the classifier using the combined
feature set outperformed the others, though they all performed at above 65% accuracy.
They also examine the effect of varying the number of authors to classify texts, finding
that larger numbers of authors caused accuracy to drop.
[104–107] all address authorship attribution through frequent pattern mining. The
first of the publications focuses on the notion of frequent patterns as a means of ensuring
the forensic worth of authorship attribution techniques, objecting to the lack of intuitive
explanation in an SVM classifier. They use a combination of lexical, syntactic, structural
and content-specific features in their method, detecting frequent writing patterns in an
author’s text and filtering out frequent patterns which are common to a large number
of authors. They validate the viability of their method in an evaluation on the Enron
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email dataset. In the second publication, the authors use standard clustering algorithms to
group texts together as a prerequisite to mining frequent patterns for author identification.
They examine the accuracy of the resulting output as a means of evaluating which
clustering mechanism is best-suited to the task, again using the Enron email dataset
as a source. The third publication presents frequent-pattern writeprints as a ‘unified’
solution to authorship analysis. The authors describe use cases involving small and
large training samples, and also extend their system to discovering characteristics of an
author. The evaluations on the Enron email dataset are repeated, and alongside these
results a trial of the characterisation application is carried out. The results show that
for gender prediction the approach performs slightly better than random assignment,
and for location prediction, with three classes, it again performs with accuracy slightly
above that which one would expect for random assignment. Finally, [104] combines this
research into one volume, providing greater detail on the difference in approach between
two versions of the classifier, with extensions covering somewhat separate problems of
extracting cliques and topics from chat logs.
[164–166] cover authorship analysis on instant messaging communications. The
first publication focuses on examining character frequency as a stylometric feature,
examining the frequencies of characters in a small four-author dataset and testing for
whether frequency of characters is distinct. The results show that uppercase characters,
numbers and special characters are distinguishing and may be used as a form of intrusion
detection system. In the second publication, the authors analyse what appears to be the
same dataset, but with an extended range of features, including sentence structure and
pre-defined sets of special characters. They apply three classifiers – the J48 decision tree,
the IBk nearest neighbour classifier and a Naive Bayesian classifier – to these features,
and find a high accuracy in each case, though given the sample size this would not be
unexpected. They analyse the distinguishing features and find that abbreviations are the
best discriminators, followed by the use of special characters. In the final publication,
the authors expand their evaluation to include two larger datasets, examining the useful
features for accurate classification in each system, and using different classifiers. They
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find high accuracy with an SVM classifier trained on a range of 356 features, including
lexical and syntactic features as well as the previously-used structural and frequency
attributes. On a dataset of 105 authors, they achieve 84.44% accuracy.
[130] cover a particularly constrained form of authorship attribution which is particu-
lar to online discourse – attribution of Tweets to their authors. They detail the structural
properties of Tweets and present a preliminary analysis of the viability of attribution
using Tweets. They find classification accuracy of approximately 60% for 20 training ex-
amples, and highlight that adding training Tweets increased accuracy up to 120 examples,
after which increases appear not to be significant.
[46] apply a frequent-pattern mining approach on the Enron email dataset. Writeprints
– consisting of numeric representations of the relative frequency of stylistic features
extracted from an author’s text – are constructed and then compared in order to determine
whether authors are similar enough to be the same. They compare SVM, PCA, K-NN,
DT and K-means approaches, finding SVM to have superior classification accuracy.
[118] uses a bag-of-words model of email bodies and applies a Naive Bayes ensemble
method to attribute emails drawn from the Enron email corpus. The method chieves a
respectable classification accuracy, outperforming previous work on the same dataset,
but it does perform best when given messages over 100 words, which slightly limits
application to online texts.
[172] cover the detection of ‘authorship deception’, which includes both a normal
attribution use case and an imitation attack whereby authors attempt to imitate the writing
style of a victim. Their method involves building a writeprint of stylometric and content
features, and applying logistic regression as a classifier. Evaluation on a blog dataset
shows good performance in the classic attribution case, and a small evaluation of the
imitation case shows highly positive results.
[134] attempt to address issues with the difficulty of writeprint comparison through
a novel semi-random subspace method, which also aims to overcome redundancy in
feature sets. A detailed description and theoretical analysis of the methodis provided,
followed by an empirical evaluation on a subset of a large English corpus, displaying
2.1 A Systematic Survey of Security Informatics 52
accuracy results with regard to both the number of authors and the number of texts
available per author. In all cases they compare their method to other well-performing
classifier ensembles, with a positive result.
Given that the aims and methodologies of many authorship attribution papers tar-
geting identification are comparable, results and methods from various studies may be
contrasted with each other. Table 2.2 gives an overview of some of the best results
from each paper, noting the dataset and number of classes being attempted. Important
additional information including length of texts used, texts per author, and features used
in classification are all left to the original texts. Items are sorted chronologically.
Authorship attribution and cybercrime
[89] cover the application of authorship analysis techniques to software source code,
demonstrating how the means of expression can vary even when programmers are solving
the same problem. Their motivation is the attribution of malicious code, just as in natural
language analyses the application is attribution of malicious or incriminating messages.
They identify a number of features which could be useful for authorship attribution, and
present two short case studies of events where malicious code has been examined for
attribution to its owner.
A number of other papers focusing on online identification of authors cited cybercrime
in a general sense, but made no specific link to the domain as defined in this study, and
hence have not been included in this analysis.
Authorship attribution and terrorism and extremism
[2] discuss authorship attribution with particular application to the forum postings of
extremist organisations, with a focus on selecting an appropriate feature set for classifying
Arabic text. They describe a study using SVM and C4.5 classifiers, applied to both
English text from a Klu Klux Klan forum and Arabic text from posts associated with the
Palestinian Al-Aqsa Martyrs group. They find slightly better performance at classifying
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Table 2.2 Summary comparison of authorship attribution approaches
Source Classifier Dataset (#Messages) Authors Accuracy (%)
[59] SVM Newsgroup (1,259) 4 -
[53] SVM Email (253) 4 85.2
[252] SVM Newsgroup (153) 9 96.08
[252] SVM Email (70) 3 91.43
[252] SVM BBS (70) 3 82.58
[251] SVM Newsgroup (c.960) 20 97.69
[251] SVM BBS (532) 20 88.33
[205] EDS Ensemble Web news (200) 10 99
[107] AuthorMiner Enron Email (120) 6 90
[107] AuthorMiner Enron Email (100) 10 90
[3] Writeprint Enron Email 25 92
[3] Writeprint Enron Email 50 90.4
[3] Writeprint Enron Email 100 83.1
[3] Ensemble eBay comments 25 96
[3] Writeprint eBay comments 25 96
[3] Writeprint eBay comments 50 95.2
[3] Writeprint eBay comments 100 91.3
[3] SVM Java forum 25 94
[3] SVM Java forum 50 86.6
[3] Ensemble Java forum 100 53.5
[3] Writeprint CyberWatch Chat 25 50.4
[3] Writeprint CyberWatch Chat 50 42.6
[3] Writeprint CyberWatch Chat 100 31.7
[135] SVM Email (150) 3 90
[137] SVM Blog (1,379) 7 89.49
[137] SVM BBS (410) 5 73.97
[137] SVM Email (95) 5 80.61
[63] SVM Blog (c44,000) 100 54.53
[166] NB IM (?) 4 99.29
[165] SVM IM (950) 19 88.42
[165] SVM CyberWatch Chat (1250) 25 84.44
[130] SCAP Tweets (100,000) 50 72.9
[105] EM Enron Email (200) 5 80
[105] K-m Enron Email (200) 5 88
[105] Bisecting K-m Enron Email (200) 5 83
[106] AuthorMiner2 Enron Email (160) 4 x≈ 90
[106] AuthorMiner2 Enron Email (800) 20 x≈ 70
[46] SVM Enron Email (750) 25 88.31
[118] NB Enron Email (6,109) 10 86.92
[118] NB Enron Email (5,799) 9 87.05
[134] PSemi-RS Text corpus (2500) 50 77.04
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English text authors than Arabic authors, and note that SVM significantly outperformed
C4.5, going on to dissect the important features in classification for both languages.
Author profiling and crimes against children
Author profiling is widely deployed in the detection of sexual predators from chat
transcripts. The typical classification is between text written by a child and text written
by an adult. Some problems arise from attempting to parse net-speak with traditional
linguistic tools, although there are indications that use of such language can itself be a
useful age-determining feature.
[175] applies SVM and k-nearest neighbour classifiers to binary classification of
predator and victim in chat logs from a vigilante website. They make use of word
n-grams, with minimal pre-processing, as their input to a feature extraction function.
They find their best classification rate (94.3%) comes from the k-NN classifier with a k
of 30 and 10,000 features, both inputs being the largest of various levels tried.
[215] detail a method for distinguishing between teen and adult conversations, with
application to detecting sexual predators. Using a chat corpus, they attempt to distinguish
between teens and chat users of different age brackets, using word and character n-grams
in a Naive Bayes classifier and then an SVM classifier, finding that the SVM classifier
outperformed Naive Bayes. Unsurprisingly, the most difficult-to-distinguish age group
were the authors in their 20’s.
[122] compare a rule-based approach to log classification to a human analysis. They
describe how a new iteration in a rule-based analysis of chat logs differs from a previous
version of the tool in more appropriately identifying combinations of keywords in chat
lines. The inter-coder reliability between their new tool and human analysis is reported
as much improved. A follow-up work by the same authors [123] surveys the literature
regarding both sexual predation and cyberbullying, and as such covers some work on
profiling sexual predators.
[146] focus on detecting a grooming author by classifying messages into one of
three attack categories and then combining classification probabilities. They perform
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a comparative evaluation with a number of different classification algorithms, finding
SVM to perform poorly next to k-NN, Naive Bayes, Maximum Entropy and Expectation
Maximisation. They consider their Naive Bayes approach the most suitable.
[173] aims at predicting both age and gender of chat authors, with application to
checking the truthfulness of reported profiles on social media sites. Working with a
corpus drawn from a Belgian social network, they discuss several issues particular to
online chat corpora, including shortness of texts and the variability of Dutch net-speak.
They avoid issues of stemming and more involved linguistic analysis by utilising word
and character n-grams. They find that word unigrams are the features best used for
distinguishing between age and sex categories, achieving good accuracy in both cases.
[100], is notable in covering both author characterisation and topic detection, address-
ing general text-based surveillance. They describe a short characterisation experiment
wherein Twitter users who are informative for a particular topic are identified, using a
broad feature set and the expectation maximisation clustering algorithm.
[29, 30] focus on two different sub-problems in the identification of sexual predators.
The first draws on the concept of fixated discourse – that predators will return to the
subject of sex throughout grooming conversations. The authors apply a sentiment
similarity measure to lexical chains identified from text. They hypothesise that long
lexical chains related to sex are indicative of authors being sexual predators. They find
some evidence for this in a comparison of the length of sex-fixated lexical chains in both
a sexual predator corpus and a cyber-sex corpus. The second publication turns to the
use of sentiment and emotion features in conversations involving sexual predators. The
authors identify from related work that several sentiment features are linked to sexual
predation, and construct a feature set based on sentiment markers. This feature set is
compared to a number of simple character and word-based feature sets in a Naive Bayes
classifier running over a corpus of chat logs from a vigilante website combined with
ordinary cyber-sex logs.
[101] cover the 2012 International Sexual Predator Identification Competition, de-
tailing a common evaluation framework against which 16 methods for identification
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Table 2.3 Summary comparison of author profiling approaches applied to crimes against
children
Source Classifier Dataset (#Documents) Task Accuracy (%)
[175] SVM PervertedJustice (1,402) Victim/Predator 90.8
[175] k-NN PervertedJustice (1,402) Victim/Predator 94.3
[215] SVM Lin2006 (2,161) Author Age 78.6
[215] NB Lin2006 (2,161) Author Age 69.8
[173] SVM Netlog (1,537,283) Author Age 66.3
[221] SVM+NN PervertedJustice Victim/Predator 93.5
of sexual predators could be evaluated in a comparable manner. The competitors were
provided with a sample of 30% of a synthetic dataset constructed from a vigilante site
and publicly-available IRC logs, and evaluated based on the F-score of their method’s
performance on the remainder of the set. The paper provides an overview of participants’
approaches as well as their results. A more detailed account of the method used by the
winning competitor [221] is also included in this review, as are the methods used by
two other competitors [152, 174] who were placed 4th and 6th respectively. A master’s
thesis [151] by the author of the 4th-ranked paper provides additional detail on their
method’s unsuccessful behavioural analysis addition to an SVM classifier using unigram
and bigram features.
Some of the approaches taken in author profiling in this domain can be broadly
compared to each other, so the summary comparison provided in Table 2.3. The two
types of task attempted are distinguishing predators from their textual contributions and
determining the age of authors as part of such a system. Note that many important details
on the precise features and processes used in classification are best explained in the
original publications, and note also that the figures given for author age classification
are figures focused on general child-versus adult classification, and the results for more
specific age groups vary from this figure within publications – the general effect being
that older adults are easier to distinguish from teens and children. Additional comparable
approaches can be seen in the results reported by [101], the figure for [221] being their
(the topmost-ranked) performance on that evaluation.
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Author profiling in terrorism and extremism
[79] use a vocabulary of group membership markers to rank documents by the degree
of militancy of the author, with the aim of building more efficient search tools for such
material. Working with a corpus of white extremist websites, they find that these hand-
selected features, when weighted by TF-IDF, correlate more closely with human rankings
of militancy than full feature-sets or feature-sets selected from those words with the
highest mutual information. They also outperform a variant using weights based on
a cosine similarity measure. They also find that an SVM using TF-IDF and the full
vocabulary performs best at classifying texts as militant.
Author profiling in threats and harassment
[47] aim to profile users who are likely to send out abusive messages. They do this through
a combination of lexical and syntactic features and independent sentence offensiveness
measures which draw upon a form of sentiment analysis. They distinguish the degree to
which profanity determines offensiveness and produce some tailored rules for identifying
name-calling. Their evaluation against manual markup of 249 Youtube users’ comments
shows high abusiveness classification accuracy.
Other author profiling applications
[179] do not make specific reference to a particular type of crime – beyond a generic
formulation of ‘cybercrime’ – but undertake a range of author profiling, ambitiously
attempting to derive not only age and gender information, but also the occupation of the
author. They gather a corpus of well-used Vietnamese blogs, and run a large number
of classifiers in a comparative evaluation for each classification task. They find, for the
most part, that an IBk decision tree algorithm is best-performing, with the exception of
the occupation classification, which is best served by a random forests classifier.
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Sentiment analysis and terrorism and extremism
[1, 4] explore sentiment analysis on US and Middle Eastern web forum postings. In
the first paper, the authors focus on the detection of emotions or affects in web-based
discourse. The authors manually construct a lexicon mapping terms to a score of intensity
in a particular category of sentiment. They proceed to a case study comparing the US and
Middle Eastern extremist groups based on the intensity of the hate and violence intensity
of their postings, finding a linear relationship in both cases and a strong one in the case
of the Middle Eastern groups. In the second paper, the authors move towards automated
sentiment classification of English and Arabic content. They use a range of stylistic and
syntactic features and make use of a genetic algorithm to aid in feature selection. SVM
classification using this system performed well at classification on a benchmark movie
review dataset and on manually tagged English and Arabic forum postings.
[245] study detection of radical opinions in web forum postings. They particularly
focus on detecting the features which are most relevant to such a specific form of
classification task, working with a full range of lexical, structural, syntactic and content
features. They validate their method on two U.S. based hate group fora, and find that a
choice of lexicon for context is highly important. Their experimentation with a number
of classifiers found SVM to outperform Naive Bayes and Adaboost.
[186] provide a very high-level description of mining of online information about
agro-terrorism, providing no detailed implementation steps nor evaluation.
Sentiment analysis and threats and harassment
Sentiment analysis has a particular role to play in detecting threats and harassment in
text, due to its ability to detect the tone of conversation. It has been applied with some
success to posts in both online fora and social media.
[202] study the dynamics of political discussions on Polish internet fora, drawing on
them as a source of strongly bipolar exchanges. They perform a topological assessment of
the discussion network, and undertake a detailed analysis of the nature of user interactions
and thread popularity based on political affiliation of participants. They note a connection
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to analyses of hate groups, and contradict existing understanding of contrasting views
leading to averaging of opinion.
[229] focus on detecting hate speech on the web, discussing issues with clearly
defining hate speech — such as distinguishing reclamation or discussion of racial slurs
from their offensive deployment. They perform a manual coding of hate speech related
to Jews, and compare an SVM classifier using a number of feature sets to this ground
truth, finding acceptable classification accuracy on a unigram feature set.
[182] cover cyber-bullying, detailing the design of a tool to help assist parents
and school personnel in spotting malicious online posts. Drawing on a dataset of
manually-gathered cyber-bullying instances, they perform a comparative affect analysis
to distinguish the degree of emotion associated with cyber-bullying texts, drawing on
an existing affect analysis framework with emoticon support. They found that there
were not notably more emotive items in the positively labelled set, but that there were
significantly more vulgarities. Interestingly, they also found evidence of sarcasm in their
bullying dataset, with the category of ‘fondness’ ranking unexpectedly high. Based on
this analysis, they build a machine learning system to be integrated into a web crawler
for classifying malicious posts.
[238] present social media as a valuable resource for facilitating academic study of
bullying, and highlight a number of key challenges for the NLP community to overcome,
using Twitter as a source for example data and a number of exploratory analyses. Their
detailed exploration of the topic is a broad starting-point for researchers to expand on.
Text classification in crimes against children
A number of publications focus on estimating the volume of child abuse media in
filesharing networks, identifying files which may contain child abuse based on their
filenames. A critical component behind many of these approaches is the collection of
appropriate keywords to identify in filenames, these terms being drawn from a specialised
vocabulary used by sharers of this media.
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[208] focuses on evaluating the volume of child abuse material on the Gnutella
network based on a keyword-based evaluation of filenames and search queries, also
investigating a number of common claims regarding characteristics of such material on
peer-to-peer networks. They find that just under 1% of queries and 1.45% of files were
related to child abuse material.
[181] specifically attempt to identify the path to the use of child abuse material,
presenting results drawn from a three-month study of the isoHunt filesharing network’s
top 300 search terms, where 3 of 162 terms were linked to child abuse material.
[169] aim at building an automatic classifier for child abuse material based on
filenames. As an early step, their SVM-based and logistic regression-based classifiers are
trained and evaluated on pornographic filenames as a proxy, with promising initial results.
Other work by the same authors [168] presents more detail on the implementation of the
filename normalisation and classification procedure, but no new results evaluating the
viability of their classifier in distinguishing child abuse material filenames from adult
pornography.
[76] perform a comparison of paedophile activity in KAD and eDonkey, two distinct
filesharing networks. Using an existing classification tool to label queries, they find that
eDonkey contained more child abuse-related queries (0.25%) than KAD (0.09%).
This collection of studies, though working on different networks, tend to arrive at
similar results regarding the extent of sharing of child abuse material, with a small but
significant percentage of a number of filesharing platforms appearing to contain child
abuse material.
[177] focus on detecting predation – rather than predators – in chat logs taken from
online games such as World of Warcraft. Their method uses a keyword-lookup system
whereby suspicious messages are those which reveal personal information. A small
trial evaluation found that their system highlighted two synthetic suspicious messages
inserted into ordinary chat logs, though it would also appear that a large false-positive
rate is inherent to their approach.
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Text classification in terrorism and extremism
[199] focuses on detecting related messages, using a form of term frequency analysis to
correlate and cluster messages using certain unusual words. Their focus is on detecting
groups such as terrorists, that are aware of being monitored by keyword systems and
are thus unnaturally altering their word usage. They demonstrate their approach on a
synthetic dataset. Stronger demonstration that the word usage behaviour expected exists
in communication traces would help validate the approach. [75] similarly aim to detect
word substitutions in messages, a measure which might be adopted by those seeking to
avoid keyword-based surveillance. They draw upon a range of weak sentence oddity
indicators which, combined in a decision tree classifier, achieve good classification
accuracy for sentences drawn from the Brown and Enron corpora where a noun has been
replaced with another noun with a similar frequency.
[200] applies a number of word-usage models to posts on an English-language forum,
drawing on measures of radicalisation and deception to rank forum posts and providing
some analysis of the distribution of posts. They find that highly-radical posts are ranked
low for deception, signalling sincerity.
Text classification in police intelligence
[212] focus on the prevention of drug abuse through monitoring social media. Their
framework is designed to identify the popularity of posts within specified topics. Specifi-
cally, they focus on the prediction of comment arrival as a proxy for popularity, finding
good results in an evaluation on Twitter and the Hong Kong Discussion forum.
Text classification in threats and harassment
[10, 12], and [21, 196, 225] cover building classifiers to detect threatening emails, all
having been covered together under machine learning applications to harassment above.
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Text classification in cybercrime
[39] appear to address cybercrime – though not clearly in the sense the term is used in this
review – applying Naive Bayes, C4.5 and SVM classifiers to the somewhat ambiguous
question of deciding whether or not texts are useful to cybercrime investigations. A trial
on manually-coded case descriptions from a United States Department of Justice website
suggests that all three classifiers have acceptable performance, with Naive Bayes the
best-performing.
Text classification in finance
[230] focus on copyright infringement, sampling the BitTorrent network to gather in-
formation on the number of shared files, assigning files individual categories, and then
checking a random sample of filenames manually to determine how many files appeared
to contain copyright-infringing material. They find that the vast majority of shared files
contain infringing content.
2.1.3 Summarised results
Within the 206 papers reviewed, there were 8 broad problem topics that papers sought to
address:
1. Financial crime, which relates to fraud or crimes like copyright infringement
whose principle damage is economic. Financial criminal activity does not always
leave visible traces in online data sources, as much financial information is kept
private. However, a number of specific areas are visible. Primarily there is the
example of copyright infringement, one of the more widespread criminal activities
visible online, can be examined via a number of public interfaces, not least the
P2P filesharing mechanisms often used to commit it. Another online lens into
financial crime comes via online auction sites, whose transactions are to some
extent available to the public for scrutiny. Finally, when an allegation of fraud
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is being investigated, the email records of suspects can indicate collusion and/or
implicate co-conspirators.
2. Cybercrime, which is intended to cover crimes focused on information systems.
While a majority of cybercrime will take place online, and leave traces in data
sources such as firewall and server logs, much of this category of crime is excluded
from the study, as it involves a vast body of work in intrusion detection and
similar fields. The works which were considered in the scope of this study which
dealt with cybercrime mostly focused on the social and economic background to
cybercriminal activity, often mined from online fora where criminals share or sell
information.
3. Criminal threats or harassment. The type of threat dealt with in this category ranges
from the identification of serious bomb and murder threats in messages, to filtering
instances of ‘trolling’, where the aim is merely to provoke shock. Identifying such
messages has proven more difficult than the identification of spam mail, due to the
varied possible representations of threats, and some form of sentiment analysis
may prove critical to any solution to this problem.
4. Police intelligence — the creation of tools to support government or law-enforcement
in the general detection of crime – is one of broader problem categories when it
comes to criminal acts addressed. Generally speaking, the interest is in either the
investigation of criminal organisations or some spatially-restricted prediction of
crime, but other minor crimes are also addressed. A large body of this work aims
to augment police investigations by filtering knowledge from web-based news
articles, the intent being to provide situational awareness and keep investigators
abreast with public information.
5. Crimes against children, including grooming and child trafficking. Online groom-
ing of children has become very high-profile, and a number of publications focus
on means of detecting it – either by identifying the age of a conversational partner
or by directly modelling predatory behaviour in instant messaging conversation.
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Other online data is also examined in relation to these crimes, most significantly
filesharing networks which are often used to distribute images or videos of child
abuse.
6. Criminal or otherwise links to extremism and terrorism. The specific nature of
the problem addressed is entirely focused on either white supremacists from the
United States or else Islamic fundamentalists. In both cases, the primary online
lenses into the groups are the online fora they use to discuss matters pertaining
to their ideologies, and much of the research effort is in examining their social
networks and analysing the persuasive techniques they have employed.
7. Identification of online individuals in criminal contexts. The Internet being a
theoretically anonymous medium, a critical issue for many criminal matters is
identifying a person. Given the highly-textual nature of much online activity,
means for identifying a person from their writing dominate this problem, but data
sources can be diverse, including email, online posts, instant messaging logs and
even images.
Additionally, some papers made reference to criminality in a broad sense, but ap-
peared not to address specific crimes or categories of crime. These were labelled as
‘Unclear’. Some papers were labelled as addressing multiple problem topics. The most
prominent problem topic was online identification — broadly, the problem of identifying
individuals based on only online data, a problem which was particularly related to the
analysis of malicious emails and language-based classifiers. This topic was closely
matched numerically by those papers addressing extremism or terrorism. Generally, the
crimes most often focused on were terrorism or extremism related, or else linked to
crimes against children.
Also identified were five broad classes of method common to several papers, including
different types of online data being gathered and analysed. Of the method categories, the
largest was natural language processing (NLP), with machine learning (ML), information
extraction (IE), social network analysis (SNA) and computer vision (CV) falling far
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behind. Some papers did not fit into these five categories neatly, so a miscellaneous
(‘ETC’) category houses them. The NLP subsection, due to being much greater in size,
is broken down into Authorship Attribution (AA), Author Profiling (AP), Sentiment
Analysis (SA), Text Classification (TC) and Other Methods (O). Data types observed
included web page and forum contents, including data from social networks, email data,
instant messaging data and network traces.
The first questions which may be answered are the guiding research questions previ-
ously outlined.
What are the problems (crimes, investigative requirements) which are being ad-
dressed in the literature?
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, a number of high-impact crimes such as terrorism and the
sexual predation of children are prominent topics, alongside more broadly applicable
aims such as identification of offenders using online data.
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In addition, Figure 2.1 shows the most common problem topics over time. Note that
individual papers could fall into multiple topics. It can be seen that topics such as the
identification of internet users and the investigation of terrorism or extremism remain
relatively stable (as a percentage of research output) over time, while the attention to
crimes against children appears to have increased since around 2009.
The problem of online identification was most often associated with NLP approaches
to uncovering the author of a given written text, an aim relevant to legal debates about
incriminating texts such as emails or blog posts. The authorship attribution literature
connected to this aim appears to be rich and mature, with a number of comparable
studies. This topic is extended somewhat in combined NLP and ML work – sometimes
including computer vision techniques – which aims to cluster spam or phishing email
campaigns to identify common origins, and similar aims motivate more traditional IP-
lookup approaches. A very much distinct body of research by A.A. Mohamed and R.V.
Yampolskiy also addresses identification, their focus being on approaches to identifying
people via online avatars in virtual games [149, 150].
Papers addressing extremist or terrorist problems almost uniformly apply themselves
to investigating and monitoring online communities as part of information-gathering
efforts. Several studies look at the links between different sites and communities,
while some others look at means of identifying the most radical members of groups
where discussion is visible. The two key demographics targeted are groups linked to
Jihadist terrorism and far-right extremist groups in the United States, suggesting a U.S.-
centered publication bias. The predominant trend in the Cybercrime publications was
also investigating and monitoring online communities, which suggests that there may be
a binding theme of investigating online criminal communities.
There are two main categories of crimes against children visible in the reviewed
publications. The first, and most common, is the detection of sexual predators engaged in
online conversation with children, the aim being to detect attempts at grooming children
for contact, a problem which by its nature draws heavily on NLP approaches. The second
is the detection of child abuse material, which includes both CV attempts to discern such
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content from images and videos and filename-based attempts to quantify the volume of
such content on a number of P2P filesharing networks.
Financial crime publications either address copyright infringement on P2P networks,
or else the detection of fraud, usually from auction sites. Intelligence tools are most
often concerned with either mining criminal social networks from open sources, or
providing alerts about potential criminal activity, often with respect to certain geographic
or temporal limits.
Those papers whose focus was least obviously a criminal matter often made reference
to pornography, which may be indicative of different legal frameworks and cultural
backgrounds. Such results in this review might be considered to address parental control
systems rather than strictly handle criminal content.
It is worth noting that ‘terrorism’ and ‘cybercrime’ were both often used as general
motivations, not necessarily specific to the paper’s focus, with 74 papers containing a
reference to ‘terrorism’ and 50 papers referencing ‘cybercrime’ compared to 47 and 12
papers actually labelled as addressing these topics.
What are the methods which are being employed to provide solutions?
Natural Language Processing (NLP) is highly dominant in this review’s results, with
around half of all collected papers making some use of NLP techniques in some way.
The presentation in Figure 2.2 breaks down this category along closer lines. The heavily
textual nature of most electronic communications makes this a somewhat unsurprising
result. Machine Learning techniques are also well-represented, with common classifiers
like SVMs and Naive Bayes being applied to a variety of problems.
There are 21 papers in the review (10.2% of the corpus) which make some use of
computer vision or image processing techniques. The low proportion of such papers may
be linked to the choice of search terms in the discovery phase of the review — there was
no CV-linked term included, but there were NLP and SNA terms. Of these 21, 16 papers
made use of only CV techniques. As is to be expected, most of the data sources used in
2.1 A Systematic Survey of Security Informatics 68
























































2.1 A Systematic Survey of Security Informatics 69
this area were forms of image and video, with only a couple of exceptions where web
and email data was processed visually.
22 papers in the review (10.7%) made use of some form of social network analysis
(SNA). This number appears relatively low given a search term specifically selected for
these methods, perhaps indicating a research area which requires further exploration. Of
these 22 papers, 13 were labelled as only using SNA methods, the others overlapping with
techniques from the domains of information extraction and natural language processing.
The data used in these papers were primarily web data, including blogs and fora, but
email data also formed a sizeable proportion of the study.
39 papers in the review (18.9%) focused on helping combat crime by mining infor-
mation from public resources. Of these, 24 were labelled as solely oriented towards
information extraction, while the remainder also used methods involving natural language
processing and social network analysis. The vast majority of information extraction
studies made use of web-based data, including online fora and social networking services
like Twitter.
There are 43 papers (20.9%) which make use of machine learning techniques, only
20 of which make exclusive use of such techniques. Of the other 23, 18 use some form
of NLP technique, indicating a significant overlap between those papers labelled as
using machine learning and those labelled as using natural language processing. Such a
relationship is retrospectively unsurprising given the close relationship between these
fields. The 43 papers were fairly evenly divided with respect to the data types studied,
with email and web data each featuring in nearly half of all studies. Four studies handled
chat data and two studies — one overlapping with CV techniques — made use of image
data.
92 studies from the review (44.7% of the total) used some form of natural language
processing, making this by far the largest category of methods. Of these 92, 65 used only
NLP techniques, making this also the category with least overlap with other methods
(closely followed by the much smaller group of computer vision). The large number of
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NLP-related studies collected may be linked to the inclusion of two terms in the search
procedure which link to NLP.
There were 27 papers which did not fit within any of the broader technique categories.
Chat data and network trace data were more prominent amongst these papers than in
the main categories. Often these papers described frameworks or abstract processes for
combating a threat.
Which online data sources are being used?
A breakdown of the different broad categories of data is provided in Figure 2.3. Most
commonly examined was web data, with nearly half of all publications making some
use of textual or semistructured web data. Within this category, simple web pages are
most favoured, with social media – particularly Twitter – second and online fora third
most popular. Behind Web data comes the other significant data source, email, which
has the advantage of being both long-established and well-used. Chat data from instant
messaging applications forms the third key data type under analysis, with comparatively
few papers making use of images or videos.
With regard to specific data sources, a few common elements were observed across
papers.
• The Enron email dataset is a dataset of roughly half a million email messages
from roughly 150 users. It was originally made public as a result of Federal
Energy Regulation Commission’s investigation into the Enron corporation. A full
explanation of the dataset is provided by [119]. As a labelled dataset of authors and
a large volume of messages produced by them, this corpus was often a standard
reference for studies attempting authorship attribution, but also used in some
studies based on social network analysis. A total of 22 papers make reference to
the Enron dataset.
• PervertedJustice2 is a vigilante website where volunteers run sting operations
by posing as minors and luring paedophiles into volunteering identifying and
2perverted-justice.com
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incriminating information. They publish a large and growing corpus of chat
logs involving attempted grooming, which have been used frequently in studies
attempting to identify sexual predators or analyse stages of grooming attacks. The
common use of this resource points to a common issue for researchers working
on such topics – the lack of actual case data to work with means that researchers
must work with proxy data. The degree to which predator-volunteer conversations
accurately reflect predator-child conversations is unclear, in part also due to this
lack of real case data to verify results. 15 papers make reference to this resource.
• The Dark Web Forum Portal is a search and summarisation interface to a collec-
tion of 28 fora which are linked to extremist or terrorist material. As a standard
collection of online forums, it is of particular interest to researchers studying the
organisation of terrorism online. 11 papers make reference to this resource.
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How many studies are making use of multiple data sources?
Relatively few papers (21 or 10.2% of the total) combine different types of data or
present methods which would apply to different types of data. Among those which
did, the approach was typically either general monitoring of all network traffic such as
in ECHELON and similar wiretapping, or else the use of NLP methods which could
apply to online texts of many kinds. Slightly more papers (24 or 11.7%) were marked as
‘partial’ responses for this question, due to using a variety of data sources of the same
type – for instance, using both English and Arabic text corpora to evaluate a hypothesis.
While in many cases a paper’s contribution will be limited to one particular subject
area, and thus would not be expected to apply to distinct data types, this result hints that
more effort at synthesis of otherwise distinct forms of online data could well prove a
fruitful area of research.
How many studies validate their contribution’s utility to law enforcement practi-
tioners?
Very few (10 or 4.9%) papers reported a positive evaluation of their tool’s utility by a
law enforcement practitioner or similar expert authority. It was possible to infer from
the means of evaluation or similar references that a further (14 or 6.8%) of papers were
written with co-operation of law enforcement, implicitly crediting the work with some
level of practitioner support.
These figures do not necessarily reflect the true rate of interaction between researchers
and practitioners, and it is possible that trials with law enforcement are only conducted
after successful publication, or that law enforcement use of tools is not widely publicised
in the name of reducing criminal awareness. Even with such qualifying scenarios in mind
it seems problematic that papers specifically reporting themselves as supporting law
enforcement and intelligence applications so rarely report on evaluations by the relevant
professionals.
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2.1.4 Discussion
Online criminality is often linked to the relative anonymity of electronic interaction, and
in response to this the reviewed computer science literature, and particularly natural
language processing, reveals a mature field of authorship analysis for online texts, with
many rigorously evaluated methods for determining the author of a given text building on
and referencing each other, with feature sets and reference corpora being shared between
papers. Consideration has been given to the standards of evidence required for legal use.
Other approaches to identification of online individuals for criminal matters show similar
levels of evaluation.
The detection of sexual predators in online chat transcripts shows similar levels of
interest, with multiple studies applying a range of methods to the same goal, and even a
number of publications recording a specific competition, with methods using the exact
same dataset so as best to be compared. It is notable, however, that the most common data
source for these publications was a form of proxy data – the Perverted Justice website’s
transcripts between people outside of law enforcement agencies and sexual predators.
This seems to indicate that a willing research community is having to work around legal
or other restrictions on gaining access to actual criminal chat data.
Similar legal obstacles seem to be faced by researchers attempting to develop means
to automatically detect child abuse media – many forced to use less-helpful forms of
proxy data such as adult pornography – and even studies merely attempting to quantify
the presence of child abuse media, where filename-only approaches are dominant.
Publications investigating terrorism or extremism also have access to a common
data source in the form of the Dark Web Forum Portal, though it appears to be less
uniformly drawn upon. With this topic, widely mentioned even in publications not
directly addressing it, scarcity of ground-truth information about real-world threats
appears to have diverted many efforts in the open literature into exploration of the
networking and rhetorical properties of self-identified online extremist communities.
As is revealed in the breakdown of the quality analysis in the appendix to the full
paper [69], a significant proportion of publications reviewed had deficiencies in evaluation
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and indeed a quarter of publications had no evaluation. While in a minority of cases
this may be because the paper proceeds via theoretical proof, or because the format of
the publication does not allow sufficient space, in others poor adherence to scientific
standards are evident. Especially when designing methods for use in law enforcement
or intelligence deployments, where lives may directly be ruined by underperforming
analysis tools, researchers must be focused on the best way to identify objective truth
regarding their methods.
In some cases, with papers relying on social network analysis or information ex-
traction methods, and particularly where the method designed was semi-automated or
involved visualisation, evaluation sections presented only demonstrative case studies of
application as support for their tool or method’s utility. Case studies are sufficient for
exploratory presentations, but where concrete benefit to law enforcement is promised,
measurement should be made of these benefits. If the contribution is increased perfor-
mance of the analyst interfacing with the software, for example, sufficiently defensible
user trials must be presented, and the same can be said for tools which aim to help an
analyst seek resources on the Web.
In other cases, laboratory evaluations of classifiers were presented, but insufficiently
comparable to the real-world deployment scenarios. With the exception of copyright
infringement, most fields of study in this review hold an inherent class imbalance
problem – there are far fewer traces of criminals in the online world than there are
traces of innocent netizens, and classifiers operating on a general population must thus
overcome the likelihood of high rates of false alerts. Synthetic but unrealistic datasets
may demonstrate a classifier’s theoretical ability, but evaluations should always be linked
to actual deployment scenarios.
A small number of long-term projects and toolsets were referenced in multiple
papers gathered by this review. In some cases, these publications report on significant
incremental improvements on developed approaches, with fresh evaluations (e.g., [19,
149, 150]). In more modular systems, such as the Email Mining Toolkit, the discussion is
limited to brief description of individual components of a larger toolset (e.g., [209, 210]).
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The lack of detail makes it difficult to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of such
extensions with respect to each other as well as other comparable approaches. Further
work and more detailed evaluations are needed to fully understand the effectiveness of
such extensions.
Impacting and underlying this survey’s results is the rapid pace of development in
online mediums. While certain technologies such as email have remained fundamentally
consistent over the years, the same cannot be said for all online activity which draws law
enforcement attention. Individual games and social networking platforms can become
popular, draw law enforcement attention, and then become unpopular even as researchers
devise the appropriate tools to analyse this content — some of the data sources in
reviewed papers are from what might now be thought of as essentially dead communities.
Certain methods, such as analysis of written text, can be generalised across a number of
platforms and data sources, and are as such especially valuable.
The current volume of papers making use of multiple data sources and data types
is low, with information extraction studies being the most likely to attempt this. The
community should put greater focus on tools which generalise to different applications.
Many methods may already be transferable, but studies attempting to replicate the
performance of a method on a new type of data are very rare. The cross-examination
of different data sets might also help standards of evaluation for researchers working in
areas where accurate ground-truth is not readily available.
A number of papers on textual analysis and information extraction subjects demon-
strate that their methods work with multiple languages, the most common being English
and Arabic. English being dominant globally, online and in science makes it a clear target
for analysis, whereas Arabic is clearly targeted by law enforcement and intelligence in-
terest in counter-terrorism applications. The linguistic challenges behind textual analysis
should not be forgotten or assumed solved when dealing with less-analysed tongues, but
law enforcement should be aware that such technology exists outside of what is collected
in this review, even if it does not advertise itself as applicable to law enforcement.
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Finally, the extremely low overall level of engagement with law enforcement bodies or
domain experts is problematic for a corpus of papers specifically selected for referencing
their intended deployment with law enforcement. This is not necessarily a problem
which may be overcome by the research community alone, but attempts should be made
to involve relevant professionals in the evaluation of tools being designed for their use.
2.1.5 Conclusion
Many directions might be taken in moving forward from these results. This thesis focuses
on the implications of two areas in particular. Firstly, the results indicate that tackling
problems of online identity is one of the most fruitful areas for practically assisting
security and law enforcement, addressing a unique and pressing aspect of the online
environment. Particular focuses within this problem area, such as authorship attribution
or avatar recognition, show signs of advanced and high-quality work.
Secondly, the relatively low rate of publications involving different types and sources
of data suggests an area fruitful for methodological advancement. Given the multimedia
nature of online social networks, their broad adoption, and their inherent connection to
the problem of online identity, they would appear to make a natural ground for valuable
research into identity resolution security tools.
As later sections will detail more closely, there is a coherent body of work on identity
resolution methods for online social networks, but research in this area is being limited
by a number of factors – ignorance of existing work in other fields, a lack of models for
the comparable value of information attributes, hurdles to iterative improvement through
lack of reliable and relevant ground-truth, and poor replication on ’real-world’ datasets.
It is to these theoretical and methodological issues that this thesis ultimately addresses
itself.
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2.2 Fundamentals of Identity Resolution
The topic of this thesis has roots which extend into an unfortunate terminological tan-
gle. Identity resolution is the term by which the topic has been introduced, and for
consistency’s sake it will be adhered to where possible. Yet this is only one of many
labels which have historically been applied to the same activity. It has also been known,
variously, as record linkage, data matching, entity resolution, data integration, object
identification, duplicate detection, deduplication and many combinations of the com-
ponents of these terms. In addition, there are highly related fields such as authorship
attribution and information retrieval, where relevant methodology has often been de-
veloped. As different fields use different terminology, it has not always been clear that
similar problems are being addressed, and solutions found in one area may not have
reached others. There are nuances of meaning and of context which colour each of these
labels with regard to the core activity in question.
For clarity’s sake, this many-named activity should be described. What is meant by
identity resolution is a process whereby some investigator, armed with records regarding
one or usually more persons or items, may match said records to a second set of records
so that any matched records refer to the same person or item, thereby resolving all data
regarding the same identities.
A classical example is presented in Figure 2.4. Given two databases, which might
contain much of the same information, but in different formats and without a uniquely
identifying key for both, an investigator wants to determine which of the two records
refer to the same person.
We can easily identify that record A1 has a likely match in record B1. While the two
databases store John Smith’s information in different format, we can piece together his
full name and address from the given components and identify the abbreviations of “St.”
and “Lancs”. Postcode is not present in Database B, but aside from that all the attributes
match, we just need to pre-process both datasets into the same format.
The cases of A2 and A3 are less clear. A sharp observer might note that there is a
Mary in Database B with the same date of birth as the Mary in Database A. Given some
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Database A
ID Surname Firstname Address 1 Address 2 Postcode Birthdate
A1 Smith John 13 Broad St. Lancaster LA4 3HQ 07-11-1981
A2 Smith James 12 Chapel St. Blackburn BB5 6ER 05-08-1984
A3 Smith Mary 12 Chapel St. Blackburn BB5 6ER 04-03-1986
Database B
ID Name Address DOB
B1 John Smith 13 Broad Street, Lancs 07/11/1981
B2 James Nearby 19 Parliament Rd., Clitheroe 06/08/1984
B3 James S. Short 14 Horton Way, Southampton 05/08/1984
B4 Mary Barlow 12 Parliament Rd., Clitheroe 04/03/1986
B5 Carl Barlow 12 Parliament Rd., Clitheroe 03/12/1974
Fig. 2.4 Two databases in a simplified identity-resolution example
knowledge about the world – that women in Western European cultures may change
their surname when married – and noting the existence of a co-resident Carl Barlow, we
might suspect that A3 should be matched to B4. Of course, even identifying A3 as a
woman requires inference from the name field. If we were to construct a key just from
first name and date of birth, we might find some systematic errors. It is possible, though
less common, for men to change their names, so perhaps we should also consider the
possibility that B2 or B3 are matches for A2. In both cases we have reason to be dubious:
Southampton is quite far from Blackburn, and B2 has a different date of birth. Of course,
A2’s date of birth should not have changed, but it is possible that this reflects a data-entry
error in Database B. There is no compelling evidence that either B2 or B3 refer to the
same person as A2, and while we might suspect a connection, we cannot be sure that A3
refers to the same person as B4, rather than there just being a coincidental similarity in
two individuals’ records. The solution to identity resolution, then, must inherently be a
probabilistic one, based not just on the attributes of the records presented but also on
inferences made about the quality of the data and its real-world implications.
In the example given above, the records referred to people. Resolution of records
referring to people is a particular focus of this thesis, and as such a contributing factor for
the selection of identity resolution as the term of reference – ‘identity’ being more clearly
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associated with people than the broader terms ‘entity’ or ‘object’. Identity resolution has
also been the term typically used in investigative or security contexts, which are another
focus of this thesis.
The earliest approaches to identity resolution came not from from a security back-
ground, but from the perspective of ordinary record-keeping. The seminal paper on the
topic, given in 1946 by Howard Dunn of the National Office of Vital Statistics [65],
uses the metaphor of a “Book of Life” written by each person on the archives of various
private and governmental record-keeping bodies. He makes the case for assembling the
pages of this book, in terms of benefits to the individual and to the state and other bodies.
Among the questions considered in scope about a person are: “What sort of jobs do they
hold?”, “How many children do they have?” and “What sort of illness do they suffer
from?”. The solution he discusses focuses in the interim on the establishment of simple
and effective record-keeping, drawing from his experiences with the Candian Dominion
Bureau of Statistics, and in the longer term on the promotion of unique identifiers for
citizens in the form of a Birth Card’s certificate number.
One of the first computational approaches to identity resolution was proposed by
Newcombe et al. [159]. They identified the chief impediment to automatic record linkage
as being “the unreliability of the identifying information contained in successive records
which have to do with the same individual or married pair”. They gave examples such
as altered spellings of surnames, inconsistent ordering of a person’s given names, and
mistaken birthdates or ages. Their resolution was that improving record-keeping was
not enough, and that records need to be linked in spite of these inconsistencies. They
discuss an identity-resolution system for connecting marriage and birth records about
the same family: using both family and female maiden surnames, phonetic encoding
of these names, the birthplace, and the first initials of parents. While they considered
no one of these features alone to be entirely reliable, they noted that, for instance, a
member of the Canadian Records Bureau would put little weight on the information that
parents in both birth and marriage were born in British Colombia, as this is surely the
case for a large group of non-matched records. The same person might, however, put
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weight on the information that in both records the parents were from New Zealand and
Switzerland, this being an unusual combination in their population. Newcombe et al.
move from this insight to a definitive model, connecting the value of an agreement or
disagreement between records to the frequency of the values presented in those records.
This probabilistic model was first expressed in terms of the binary logarithm of the
observed frequencies, as
log2Pl− log2Pr (2.1)
where Pl is the frequency with which an agreement (or disagreement) between these
values occurs in linked records, and Pr is the frequency with which agreement appears at
random between non-linked pairs of records. The value of the expression will be positive
if the attribute match should be taken as evidence of a genuine match between records,
and negative if it should be taken for disagreement. By calculating these values, and
then summing these probabilities for all agreements and disagreements between a pair of
records, a judgement can be reached about whether the balance of probability suggests
these refer to the same family or not. Newcombe would later restate this model as
log2(Pl/Pr) (2.2)
which is the form most commonly referred to in later work, including this thesis [158].
Note that Newcombe defines these probabilities of agreement (or disagreement, there
is no need to alter the model) in terms of specific values within fields, such as the New
Zealand-Switzerland birthplace example, and not generically across the field (such as
birthplace). Newcombe did however discuss understanding the value of particular fields
for the process known as blocking.
Blocking is a necessary step in most identity-resolution systems, due to the vast
quantity of records to be compared. Without blocking, identity resolution is an O(n∗
m) process – in trying to resolve identities between two databases of 1000 records
each, 1,000,000 pairs of records must be compared. This very quickly becomes an
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unsustainable process, – consider the case of trying to match a few thousand records to
a larger dataset that is already millions of records long – and in many cases much of
the work is manifestly unnecessary, as simpler processes than full identity resolution
calculations can tell one that the no match will be found. The solution used is to divide
the pairs of records into blocks which are smaller than the entire search space, but which
are highly likely to contain the genuine match. For example, a common method for
identity resolution is to use some transformation of the surname of the individual as the
blocking key, so that full profile comparison only occurs between a record and those
records which share a similar surname. Of course, with any blocking system one runs the
risk of accidentally excluding the true match. Newcombe expressed his blocking quality
measure as a general merit ratio between this risk and the discriminative power gained
by the blocking, or
M = D/I (2.3)
Where I is the probability of introducing errors, and the discriminative power D is
given by reference to a coefficient of specificity
Cs =∑P2x (2.4)
with Px being the proportion of a file in each block x, and the discriminative power is
inversely related to Cs
D = log2(1/Cs) (2.5)
So that, intuitively, discrimination increases the more finely the blocking key divides
the original records. This quality measure for a blocking system can be considered a
precursor to the quality measures for identity resolution which will be presented later in
this thesis.
Newcombe’s methodology was formalised by Fellegi & Sunter [74] in 1969. They
expressed what was then termed record linkage as a problem of deciding, for a set of
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comparison vectors between pairs of records γ ∈ Γ, whether the vector referred to a
link (A1), a non-link (A3) or whether there was insufficient evidence for a decision (A2).
All linkage rules are seen as producing conditional probabilities P(A1|γ), P(A2|γ) and




P(Ai|γ) = 1 (2.6)
They then define the possible errors in terms of the probability of a comparison vector
γ given the true outcome, and define the optimal linkage rule as the one which has the
minimal number of cases where no decision is made. They proceed to demonstrate that
Newcombe’s weighting method (Eq. 2.2) approaches the optimal method as the number
of agreement measurements is extended, depending on certain conditions, and that this
agrees with other formulations from the realm of hypothesis testing. For more detail
on the development of the probabilistic record linkage techniques that underlie identity
resolution, including the deployment of the EM algorithm, the reader is referred to the
overview by Winkler [234].
2.3 Identity Resolution in Online Social Networks
Jumping ahead many years, and across disciplines, an interest in identity resolution has
emerged amongst computer scientists studying online social networks and online profiles.
For the most part, these authors do not appear directly aware of the existing approaches
to identity resolution from the statistical literature.
2.3.1 Early clustering approaches
Early approaches to the problem viewed the issue through the lens of clustering together
resources such as web-pages. Rekkerman & McCallum [24] tackle clustering web
pages about the same person, using a variety of approaches to build a classifier for
information about a specific person as opposed to individuals with the same name. Their
approach highlights how unstructured or at best semi-structured data, from large and
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difficult-to-index populations, frames the problem with different challenges, even if their
methodology for collecting training data – hand-verification of matched pages – closely
resembles that deployed in the statistical literature.
Bridging this work more specifically to social networks, Malin [140] discusses
social network methods for disambiguating entities with the same name. He uses both
hierarchical clustering of (for example) websites to form clusters of resources referring to
the same entities, and a random-walk based method over a social network built from co-
occurrence relationships weighted by the sparsity of such relationships. His evaluations
on a dataset from the Internet Movie Database (IMDB) find that a surprisingly low
threshold is sufficient for high F1 scores. The use of an external ground-truth is notable,
but also the consideration of network properties as identifiers highlights how approaches
not necessarily possible in the traditional statistical record linkage context can be highly
effective at identity resolution.
This is further highlighted when Narayanan & Shmatikov [155] demonstrate a de-
anonymisation attack against the Netflix Prize dataset. They focus on the identifiability
of ‘micro-data’ – sparse ratings of content in a typical zipfian distribution, even where
sanitisation and non-uniform subsampling have been applied to the original data. They
present an approach which relies on the identification of improbable correlations between
a small set of movie ratings in the Netflix dataset and public IMDB records. They find
that 8 movie ratings with 14 day error in dating are enough to identify an individual with
high probability.
Similarly, Szomszor et al. [214] focus on social tagging systems, and how user
tagging tends to persist across different folksonomie focii. They find that salient interests
are present in user tags from both del.icio.us and Flickr3. They use accounts they
judge connected (based on exact profile name matching) to test the correlation of actual
tagging patterns between the two networks. They filter tags, dealing with misspellings,
pluralisation and shifts in terminology (including using Wikipedia to disambiguate proper
3del.icio.us is a now-defunct online bookmarking service allowing tags to be attached to links,
Flickr is a popular photo-sharing service, permitting the same for images
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nouns), and demonstrate that this improves the correlation between tags on the two social
networks.
While these features are novel, and have unique properties of sparsity and distribu-
tion which are alien to the pre-digital statistical presentations, the approaches used by
Narayanan & Shmatikov, and Szomszor et al. would fit comfortably within the general
model of Fellegi & Sunter. Unfortunately, this connection is not acknowledged, and a
partial theoretical re-derivation is achieved instead. The features being explored are very
specific to the particular datasets, relying on a single attribute of the user (content ratings,
tagging patterns).
2.3.2 Unique identifiers
Of course, non-probabilistic approaches have also been applied in online identity resolu-
tion. Golbeck & Rothstein [86] approach identity resolution via a Semantic Web project
known as the Friend-of-a-Friend project, which merges together social connections from
multiple social networking sites, using a common vocabulary and markup. They focus
on enabling a reasoner to connect profiles via unique identifiers such as Chat IDs, and
measure some of the properties of the cojoined social networks. This approach recalls
that of Dunn, seeking to find or create a unique identifier for a person between records.
Further developments in this area are pursued alongside and informing strictly proba-
bilistic approaches to identity resolution. Bouquet & Bortoli [31] would later describe
the “FOAF-O-matic” tool for creating FOAF profiles connected to a global resource
identification system. Their system relies on the existence of globally unique identifiers
and either the adoption of shared ontologies by social network providers or else the
re-entry of data by users.
Zafarani & Liu [249] take a less strict approach to unique identification, focusing on
the use of usernames as a discriminative feature for mapping identities across different
online communities, starting with a blogging community. Their method is to perform
a web search for the username of a profile, and parse the resulting URLs for candidate
usernames, which they modify with common prefixes and suffixes. If any of these
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usernames appear in the target domain, they consider this a match, and this method
appears to hold for some 66% of cases based on the ground-truth they extracted from
their blogging community’s links. Many later works return to usernames as a roughly-
unique identifying feature for validating other schemes, a practical but problematic
approach given these figures.
2.3.3 Iterative filtering
In one of the earlier approaches to multi-attribute identity resolution in online data,
Motoyama & Varghese [153] treat identity resolution as an information retrieval challenge
for end-user support in social networks, focusing on the use-case of a user trying to
locate their friend within a network. They use identities gathered from Myspace and
Facebook in a multi-layered search process, using first one attribute (such as name) and
then another, until they have a final set of candidate profiles. They build a classifier based
on weighted values of individual threshold judgements for each feature. They find that
name fields are the most important to matching.
A similar method is employed by Rowe [188], who focuses on disambiguating
information about individuals with the same name within a semantic web context. His
method relies on network graphs, based on the intuition that a person will appear on
web pages which reference other people from their social networks. Using members of
the local computing department, he extracts social network connections for each subject
from their Facebook and other social network profiles to a FOAF ontological RDF
structure connected by sameAs relations. He searches for the subjects’ names on social
networks and builds resource graphs of the entities extracted from these documents. He
then merges these resource graphs based on string similarity for people and geographic
proximity for locations, resolving social identities to resources using a graph traversal
measure.
This iterative filtering approach used by both authors is distinct from the probabilistic
combination of the Newcombe model, but begins to approach it in that it combines the
judgement of individually unreliable attributes. The approaches could be understood as a
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particularly aggressive form of blocking, such that relatively poor comparison vectors
can be used, because the comparison set is already strongly preselected.
2.3.4 Data quality & availability
Carmagnola et al. [37] explore identity resolution as a task for online database holders to
engage in to better manage user data, such as preferences, for personalisation purposes.
They explore what they term the ‘univocity’ (how much a feature may assume the same
value across different users) of various identity attributes including email address, last
name, first name, and birth city. As part of this they record estimates for the number of
values attributes take per user across some 25 services. They implement a hierarchical
model for identification based on this, and test it on 80 users, 64 of which they cause to
fill in registration forms for different services after some delays introduced to produce
realistic ’copy errors’. They achieved 5/64 false negative and 2/16 false positives. Here
again there is a partial reconstruction of Newcombe’s approach, including comparison
between the frequencies of values for the same user and for different users. They relate
these terms in a manually-weighted model, however, and use a different thresholding
system rather than inspect the sign of feature weights. Notable for the purposes of this
thesis, though, Carmagnola et al. produce an overall identification value weight for a
range of different online profile attributes, based on certain qualities of the attribute data.
A secondary aspect of data quality also sees some coverage. Irani et al. [109] crawl
a social aggregator site in order to examine how many personal information fields are
disclosed on average by a person using a social network, and relatedly how much of
a person’s total online footprint can be connected through attributes such as username
and name. They discover that an active member has an average of 5.7 social networking
profiles, and that connecting these profiles increases the number of identity attributes
which can be collected. They test methods for connecting profiles based on a known
pseudonym, revealing up to 40% of an individual’s footprint, or real name, with more
variable performance. They also discuss measuring the consistency of certain profile
attributes as a means of confirming an identity. They find ‘sex’ to be the most consistent
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marker, but discard it as not very discriminatory, and focus on last name, birth year and
country as good fields. Though their treatment does not constitute a combined model,
Irani et al are here exploring both the consistency and availability of certain profile
attributes.
In similar availability-focused work, Krishnamurthy & Wills [126] focus on informa-
tion leakage via HTTP headers and cookies associated with OSNs, looking at how third
parties might access these details. This is of secondary importance to identity resolution,
but as part of their discussion they include a list of personally identifiable information
which is available across different social networking sites – an early contribution to
understanding the scope of possible attributes in this domain.
Nosko et al. [162] describe a study into information disclosure in Facebook. 400
randomly selected Canadian Facebook profiles were selected, and their content was
assessed according to a schema developed from multiple pass human annotation. They
examine relationships between different demographic markers and willingness to reveal
sensitive information. Abel et al. [5] set out to investigate general applications of
interconnecting profile information. They collect a large sample of public profiles via
Google’s Social Graph API, downloading the publicly available attributes in order to
study completeness of the attribute fields necessary to complete vCard or FOAF profiles
on up to five different services. They examine tagging behaviour as well, including an
exploration of tag prediction based on a user’s tags from different services.
2.3.5 Security & privacy leak detection
The use of identity resolution to reveal security and privacy leaks in online social
networks – as opposed to helping users or networks provide functionality – has gained
serious interest. Narayanan & Shmatikov [156] examine how the anonymised data social
networks share with advertisers and researchers can be de-anonymised with reference
to external social networks. Their method proceeds by searching the anonymised graph
using the degree of certain nodes in an auxiliary graph and the number of common
connections between these nodes - early termination helping the process. They verify
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this process on a dataset of Twitter, Flickr and Livejournal networks, using username
matches as ground-truth. They hit a recall of 30% and a precision of 72%, impressive for
a single feature.
Wondracek et al. [235] present a method that uses group membership information
to de-anonymise users of social networks. They discuss how attackers can learn group
memberships through examining the history and cookies associated with social networks.
By learning the public membership list of groups, the attacker can create a candidate
set of users which may be the target, which can be more quickly filtered by finding the
intersection (though this can be fragile to misleading data in the browsing history). They
analyse this attack against the Xing network, and check the feasibility for its application
to Facebook and LinkedIn. They also detail the results of some crawling experiments,
including the accessibility of group and member directories on a range of OSNs, showing
an important recognition of the difference between a value being recorded in the social
network and that value being available to an adversarial identity recognition system
running against its web presence.
Iofciu et al. [103] explore whether data from social tagging systems such as Delicious
can be used to identify individuals in other tagging systems such as Flickr. They suggest
the use of tagging information as an accompaniment to username information, analysing
performance across Delicious, StumbleUpon and Flickr. Their tag metric is BM25, a
form of TFIDF where the IDF is tempered by site-specific features. They combine
username and tag features through a parameter λ , which defines their relative importance.
Their evaluation is on a dataset from the Social Graph API, which explicitly makes
information about connections between profiles available. They found 1467 people with
a Flickr and Delicious profile, and 321 of these with a profile on StumbleUpon. They
note that very few tags are used in each system. They find usernames work for 55% of
their data, and tags add roughly 9% to this.
Friedland et al. [78] create a general threat model of the privacy-invasion in identity
resolution, distinguishing between targeted and easiest-K motives (trying to resolve
specific identities, or trying to resolve some of the easiest-to-resolve identities) as well as
2.3 Identity Resolution in Online Social Networks 89
the capability of attackers, with focus on the heterogeneity of data which can be used
by attackers. They discuss some motivating examples, and two specific attacks – one
related to geotags and another related to the speakers in various audio samples.
2.3.6 Credibility & user support
In another area, authors start to compare the truth value of online attributes. Rowe &
Ciravegna [190] address a number of issues regarding disambiguating resources about
a person. They perform a comparison between the real world social network revealed
by 50 participants and the network extracted from their Facebook accounts. They found
that at least half of the real social network was duplicated in the digital social network,
with an average of 77% coverage. They employ a rule-based decision process to identify
web resources that refer to the identities from their original seed dataset. They go on to
evaluate this process through the creation of a manually-identified gold standard of 50
people’s Facebook and Twitter accounts. Further work by the same authors continues the
theme of exploring the credibility of online information [189]. This same property will
be explored later in this thesis under the title of veracity.
Related work by Cortis et al. [54] approaches identity resolution as a challenge
for support of end users, focusing on the case of resolving the identities of contacts
from multiple online accounts. They report percentages for users’ self-reported rate of
consistency between professional and personal online profiles. Using a common schema
to represent profiles, they match accounts based on linguistic analysis – differentiated
by the attribute type – as well as simple string matching of attributes and lookup of data
such as addresses or job titles in knowledge bases to determine equivalence. They do not
provide an evaluation of this approach’s efficacy.
Raad et al. [184] also consider cross-network profile matching as an end-user chal-
lenge, with it being considered the basis of a number of user experience related functions.
They use a weighted similarity vector approach for comparing profiles, validating their
method against some simulated data based on real FOAF data. Significantly for the
work carried out in this thesis, their method aims at generality across the domain of
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online social networks, and lists a process to assign weights to attributes based on the
consistency of values between matched profiles – one half of Newcombe’s methodology.
Kontaxis et al. [121] propose an interesting application of identity resolution: to
detect profiles which have been cloned across networks by attackers as part of a social
engineering campaign. They extract key identifiable information from a legitimate social
network profile, and search for profiles on other networks which contain this content.
The identifiable information is identified by reference to the legitimate network’s search
system, in their demonstration on LinkedIn this became the person’s title, current and
previous employers and education history. Matching profiles are verified through exact
string matching and profile image comparison. They provide a small-scale validation
and then examine the possible extent of profile cloning within LinkedIn.
2.3.7 Integration of social network analysis
Further work at this time relied on developments in social network analysis, approaching
identity resolution from a network edge construction perspective. The simpler approaches
in this class include identity resolution using the overlap of names in friends lists, as
presented by Labitzke et al. [128], and the work of Buccafurri et al. [35], who present
identity resolution as the problem of finding ‘me’ edges to connect online social networks
via ‘bridge’ users which have profiles in each network. Their method relies on the
similarity of both usernames and a proximate contribution from the common neighbours
of the two nodes, though they seem not to evaluate the efficacy of this second component
in real classification attempts. Labitzke et al made note of the availability of attributes in
their connection of online social networks, and acknowledge the impact that availability
of information has on the possibility of linking a given profile.
In a notable development, Narayanan et al. [154] discuss the feasibility of authorship
recognition when given large class sets: they work with texts from 100,000 possible
authors, finding correct identification in 20% of cases, raising this to 80% when dropping
recall to 50%. They strongly distinguish their work from previous authorship recognition,
which typically deals with 100-300 possible authors. They evaluate their approach on a
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large dataset of blog posts, using function words and single-character features along with
word length distribution and captialisation, avoiding bag-of-words models4 as part of
an effort to avoid detecting only the commonality of topics between posts. The critical
development here, however, is the acknowledgement of the difference between attribution
in a bounded dataset, and attribution across the entire search space of online media, a
distinction often brushed over in previous work.
Chen et al. [45] discuss the notion of ‘complementarity’ in aggregation of OSN
profiles – the information being gained by resolution of the profiles, and the related
finding that users with multiple social networks are more likely to share attributes within
a network. They also measure the consistency of attributes versus a random model of data,
and finally link online profiles to an Australian telephone directory as a demonstration of
how linkage is not only a matter for online profiles.
2012 also saw important developments in multi-attribute identity resolution, with
papers combining profile-based and network-based solutions to identity resolution. Mal-
hotra et al [139] used social aggregators (FriendFeed, Profilactic and the Social Graph
API) to gather information on users of both Twitter and LinkedIn. They used a similarity
vector constructed of scores for the similarity between username, name, description,
location, image and connections. They trialled four supervised classifiers: Naive Bayes,
a decision tree, kNN and SVM. Strings are compared with Jaro-Winkler distance, self-
descriptions with Jaccard distance between standardised term representations of the text,
images as a greyscale vector of values in [0,255] which are compared with Levenshtein
distance, locations via Euclidean distance and number of connections by an internal bin
class of connection count. The most discriminative feature was the user’s name. They
test performance not only internally, but in the real data retrieved through searches for
the display name of one profile on the other network. Their learning methods performed
significantly better on their internal dataset (precision and recall of 0.99 and 0.96) than
on the external one (accuracy of 0.64), suggesting that a classifier’s reliance on names is
dangerous for real-world performance of this sort.
4Which represent documents as a simple collection of all the words they contain, without more
considered feature selection.
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Similarly, Bartunov et al. [23] describe an approach to profile linkage across so-
cial networks using a Conditional Random Fields technique. Their approach combines
network similarity information with a profile field comparison vector. Working with
a dataset of Twitter and Facebook profiles, they train classifiers, revealing high perfor-
mance, especially where node degree is high.
2.3.8 Recent developments
Work on identity resolution which was developed during the formation of this thesis has
focused on more general approaches using the range of available profile attributes, with
a focus on generalising to large user populations and resolution between multiple online
social networks.
One exception to this general rule is the work of Chen et al. [44], which instead
focused on the estimation of attribute uniqueness, leveraging a large dataset of Facebook
profiles in order to identify the most-revelatory individual attributes when it comes to
identification. Their thorough discussion of uniqueness estimation complements earlier
studies of attribute consistency and availability.
Jain et al. [113] motivate identifying users across multiple online social networks
from a security perspective, as a means for detecting malicious users. They describe
user identities as being comprised of profile, content and network components. Within
identity resolution, they distinguish ’identity search’ from ’identity matching’, with
identity search being a means for creating a candidate set and identity matching being the
identification of a true match in the candidate set based on the comparison vectors. Their
conception of identity search is highly similar to the underlying principles of blocking,
with the proviso that Jain et al are working with large and potentially incompletely-
indexed databases. They describe some novel identity search methods to complement the
usual name-based candidate generation, including methods which would not be possible
in the traditional statistical setting. They then use some similarity measures between
profile attributes and profile images to rank candidates, then presenting them to a manual
verification in a semi-automated workflow.
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Later work by the same authors [112] approaches identity resolution as both a security
issue and a business concern regarding accurate audience estimation. They continue their
earlier division of the subject into identity search and identity matching, and discuss a
range of search methods, including profile, content, self-mention and network methods.
They use the ground-truth from the Social Graph API dataset to evaluate their search
approach between Twitter and Facebook users. They demonstrate a cascaded machine
learning approach to using usernames as a discriminative feature for identity resolution,
using Twitter self-mentions as the ground-truth.
Bennacer et al. [26] describe an algorithm to iteratively match profiles across numer-
ous social networks, building on known connected profiles to inform ongoing identity
resolution. They use a network topology method to select candidates for matching –
adopting a similar process to that advocated by Jain et al above. The iterative nature of
this process acknowledges the nature of identity resolution in its entire online context
– this is not merely a process between two datasets, but a potentially unbounded explo-
ration of the online profile space. Another identity-resolution system that focuses on
multi-network applications is the Mypes tool presented by Abel et al. [6], who also used
the tool as a means to explore information availability and revelation patterns across
social networks.
Goga et al. [83] focus on the use of three specific features for identity resolution across
social networking sites: geo-location, timestamps and writing style. Using a dataset of
linked Flickr, Yelp and Twitter accounts gathered via a friend-finding function and an
existing large list of emails, they demonstrate that the combination of these features is
comparable in effectiveness to previous approaches based on usernames, so highlighting
that users can be identified and connected despite adopting distinct pseudonyms. They
also examine the improvements in accuracy from each feature, finding location and timing
to be powerful features where available, combining them in a logistic regression classifier.
At the same time, these authors [85] demonstrate the feasibility of large-scale account
correlation attacks, building on previous efforts focused on the use of usernames alone by
including real names, profile photos and locations as features, demonstrating significant
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recall with a high precision. They work on a dataset of Twitter, Facebook, Google, Flickr
and MySpace accounts. Usernames are compared using the Jaro string distance metric,
images via a ’perceptual hash’ which can be compared using Hamming distance, as
well as a facial recognition module, and locations as a scaled geodesic distance between
coordinates. They include a discussion of availability and discriminative ability of profile
attributes.
The SuperIdentity project [28] is a recent large effort at understanding real and
digital identities, and how different identity components from different scientific domains
might relate to a core conceptual identity. As part of this project, Bruce et al. [33]
have highlighted how identity fragments from different domains can be best visualised
for law enforcement, including the chain of reasoning for inferred characteristics. As
part of this work, they constructed a broad model of identity components, the cyber
persona components of which could be construed as an alternative matching schema to
the one developed within this thesis. Creese et al [55] elaborate on how this model can
be used to understand the reachability of information across social networks, though the
process is best understood as semi-automatic, with tools and domain knowledge guiding
investigators to resolve identities and build a consolidated profile, rather than enabling
the resolution of multiple identities across large datasets.
The availability of ground-truth data is a significant limitation on developments in
the application of machine-learning to identity resolution. This is highlighted by the
impressive work of Liu et al. [133], enabled by a large governmental database linking
millions of Chinese online accounts to a unique identifier. This high population legibility
allows for the development of highly accurate models based on user text and facial
recognition. Similarly, Wilder et al. [233] deploy identity-resolution techniques on a
10TB collection of roughly 6 million entities’ various social media accounts. They
note with some confusion the lack of more developed general approaches to identity
resolution.
Most recently, the area begins to see publications which are critical of the real
performance of previous identity-resolution solutions for online profiles. Vosoughi et
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al. [222] noted that many previous publications have relied on unreliable ground-truth –
matched usernames – for the mapping between profiles, despite known problems with
this data. Goga et al. [84] use a number of criteria to evaluate the reliability of identity-
resolution systems, with model which closely resembles that presented in this thesis 5,
and commented critically on the data collection methodology of many previous studies.
Related work has also addressed the topic of identity verification, where the focus
is on gauging the trustworthiness of attributes drawn from online profiles, or entire
profiles. Bahri et al. [16] provide a solution to this problem based on crowdsourcing
information about validity from online communities, having raters rate the validity of
individual attributes in order to detect Sybil profiles. This is an intriguing potential source
of information about the veracity of profile attributes.
2.4 Summary
The survey of online data mining technologies targeted at law enforcement revealed
several issues with the quality and evaluation of such work, which are worrying for such
an important discipline. This motivates work which enables security researchers to raise
the bar in these areas. The review also revealed that methods for the identification of
criminals in online contexts are highly important to law enforcement, and that methods
fusing multiple data-types are under-employed.
Returning to the foundations of identity-resolution procedures reveals that a strongly
defensible probabilistic framework exists for understanding identity resolution at the
level of individual traits (e.g. the name Smith, the birthplace Ireland) but this is only
extended in a limited way to understanding the value of attributes which might present
those traits (e.g. names, addresses, photos).
Looking at the history of recent work which attempts identity resolution in online
social networks, in a computer science context, it can be seen that the foundation statisti-
cal literature is not well referenced or integrated, with publications mostly focusing on
identity resolution as a machine-learning problem, and individual studies reconstructing
5See Chapter 4.1 for a detailed discussion of the similarities and differences between the approaches.
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portions of the general understanding given by Newcombe. Novel methodologies are
advanced which deal well with new types of data, but comparison between these types is
scant, and recent papers call into question the reliability and reproducibility of published
approaches, and trace this in part to issues with data collection strategies.
It is this context, of the unreliable ground-truth provenance and a lack of well-
grounded domain-general data quality measures for identity resolution, that the following
pages of this thesis is situated, and it is these challenges which this thesis will seek to
address.
Chapter 3
Sampling Labelled Profile Data for
Identity Resolution
The advent of the internet, and in particular online social networks (OSNs), has brought
a fresh wave of voluntarily-provided profile information on individuals, the majority
of it available to the general public. These profiles contain detailed information about
aspects of peoples’ lives which were previously unrecorded, and as such the value of
linking profiles has exploded for everyone from advertisers to sociologists to criminal
investigators.
Particularly relevant for gathering additional information about a person is the case
where identities need to be resolved across different OSNs due to the way specific OSNs
record different categories of information. For example, a profile on an image-sharing
site may reveal a person’s visual record of their day, while a microblogging platform
profile presents written report and commentary. Tying the two together provides a more
complete picture of events. Consider the motivating example given in Chapter 1, of the
police officer checking other social networking sites for corroborating evidence about
an alibi – it may be that a microblogging post attests a suspect’s location, but an image
shared on another platform clearly captures them elsewhere.
The social web could almost be viewed as a commercial implementation of the
DARPA Lifelog project [57], providing an online database for nearly every aspect
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of a person’s life, except that the tables lack proper index keys to connect records.
Demonstrating how profiles may be linked across services despite this has been a method
for privacy researchers to alert the public to the value of what they are publicly revealing.
A number of solutions have been proposed specifically for identity resolution tasks
across OSNs, each making use of some part of the diverse feature set available in social
network profiles [85, 156]. Yet without a common frame of reference to work against,
these various approaches and results are difficult to compare, which hinders identification
of the best-performing methods and the direction of future research.
In many machine learning domains, research is advanced by the sharing of labelled
datasets for purposes of replication, validation and incremental improvement on method-
ology. However, ethical constraints can prevent the dissemination of such datasets when
they contain significant personal information, such as is always the case with profile data
from OSNs [258]. While this profile data is nominally public information, as accessible
as newspapers, it would be irresponsible to assume that personal information embedded
in a public profile dataset is safe to preserve forever, and allowing members to later excise
their data would pose significant obstacles to maintenance and consistency of instances
of the dataset. Attempts have been made to anonymise these resources, but numerous
de-anonymisation attacks have been demonstrated against such ostensibly anonymised
datasets [61, 156, 258].
Rather than provide a single common dataset, this chapter proposes a sampling
method which should allow researchers to independently gather comparable datasets.
This approach is taken to overcome the tension between the research need for replication
and ethical handling of personal information. The following sections propose, implement,
and evaluate a sampling tool for gathering labelled connections between online instances
of profiles, and also for gathering suitable negative data – real profiles which a classifier
may be realistically asked to discriminate from the actual linked target. The output of this
tool is a labelled dataset of profiles suitable for training and evaluating systems aimed at
resolving identities across different OSNs.
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Providing a tool rather than a dataset allows for comparable samples of linked profiles
to be independently harvested by researchers from publicly available data on OSNs,
without need for public release of actual profile data snapshots.
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that data collected by different researchers
using this tool will be sufficiently comparable that their methods and results can be
contrasted with some confidence, while at the same time they are working with data
realistically reflecting the current social networking landscape. This approach also allows
individuals and OSNs to determine between them what information is to be revealed to
the public and does not presume upon any improper access on the part of researchers
acting as part of that public.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1, surveys historic and existing sources
of ground-truth data as used in previous studies, identifying issues with these sources.
Section 3.2, outlines the sampling method proposed, along with some requirements for
implementing it. A demonstration of one such implementation is provided in Section 3.3,
and two large samples are gathered via this implementation for use in Section 3.4
and 3.5 to validate that samples drawn through this method are comparable. Section 3.6
concludes by discussing the results and some outstanding issues in this area.
3.1 Ground-Truth Data Sources
In aid of identifying suitable methodology, this section surveys the data sources employed
in existing literature on identity resolution across social networking sites.
Malhotra et al. [139] in 2012 made use of three separate sources: Google’s Social
Graph API, and two social aggregators, FriendFeed and Profilactic. Of these three
sources, none are still operational. This is a recurring pattern with social aggregation
services similar to FriendFeed. Many exist or have existed, marketing themselves to users
on the basis of consolidated access to multiple social networks, but they commonly go out
of operation or are bought up by dominant social media organisations which repurpose
their assets. This is disappointing, because as Malhotra et al. and also Jain et al. [113]
with their small Social Graph API dataset and Irani et al. [109] with their unnamed single
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aggregator site all demonstrate, these sites can be a rich source of ground-truth data
whilst they exist.
One of these services, Plaxo [180] (which now operates as an online address book
service, with mostly private profiles), has released a tool which highlights how user
annotation of links might be utilised by researchers to gather labelled profile linkage
data, relying on rel=‘me’ annotation within the anchor tags for links as part of a crawler.
To make suitable use of this annotation, researchers would first have to gather a large
random sample of profiles which contain annotated links. Though they do not explicitly
state their collection method, Buccafurri et. al [35] appear to have made use of such
rel=‘me’ annotations and/or Friend-of-a-Friend (FOAF) data (see below) in identifying
cross-links between profiles on LiveJournal, Flickr, Twitter and Youtube, a dataset which
was later enriched by Bennacer et. al [26]. In this dataset of 93,169 nodes, only 462
unique cross-links are identified, suggesting such annotations are not in widespread
adoption.
Golbeck and Rothstein [86] used FOAF semantic data obtained from a number of
social networking sites, looking for specific shared traits in FOAF files such as chat
IDs or homepages in order to identify profiles of the same person. The FOAF format –
being a common format for description of profiles and their interconnections – would
be theoretically ideal for gathering linked profiles, if it were widely supported by large
OSNs. However this does not appear to be the case, with LiveJournal the lone popular
exception amongst a largely niche set of small OSNs which support it.
Goga et al. [83] made use of the Friend Finder functionality which was formerly
common on many social networks, using an existing list of 10 million email addresses to
find users’ accounts present on multiple social media platforms. Due to several privacy
concerns raised by the feature, many social networks no longer allow email-based search
for profiles, most notably Facebook [18]. Even were the functionality still available, the
email addresses required in order to utilise it to gather linked profiles are typically more
closely guarded than other profile information.
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Narayanan et al. [156] take a somewhat different approach in their de-anonymisation
study, basing their ground-truth mappings between profiles on exact matches in the
username or name fields, attempting to verify such matches with a score generated from
a small number of heuristics – the length and rarity of the name, and overlap in location
information. As their method (topographical identification) did not rely on any of these
features, this linkage method retains validity within their study, but it cannot easily be
generalised as a means for other researchers to go about acquiring ground-truth mappings
for identity resolution.
Based on an exploit discovered by Kaafar et. al [116], some researchers make use
of the optional ‘other profiles’ feature of Google Buzz profiles to identify cross-links
between profiles from different networks. They gather a large dataset of some 4 million
profile identifiers from Buzz, a predecessor of the Google+ social network, using a
graph-based crawler which collects lists of Follower/Following users from each profile.
A large proportion of these profiles made use of the ‘other profiles’ feature, and as such
this dataset has gone on to be reused in several other studies on identity resolution across
OSNs [45, 85, 178]. However, Google Buzz was discontinued in 2011, and its successor
Google+ does not make a profile’s Circles (the Follower/Following relationship being
abandoned with Buzz) easily accessible for scraping.
Based on this survey, it appears that the majority of previously employed datasets
in this area of identity resolution come from sources which are no longer available for
re-sampling. Those datasets which may theoretically be re-sampled in the same manner
are of limited value, covering only small user populations.
3.2 Sampling Method
If researchers are to avoid making assumptions based on usernames, and cannot rely on
the availability of unique identifiers persisting across OSNs (such as email addresses),
then the search for ground-truth data is effectively a search for instances where a user
has stated a connection between two or more of their own profiles. Social aggregation
services are one means by which such information may be collected. However, they
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appear to be an unpredictable source, not suitable for the basis of long-term research. If
social aggregation services cannot be relied upon as indexes, then it may be better to
examine the social networks themselves for users’ revelation of connections to other
networks.
This is similar to the approach used in the tool released by Plaxo [180], which
examines the rel=‘me’ property of links to find links which a user identifies as being
another profile of theirs. This annotation does not appear to be in widespread adoption,
but it may be possible to find alternative indications that a link is intended to represent
another profile of the user.
Presuming for the moment one such OSN where one might expect to find this ground-
truth link data, terming this the primary study network or primary network, the problems
can be stated as follows:
1. Gathering a representative random sample of profiles from the primary network.
Notably, one is not interested in identifying the most connected users or in sampling
a connected subgraph of the primary network, only in a random selection of profiles
(or in graph terms, nodes).
Previous efforts focused on crawling large graphs of OSN users through the applica-
tion of breadth-first search or random walks [34] are unable to reach disconnected
components of the overall graph and are usually biased towards popular nodes by
early stopping.
Most desirable would be methods which can directly sample from the network,
such as the ability to randomly select from assigned unique identifiers, but these
indexing mechanisms are usually not publicly available.
As an alternative, the network search functionality provided by many OSNs can be
used to gather unbiased samples of profiles. This functionality is provided to users
to enable them to find other users based upon their name or other information.
Given a random selection of search attributes (such as can be constructed based
on population data such as census records), these search systems can provide a
random index into the OSN’s profiles.
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2. Identifying in randomly selected profiles those linked profiles which belong to
networks of interest. While links act as identifiers for a profile, extracting the
profile content is an involved process highly dependent on the network being
targeted. As such, it is prudent to focus on a few such networks – secondary study
networks – and discard links to other networks.
3. Gathering plausible negative examples for a ‘realistically challenging’ dataset. A
sample consisting of only those profiles which are known to be matched would be
of little use for training and evaluating a classifier. As well as positive examples of
profiles which should be matched, an appropriate sample should be made of those
profiles which are not matched in other networks, for both primary and secondary
study networks.
For any profile, it would be possible to use other profiles in the same network as
negative examples, but these profiles would make for a poor candidate set, being
mostly easily distinguishable from the true results. Instead, researchers should
opt for a candidate set which more reasonably reflects real disambiguation tasks
with public social network data – search results in the secondary study network,
with the query being constructed based on attributes of the primary network profile
from which a link was found. Such a dataset better reflects a core issue of identity
resolution: given a particular individual profile, how does one find out which of
many profiles with the same name are the ones to be connected?
Note that users voluntarily complete these fields in their profiles, and so as with
previously discussed datasets, the datasets this method aims to generate may not be valid
for adversarial profile linkage tasks, where the emphasis is on detecting a link between a
user who is attempting to mask any connection between their two profiles. Nor should
the sampling method be taken to enumerate all matching profiles in the primary network,
or any similar property which assumes an exhaustive exploration of any of the study
networks. The dataset should remain relevant for purposes such as estimating the privacy
impact of revealing certain profile attributes, testing existing identity resolution methods
and comparing behaviours between the same individuals on different social networks.
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Considering these issues, the requirements for this method are:
1. A primary study network in which users provide links which can be understood as
statements that the link refers to another profile of theirs. This network must have
a network search system which can be used for random sampling of profiles.
2. A set of secondary study networks which are linked to from the primary network.
These networks must have an index suitable for selecting negative examples.
3.3 Implementation
One of the most promising data sources as a primary network for implementing this
sampling of ground-truth data would appear to be Google+. As previously mentioned,
Google+ provides an “other profiles” field on a person’s profile page where users can
provide links to their profiles elsewhere on the web. This field is accessible via the
Google+ API and so it is possible to automatically examine the Google+ network to find
profiles which link to other profiles of the same person.
There are other reasons to favour the selection of Google+: while it is difficult to
predict the shifting landscape of OSNs, Google as an organisation seems unlikely to
disappear in the short-term, and it seems reasonably likely to maintain the Google+
service or an equivalent network for the next few years. At the same time, a number of
influential studies referenced above have historically made use of a dataset drawn from
Google profiles.
The primary network must also have a search system which can be used to perform
random sampling from the network. This is drawn from the approach of Gonzalez et.
al. [87], whereby a random sample of names from a large list of uncommon surnames
are used as input into Google+’s profile search API, and those result sets numbering
less than Google+’s cap on responses are taken as an unbiased sample of profiles. The
aim of using uncommon surnames is to increase the likelihood of retrieving result sets
numbering less than the results cap. Because the Google+ search API limits the number
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of returned profiles to a maximum of 300 per query1, and these results are ordered by
popularity, a sample which includes all search results would be biased towards more
popular users. Therefore, the implementation accepts only those profiles returned by
queries which have fewer than 300 results in total.
In detail, the method proceeds as follows.
1. Initial search terms are randomly selected from a list of 128,000 uncommon US
surnames. Following Gonzalez et al. [87] this list was drawn from those surnames
which occurred more than 100 times and less than 1000 times in the US Census
20002. The US makes up a majority (55%) of the Google+ userbase, and so is the
best national census for this purpose [207].
2. The Google+ search API is queried for these terms. Those result sets with < 300
items are taken as unbiased.
3. The search phase completed, all publicly available data on the accepted profiles
is downloaded via the Google+ API. Two formats are used to store the data –
one which records the exact queries and the raw responses, and another which
standardises the data into a Profile object.
4. The ‘other profiles’ sections of the Google+ profiles gathered are examined to
establish the ground-truth true links. Where a link is made to one of the secondary
networks, that link is queued for download and a record is made of the connection
between the two profiles.
5. The full name attributes of the Google+ profiles are then gathered to create a
second set of search terms.
6. This second search term list is then entered into the search functionality for each of
the secondary networks, and the resulting profiles are queued for later download.
These results form the realistic candidate set for attempted identity resolution from
the seed profile.
1At the time of publication for Gonzalez et al.[87], this limit was 1000
2Data on surnames occurring less than 100 times was not available
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7. The profiles indicated by the true links and the candidate sets from the name-based
searches are then downloaded from their respective networks’ APIs, and stored in
the same manner as the Google+ profiles.
There are a few implications of this method which should be borne in mind. Firstly,
surnames of profiles will be unusually distinctive as compared with a population average,
though the procedure for selection of negative results given above should mitigate this
impact. Secondly, these names are those which are uncommon in the United States. As
previously addressed by Gonzalez et al, the diverse immigrant history of the United
States combined with the US bias in Google+ membership would mitigate the US-centric
aspect of this concern, but there are possible correlates of low-incidence surnames with
recent immigration and thus socio-economic status and perhaps in turn lower digital
literacy. Next, it should be noted that the sample mechanism used has only 128,000
different search possibilities, with a proportional chance of collision, and also a maximum
theoretical result size of 38,272,000 Google+ profiles (though in practice there are likely
to be far fewer than this). Finally, there will be at most 299 Google+ profiles with the
same name, so for a method attempting specifically to discriminate between such profiles,
its capability cannot be demonstrated as greater than this limit.
3.3.1 Secondary study networks
Only nodes from a specific set of OSNs should be selected, these OSNs are termed the
secondary study networks. Extracting structured information from profile pages involves
API queries for the content of profile pages identified by URLs, analysis of which must be
specific to the social network in question. Additionally, name-based search functionality
must be implemented for each social network being sampled, in order to furnish negative
examples. Therefore it is important to find the social networking sites which form a
strong initial set of study networks from which to draw samples.
A number of constraints exist, including that the network in question must make
profiles public (to members of the network, if not the wider internet) and allow for
name-based search. The main deciding factor for including a network will be whether a
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Table 3.1 Most commonly linked profile networks.
significant number of Google+ profiles link to profiles in the network, as this furnishes
researchers with a greater number of positive examples to analyse, and focuses efforts
on linkage tasks likely to be of more value in application scenarios. The method could
easily be extended to include less-frequently-linked networks, though researchers may
need to select larger initial samples from Google+ to get representative sets of linked
profiles. Using the proposed sampling procedure for Google+ profiles and examining
those profiles with links to other networks, counts were made of links to other networks.
As shown in Table 3.1, the most common networks which were not other services
owned by Google (which one might expect to be overrepresented, and are increasingly
integrated into Google+) were Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn. These top three networks
would appear to be mostly suitable as secondary networks, with some minor caveats
regarding their accessibility: for example, LinkedIn does not offer a global name-based




The implementation is realised in a Python tool3 capable of sampling ground-truth data
from the primary and secondary networks given in this paper. The primary evaluation of
the sampling method is to compare the distribution of certain node attributes in different
samples gathered by the implementation. The node attributes that are the simplest to
compare in this manner are numerical, so the distribution of certain numeric properties of
nodes – such as counts of followers and posts – is examined in different samples gathered
from the Google+ and Twitter profile networks via the implemented sampling method.
Using the methodology described above, two large independent samples are gathered
from both the Google+ and Twitter networks. The two samples of the Google+ network
had respective sizes of 4,986 and 11,719 nodes, while the samples of the Twitter network
had 8,259 and 17,862 nodes. These samples (henceforth Datasets 1 & 2) were gathered
over Oct-Nov 2015 and Dec-Jan 2016 respectively. A number of numeric properties
were recorded reflecting attributes of interest to identity-resolution research.
One could attempt to demonstrate a lack of statistically significant differences
between these samples by aiming to fail a statistical test such as the two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. However, the large sample sizes mean that a direct test
for statistically significant differences between the two samples would likely be overpow-
ered for the usual critical values, with a high chance of committing a Type I error and
finding a false difference between the groups.
Rather than focusing on statistical significance, it is possible to test whether there are
important differences between the samples by comparing the effect sizes between the
two samples. Table 3.2 shows comparisons between counts of attributes for each node.
Cohen’s d is the typical measure of effect size, but its calculation relies on assumptions
of normality which are violated in social network data, which tends to follow power-law
distributions. Instead, a nonparametric measure of effect size is applied. This measure is
known as Cliff’s δ , and has been recommended specifically for such situations [145].
3https://github.com/Betawolf/identity-sampler
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Other properties of the two samples may impact their comparability for research
purposes. This can be more directly examined by reference to the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence, also known as information gain when using one sample in order to approximate
the other. This measure directly relates to the intended use of the sampling mechanism
– as a means for researchers to compare results obtained on one sample with existing
results obtained on a similarly collected sample. Table 3.2 reports the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence between the two samples, with measures discretised into 15 bins for
computation4. As the KL divergence is non-symmetrical between distributions, the
figures reported are the average of both directions of the measure.
Property G+ |δ | Tw |δ | G+ KL Tw KL
Age∗ <0.01 – 0.01 –
NumFollowers 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00
NumFollowing – 0.03 – 0.00
NumInteracted 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.01
NumLocations <0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
NumTexts 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01
NumDescribes 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02
NumLinks 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04
NumPics <0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
NumTimes 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.01
Table 3.2 Nonparametric effect sizes and average KL-divergence for comparison of the
two samples from the Google+ and Twitter networks. ∗Age where available.
The KL results show that very little divergence is present between the two samples,
or, alternately, that very little information is lost when using one to approximate the
other. Similarly, The average of all δ for Google+ comparisons is <0.03 and for Twitter
is <0.04, indicating a very low practical difference overall between properties in the
two samples – the usual standard for a ’small’ effect size is 0.2. The large sample size
increases confidence that this result is not due to a failure to detect larger effects.
4Based on Sturge’s formula, k = ⌈log2n+1⌉
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3.5 Application of Existing Identity Resolution Approach
As a secondary evaluation of the proposed approach, an existing identity resolution
method is applied to both of the datasets. This serves to illustrate a possible use of these
samples and further validates the comparability of results drawn from different samples.
The aim here is not to provide a novel and competitive classifier, but to demonstrate the
viability of the suggested replication method.




Fig. 3.1 ROC plots for individual feature classifiers
Following Goga et al. [85], the three features they used for identity resolution are
investigated: the name, profile image and location of each pair of profiles.
3.5.1 Username
Usernames have often been considered a useful feature in identity resolution. Perito et
al. [178] provide a full treatment of this topic. However, facets of the sampling method
make names unlikely to be effective features: the ‘display name’ feature was used to
generate the negative examples, so all comparisons are between profiles with highly
similar names.
The effect is that names are not highly discriminative features in the comparisons
made in the datasets, as shown in Figure 3.1a. In fact, the average Levenshtein distance
between matched pairs of profiles was actually greater than the distance between un-
matched pairs (5.82 and 4.01 for matched vs 2.75 and 3.24 for unmatched). This is the
reverse of the normally expected direction in broader comparisons.
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3.5.2 Image
A perceptual hashing technique is used to identify the key features of all profile images.
The Hamming distance between two hashes [120] is then used to test for superficial
adjustments to the same avatar image. This feature showed some small but consistent
discrimination, with the average Hamming distance between matched pairs being 27.72
and 27.02 for Datasets 1 and 2 respectively, and 31.66 and 31.94 between unmatched
pairs. Just as Goga et al. discovered, simple threshold-based classification using this
image feature has poor recall, but high precision – not many users do use the same profile
image, but when they do they are very likely to be the same person. As Figure 3.1b
shows, this means this type of image similarity performs poorly as a classifier by itself.
3.5.3 Location
Location data such as geolocated status updates or persistent ‘hometown’ or ‘location’
fields can be a good feature when it is available. However, location data is quite rare in
the datasets, and this rarity is compounded by location comparisons only being possible
where both profiles have location data: only 72 of 9558 comparisons in Dataset 2 and 17
of 1309 comparisons in Dataset 1 could use geodesic distance as a feature, even where
any available location information was used (i.e., both tagged status updates and stated
profile locations).
As Figure 3.1c shows, however, within this small (< 1%) subset, location distance
was highly predictive.
3.5.4 Combined
The identifiability of these features was investigated jointly as part of a binary logis-
tic regression classifier combining all three features, using a ten-fold cross-validation
approach.
An important issue for classification tasks such as this is the handling of missing data.
The majority of comparisons lack a location distance component, so how this is handled
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(a) Omitting records with
missing features
(b) Missing features replaced
with means
(c) Subsampling 1000 of
each dataset
Fig. 3.2 ROC plots for combined classifiers
has a significant impact on model performance. Naively omitting records with missing
data produces good-looking performance, as shown in Figure 3.2a, but tells us little
about performance for the majority of cases. Imputing missing data with feature averages
produces a more muted performance across more examples, shown in Figure 3.2b.
Performance in general was quite poor where location information was not available,
unlike the findings of Goga et al. [85]. This can be attributed largely to the differences in
the discriminative ability of the username feature, as this has poor performance within
the dataset due to the manner in which negative examples are gathered and comparisons
are made.
The aim here was not to provide a competitive identity-resolution approach, but
to demonstrate the comparability of results obtained through different samples via our
methodology. It can be seen from the ROC plots that this is validated, with curves
following the same trajectories with only minor deviations. Dataset 2 does tend to
produce marginally better performance, but this is due to training benefiting from a larger
sample size. Randomly subsampling 1000 data points from both samples produces a
much closer match, as illustrated in Figure 3.2c.
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3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Implications for identity-resolution research
This chapter presented a sampling mechanism for gathering ground-truth links between
profile networks and appropriate negative examples, in proportion to their appearance in
real-world data. The evaluations confirm that samples being drawn in this manner are
sufficiently comparable that methods developed against one sample should transfer to
other samples drawn in the same manner with minimal impact – based on this initial
analysis one could expect even small effect sizes to be replicated between experiments
performed on different samples. It can also be expected that ROC curves from a method
trialled on one dataset to closely track those from another.
A common reference point for experimentation is necessary for researchers to com-
pare their methodologies, and sampling mechanisms which reflect their population are
necessary for properly grounding results. Both comparison and reference to the true
population are necessary for advancing the state of the art. It is hoped that this sampling
method will be used by researchers in identity resolution as a basis for reproducing
each others’ results and comparing identity-resolution systems which make use of the
heterogeneous data available in OSN profiles, something which has been hindered by the
difficulties in obtaining and sharing such privacy-sensitive data.
The implementation presented focuses on the Google+ profile network as its primary
network. However, the method is not restricted to application on just this network.
Any OSN which provides a similar field to the ‘other profiles’ field within Google+
and makes this field publicly accessible would prove a suitable replacement. Indeed,
recent work in identity resolution has started to recognise the identification use of URLs
included in Twitter profiles [112]. While this field is less well-designated than the ‘other
profiles’ field on Google+, and its utility as a source of ground-truth must be investigated,
it would provisionally appear to be a candidate replacement for the Google+ ‘other
profiles’ attribute which would allow samples to be drawn with Twitter as the primary
network. This could improve the throughput of the system. It is also possible that
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conventional blogging platforms might provide a long-lasting index which is open to
more conventional web-scraping approaches, which might allow a future implementation
to sidestep API limitations.
Similarly, the implementation presented suggests that blocking – the generation of
candidate record pairs for identity resolution – be based on the name of one or more
profiles, as this is the search mechanism used for collecting negative examples. This
is not necessarily problematic, as name fields are often used as blocking keys, but it
should be noted that alternative search systems can be used for finding candidate profiles,
including searches based on content and network properties as described by Jain et
al. [113]. Generally speaking, any property which can be used to generate negative
examples from search of secondary study networks can also be used for blocking.
This may be particularly important when considering the performance of classifiers
which include profile name similarity as a key feature, as sampling negative results based
on name necessarily reduces its utility as a distinguishing feature. Such a task, however,
realistically reflects real-world challenges in disambiguating users with the same or
similar names.
Finally, note that while this approach is particularly tailored to research for iden-
tifying links between profiles on OSNs, the generation of accurate ground-truth data
is a recognised problem for identity resolution in general [124], and it is possible that
this sampling approach could be informative for researchers working within similar
constraints, such as in bibliographical or medical record linkage.
3.6.2 Selection bias & limitations
As noted, the tool does not generate data which is appropriate to adversarial identity
resolution – where the owner of the profile has anticipated a potential attempt to connect
their identity, and worked to frustrate such efforts. The users for which positive matches
are available are those who have volunteered the connection between their profiles, and
could hypothetically be systematically more consistent in their presentation than profiles
linked through some other means. A valuable angle for future work would be to explore
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how adversarial, voluntary and otherwise inferred true connections differ in their profile
consistency, to estimate effect size reduction from datasets such as are generated by this
tool.
There are other selection concerns connected to the current implementation’s use
of Google+ and a US population index. Google+ itself may have particular social
biases (e.g., towards early-adopters within the tech community) which influence the
matching rate with other OSNs, and the consistency of contained profiles. Similarly,
the sampling mechanism implemented may unduly weight results towards US profiles,
which could be less representative for identity resolution in other domains. Finally, it
must be acknowledged that the trends of social media are fast-moving, and even using
OSNs themselves to identify links could prove fragile, as the population moves on to
new OSNs or even more novel platforms, wherein new sampling mechanisms may have
to be designed.
3.6.3 Limitations of the tool
The potential for one or more OSNs to alter or close their public API is a partial threat
to continued functionality of the sampling tool. While the tool has been designed
in a modular manner, so that secondary study network APIs which no longer work
need not impair the general operation of the tool, it is likely that maintenance will be
necessary to keep these modules functional. Policy changes on the part of the OSN may
similarly affect the data this tool is able to provide to researchers. Note also that potential
improvements in the speed and reliability of the tool could be achieved through sustained
development.
This work has concentrated on development of a sampling tool which uses the APIs
provided by the OSNs, using only the access rights granted to any app developer. This is
ethically necessary: the sampling position as members of the public ensures no improper
access is gained to the profile content of users by e.g. befriending them, or paying for
profile information as an advertiser. Authentication with the OSN means their release
of the data being sampled is tracked and recorded. However, use of the APIs for these
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services can be limiting – in some cases, content which a member of the public may view
on the web is not available within the API.
A possible solution to these limits would be to apply web-scraping technology to
enrich profile data. This would bypass many hurdles with API limitations. However, this
is not a straightforward proposition: modern OSNs make extensive use of asynchronously-
loaded content, with little profile information accessible at the initial page load. Scraping
technology has advanced in step, but a scraper intent on accessing large numbers of
profiles may also have to contend with accounts and IP addresses being blacklisted,
necessitating greater infrastructural requirements – such as a cooperating network of
machines – for any sampling tool, which would hinder replication. Overcoming these
issues may require centralisation of the sampling tool as a service for researchers, which
re-opens questions about sharing profile data.
3.6.4 Privacy and ethics
The issue underlying the design of this sampling mechanism can be described as an
ethical tension. It is easy for scientists to identify that making their results replicable
is ethically necessary, this having long been a guiding principle of science. A direct
approach to satisfying this replication requirement would be to release all the data used in
an experiment, and in most areas this is still appropriate. At the same time, however, there
is an increasing recognition of the paramount ethical obligations to protect the privacy
of data subjects [143]. Even where, as in psychology or the social sciences, waivers
can be be gathered to permit the release of some personal information, only relevant
data is collected and communicated, to reduce the risk of a subject being identified. In
large-scale studies of social networks, contacting profile owners for approval would be
impractical, and in the field of identity resolution in particular it is not sensible to talk of
removing personally identifiable information from a data release (except perhaps as a
research challenge). Researchers are presented with a difficult choice: either they never
release their data, protecting their subjects but hindering the development of their field,
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or else release it, and risk harm to their many subjects and perhaps also personal legal
consequences.
This chapter’s contribution has been to identify a means for researchers in identity
resolution – and related fields – to fulfil their ethical duties to their profession and
colleagues without revealing the personal information of their subjects, drawing upon
the reachability of a common population for sampling purposes. However, the solution
cannot be said to entirely remove the underlying tension. For one, researchers must
remain cautious about how they store and present data from these samples. For another,
the scraping countermeasures discussed above require a careful response: the decreasing
availability of useful ground-truth data about the identities of social media users may
be a barrier for research in this field, but it could also be more positively viewed as
an indication that social networking sites are becoming more protective of their users’
privacy.
3.7 Summary
A review of the data sources from previous identity-resolution literature reveals that the
majority of sources are no longer available for reuse or re-sampling, and those which are
available are of limited value due to their constrained scope.
On the basis that mining the social networks themselves may be a source of ground
truth information, a sampling methodology is described for producing realistically
challenging datasets based on the visible cross-links from randomly sampled nodes,
using the search features provided by social networks to collect both the initial population
samples and negative examples that complement cross-links with realistic candidate sets.
An implementation of such a system is given for the Google+ social network, linking
to profiles on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn. In an evaluation of this method, profile
characteristics from two samples are compared to show their low deviation, and identity-
resolution methods from previous literature are applied to demonstrate comparable results
across samples.
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Finally, a discussion is made of the limitations of this approach and implementation,
along with areas where improvements could be made in future work.
Chapter 4
Modelling and Valuing Online Profile
Information
This chapter presents the ACU model for understanding the identification value of
attributes in profiles. Return to the example from Chapter 1, of the police officer
searching amongst profiles with the same name as one offered up in evidence. How can
he know which pieces of these profiles are useful to compare?
The first stage in answering this question would be to have a consistent theoretical
system for understanding in general the identification value of a profile attribute. Such
a system is described in Section 4.2 below. The next step would be to obtain a schema
for understanding which attributes on profiles from different networks are functionally
similar, so that they could be identified for comparison. This schema-building activity is
detailed in Section 4.3. Finally, empirical measurements to inform the model must be
made, for the components of the theoretical model, using the schema from the previous
stage. Measurements in this regard are presented in Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. Finally,
these values can be combined according to the model and a general identification value
can be extracted for each schema item. The officer, or another user of the method, can
then understand which attributes are useful to their application of identity resolution.
4.1 Background 120
4.1 Background
We begin in identity resolution with a selection of datasets D= [d1,d2, . . .d j, . . .dn]. Each
dataset contains some number of records R = [r1,r2, . . .rl, . . .ro] relating to an individual,
with fields F = [ f1, f2, . . . fi, . . . fm] relating to their different features within the dataset,
such as name, age, etc. We can construct a matching schema to understand which fields,
speaking across all records, are defined in a manner comparable to other fields in different
datasets so that F is consistent across all datasets, even if for some datasets there are
no corresponding values in records for a particular field fi that is shared between other
datasets, because that dataset did not contain a comparable piece of information.
The goal of identity resolution is to understand when a record d jrl can be treated
as equivalent to another d jrl ≡ dkrm. The ≡ operator here means that the records are
equivalent as a result of referring to the same individual. The ≡ operator will also be
used between fields for particular records to indicate successful comparison between the
values – the particular age or name given for that record. For example, d jrl fi ≡ dkrm fi
indicates equivalence between the value given for a field fi in two records d jrl and dkrm,
which happen to be from different datasets. The similarity of values held in a field fi
lends support to the hypothesis that the two records should be considered equivalent.
The term ‘profiles’ is used interchangeably with that of ‘records’, and ‘attribute’ is used
interchangeably with ‘field’.
In prior work, Goga et al. [84] proposed the ACID framework for understanding
the reliability of identity-resolution schemes in online social networks. This framework
suggests that matching scheme reliability be understood as depending on four properties
of fields (so each measure is defined for a field fi). Below, that framework is restated in
the terms defined.
Availability The probability that profile attributes for individual profiles d jrl and dkrm
which are matched across distinct datasets have values d jrl fi and dkrm fi available
in both datasets.
A = P(∃d jrl fi∩∃dkrm fi|d jrl ≡ dkrm)∀l,m∈1...o∀ j,k∈1...n (4.1)
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Consistency The probability that the similarity function s for the two values d jrl fi
and dkrm fi produces a result greater than some threshold value th, given that the
profiles d jrl and dkrm do refer to the same entity and both values are available.
C = P(s(d jrl fi,dkrm fi)> th|d jrl ≡ dkrm,∃d jrl fi∩∃dkrm fi)∀l,m∈1...o∀ j,k∈1...n
(4.2)
non-Impersonability The probability that the value dkrm fi has not been intentionally
duplicated from the value d jrl fi by an attacker, so that the maximum similarity
between two values d jrl fi and dkrm fi (where dkrm fi is drawn from a set of possible
impersonator values V I) is less than a threshold th.
nI = P( max
dkrm fi∈V I
s(d jrl fi,dkrm fi)< th)∀l,m∈1...o∀ j,k∈1...n (4.3)
Discriminability The probability that an attribute value dkrx fi from the set of non-
matching profiles dkrx ∋ {dkrm,d jrl} is less similar to d jrl than some threshold th.
D = P( max
dkrx∋{dkrm,d jrl}
s(d jrl fi,dkrx fi)< th | nI(d jrl,dkrx))∀l,m∈1...o∀ j,k∈1...n (4.4)
They attempt to measure some of these probabilities with reference to a small set of
possible attributes, and use them to explore the practical limits of some existing identity
resolution approaches [84].
This chapter presents ACU, a refined, expanded and repurposed version of the ACID
framework, suitable for application to understanding the identification value of individual
profile attributes in both identity resolution and record linkage generally. The model
rests on the availability, consistency and uniqueness of profile information. Alongside
this revised model a grounded schema is presented for profile attributes in the domain of
online social networking. These two components are then combined in the collection
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of domain-general estimates of the identification value of each of the attributes in the
schema, according to the components of the ACU framework.
Chapter 5 will further explore the application of these domain-general identification
value estimates to improving general-purpose classifiers, demonstrating an application in
feature selection under missing data conditions.
Chapter 6 will discuss possible extensions to the ACU framework, including re-
integration of the concept of non-Impersonability under the label of Veracity.
4.2 The ACU Framework
This section will describe three properties which are necessary for understanding the
identification value of the fields of records for record linkage purposes. The identifi-
cation value of fields can be contextually sensitive, so here two applications should be
distinguished: the task-specific identification value of fields and their domain-general
identification value.
The task-specific identification value of a field is the expected utility of that field in a
specific record linkage task between two or more datasets1. This necessarily implies a
restricted domain (for example, joining two bibliography datasets), and where ground-
truth data is available, an appropriate statistical analysis will reveal a direct measurement
of the variance in match prediction being explained by each field. Of course, ground-truth
data is often not available a priori for real-world record linkage tasks, and so alternative
means of identifying valuable information are desirable.
The domain-general identification value of a field is a generalisation of the expected
utility of that field in a certain class of record linkage tasks. This class should be defined
by a matching schema which covers the major fields which are available in any of the
datasets for which linkage might be attempted. This ontologically grounds the domain.
For example, domain-general identification values might be estimated for the fields
which are available in most bibliography datasets, for the purpose of understanding
which fields are generally useful in linking bibliographical records.
1Or indeed in a de-duplication task within a single dataset.
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The domain-general identification value is thus the upper limit case on the task-
specific identification value. If the expectation of the task-specific identification value of
some field fi in a linkage task between two datasets is some function
E( fi) = h(d1,d2)
of the two datasets d1 and d2, and in general for n datasets is an average




it can also be helpful to think of the relationship between task-specific identification
value and domain-general value in terms of sampling theory, where the task-specific
value is a property of a sample, and the domain-general value is the related population
statistic. As will be examined in Chapter 5, an estimate of the domain-general value can
also be used as an a priori estimate of the task-specific identification value of a field.
The ACU framework consists of three properties: availability, consistency and
uniqueness. These properties are orthogonal dimensions for understanding the identifica-
tion value of any of the fields F = [ f1, f2, . . . fi, . . . fm] in a matching schema of n fields.
The selection of fields in a matching schema is based on on the common and correspond-
ing fields which are usually visible in the application domain D = [d1,d2, . . .d j, . . .dn]
of datasets. In the task-specific case, D is the datasets across which records should be
linked. In the domain-general case, D is the set of possible datasets which typify the
area. In both cases, availability, consistency and uniqueness measure different properties
which combine to determine the expected utility of any field fi in record linkage.
4.2.1 Availability
The availability definition given in Eq. 4.1 is made conditional on the known true
match status of two records. Within the authors’ context of the reliability of a linkage
method, this definition limits consideration to only the records most relevant to method
reliability. However, this definition severely limits the property in the context of attribute
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identification value, by leaving it undefined for non-matched or unknown match status
records.
The alternative is to remove this restriction, and define availability as the probability
that for a field fi from the matching scheme there are at least some non-null values d j fi
and dk fi in records from datasets d j and dk respectively
A( fi) = P(∃d j fi ̸= /0∩∃dk fi ̸= /0)∀ j,k∈1...n (4.5)
This has the desirable property of being calculable without the provision of ground-
truth data on match statuses, and thus usable by record linkage practitioners without the
need for manual classification or model training.
Additionally, in many cases the task-specific identification value might be approxi-
mated by
A( fi) = Ag fi
2 (4.6)
where Ag fi is a domain-general estimate of the internal availability of fi
Ag fi = P(∃d j fi ̸= /0)∀ j∈1...n (4.7)
and so with suitable domain-general estimates, approximations of A fi can be used to
inform model-building even before access is granted to the target datasets2.
Furthermore, in the domain-general case, this definition can be usefully decomposed
into two components: the structural support for a field within a domain
SS( fi) = P(∃d j fi)∀ j∈1...n (4.8)
which measures the probability that a field exists within a dataset from the domain D,
and the complementary component of completeness
CM( fi) = P(d j fi ̸= /0|∃d j fi)∀ j∈1...n (4.9)
2Much in the same way domain expertise enables the same thing.
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which measures the probability that that field contains a non-null value for any given
record in a dataset d j. Thus decomposed, availability spans two distinct explanations for
missing data for a field fi and dataset d j, that either
1. the field in question was not intended to be recorded in this dataset; or
2. the field in question was intended to be recorded in this dataset, but individual
records are missing values for this field.
The ability to distinguish between these cases is important, as remedies for one
(reviewing data entry methods, making fields mandatory) are not applicable to the other.
This decomposition is still valid in the task-specific case, however, in such cases
the structural support is resolved to a binary variable (either the fields exist or they do
not) and non-existent fields would be omitted by sensible matching schema design, so
considerations of completeness alone will dominate the measurement of availability.
4.2.2 Consistency
The definition of consistency given in Eq. 4.2 and its extended discussion [84] identifies
consistency as being a probability of the output of some field similarity function s() being
above a certain threshold th. However, the introduction of a threshold into this definition
is unnecessary, as s() itself should be an appropriate probability for the definition of
consistency between two attribute values.
Thus, the definition of consistency is the probability that two values are equivalent,
given that a) The records containing these fields are in fact referring to the same entity;
b) both fields exist and are non-null in the given records.
C( fi) = P(d jrl fi ≡ dkrm fi|d jrl ≡ dkrm,A( fi) = 1)∀l,m∈1...o∀ j,k∈1...n (4.10)
This probability of equivalence can then be given by the appropriate similarity
function s for the field fi of known matched records. Definition of the similarity function
is domain-specific.
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One benefit of this definition is that it permits consistency information to be used in a
Bayesian analysis, giving consistency a known role in Bayesian probabilistic approaches
to record linkage. Bayes’ rule establishes the manner in which one conditional probability






Then once values can be obtained for
P(A) = P(d jrl ≡ dkrm∩A( fi))
P(B) = P(d jrl fi ≡ dkrm fi)
a probability can be obtained for the likelihood that two records match, given that
two fields match (expressed in terms of A( fi), but as noted before this is easily calculable
for a given task).
P(A|B) = P(d jrl ≡ dkrm∩A( fi))|d jrl fi ≡ dkrm fi)
The value of P(A), the expected overlap rate between datasets, will be task-dependent.
The value of P(B), the base rate of equivalences, is the inverse of the uniqueness of
field’s values, as discussed below.
4.2.3 Uniqueness
Goga et al. acknowledge in their initial statement of the ACID framework that the
version of ‘discriminability’ given by Eq. 4.4 is practically impossible to estimate without
4.2 The ACU Framework 127
knowledge of impersonating profiles [84]. They instead work with a proxy definition:
Dˆ = P( max
dkrx∋{dkrm,d jrl}
s(d jrl fi,dkrx fi)< th)∀l,m∈1...o∀ j,k∈1...n (4.12)
Taking this revised equation 4.12 as a basis, but also remaining consistent with the
approach to the similarity function s() outlined in the definition of Eq. 4.10, allows for a
revised definition of:
U( fi) = P(d jrl fi ̸= dkrm fi|d jrl ̸= dkrm)∀l,m∈1...o∀ j,k∈1...n (4.13)
That is, uniqueness is the probability that two non-matching records’ values for
the field fi will not match by chance. This probability, and its complement, have a
number of desirable properties. Firstly, as mentioned above, Uˆ( fi) = 1−U( fi) fulfills
the denominator in Eq. 4.11, thus integrating all three terms of the framework into
Bayesian approaches to probabilistic record linkage.









P(xi) logb P(xi) (4.14)
most critically in that it rises in proportion to the number of distinct values which
a field may hold, and thus existing solutions for measuring entropy can be utilised
(however, entropy itself is not expressed as a probability).
Third, in the case of identity resolution and other areas where very low match-rates
are to be expected, uniqueness can be approximated as
U( fi)≃ P(d jrl fi ̸= dkrm fi)
which is calculable without known match states, or alternatively as
U( fi)≃ P(d jrl fi ̸= d jrm fi|l ̸= m)
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within a single dataset d j if match rates cannot be assumed to be low, but duplication
within a single dataset is known not to exist.
4.2.4 Combination
Returning to equation Eq. 4.11, all the necessary components are in place to construct,
for a given field and similarity function, from a dataset in a particular domain, I( fi),
the conditional probability of a match in terms of a similarity function, weighting the
function by both its prior performance on this kind of task and the availability of the





By the earlier justified substitutions of P(similarity)with 1−U( fi), and P(similarity|match)




As the value of P(match) is a constant factor within a particular dataset, it has no
bearing on the comparative weighting of field/similarity functions and can be omitted.
For comparisons of feature weights between different datasets it should be retained, but
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This formula agrees with a secondary derivation from the classical statistical treat-
ment. Recall the value-specific frequency ratio given in Eq. 2.2. The terms in that model
record, for a specific value of a field, the frequency of agreement between matched records
and between unmatched records. This relates to the definitions above for C( fi)|A( fi) (As
frequency of agreement weights agreement where complete by possibility of agreement)
and 1−U( fi). A simple generalisation of Newcombe’s method to the case of attributes,
then would set the identification value of an attribute as
I( fi) = log2(
C( fi)A( fi)
1−U( fi) ) (4.16)
Which is a simple and useful transformation of the weights given by 4.15.
4.2.5 Multiple fields
The previous discussion focuses on finding the identification value of a singular field
fi through the three measures of availability, consistency and uniqueness. However, it
might be asked how this model extends to measuring these properties for the combination
of n fields from F , which can be termed Fn.
Values of availability extended across multiple fields will tend to decrease as the
number of fields included in the definition increases. Take for example a set of fields
such as a username, a location and a profile picture in a domain. The availability of the
field f1, username, may be 1. The availability of the field f2, location may be lower, at
0.4, and for f3 it may be 0.2. The availability of the combination { f1, f2} must be at
most that of the least available component, 0.4. The availability of { f1, f2, f3} similarly
must be at most 0.2. The lower bound on the availability will depend on the relationship
3Given very low empirical correlations observed later in this chapter, this assumption would seem to be
justified
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between the availability of the individual pairs. If we assume the two are independent,
then the availability would be 1×0.4×0.2 = 0.08. However, this availability could be
correlated (users with locations always give pictures), in which case availability would be
0.2, or anti-correlated (users with locations never give pictures) in which case availability
would be 0.
A similar process should hold for consistency. The consistency of any two fields
in concert is, in the best case, the product of the consistency of each component field,
and any combination of fields cannot be more consistent than the least consistent field
amongst the components.
For uniqueness, the combination produces a different result. For a given record rl
the number of records in dk (a dataset of m records) which accidentally share with rl a
comparable value for fi may be I, and for f j may be J. The number of records which
by chance share comparable values for both f1 and f2 is, under independence Im × Jm , or
under correlation of uniqueness of f1 and f2 is min(I,J). In either case, the number of
chance matches tends to decrease as the number of fields increases, thereby raising the
uniqueness as more fields are added, as there are fewer possible accidental matches.
Combining multiple fields then becomes a tradeoff between the falling values of
consistency and availability (which, it must be stressed, are multiplicative in the general
identification value definition given in Eq. 4.15) and the rising value of uniqueness.
Where adding additional fields fails to raise combined uniqueness of Fn more than it
decreases the product of consistency and availability (and whether this is the case will be
dependent on these measurement figures for the field in question), the additional fields
are harmful to the identification value of Fn.
4.2.6 Summary
This section has defined the ACU framework for establishing the identity value of fields
in a record linkage task, extending and refining the ACID framework presented in recent
literature.
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The ACID framework includes one term, non-Impersonability of attributes, which
is not represented under the ACU framework. There are two primary reasons for this.
First, it is not clear how values for non-Impersonability can be reliably established from a
dataset. Such measurements might be accomplished by identifying actual impersonating
accounts and examining the attributes held in common with the original profiles compared
to baseline or matched profiles, but on a large scale network it may be difficult to gather
appropriate ground-truth to support such an analysis. Goga et al. themselves only identify
potential impersonators [84], and it is not clear that these are well distinguished from
profiles with similar attributes occurring by chance.
Secondly, non-Impersonability is a property which is only meaningful in identity
resolution, and perhaps primarily in the domain of online social networks. It does not
extend to record linkage tasks in other domains, and as such it limits the applicability
of the ACID framework to a narrow domain. By removing this property, the ACU
simultaneously broadens the scope for its application and increases its ease of use.
In the following sections, this chapter proceeds by first describing how a matching
schema of online profiles was grounded and built. Next, each of the ACU properties is
described in detail with reference to this domain, and estimates of the domain-general
value of each property are made for each of the profile attributes from the schema. These
estimates are derived based on data gathered via the method described in Chapter 3, and
on previous literature. Finally, the chapter concludes by examining these empirically
grounded estimates of identification value, and how well such values correlate with each
other and the existing understanding of the identification value of profile elements in
identity-resolution literature.
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4.3 Building a Matching Schema for User Profile Infor-
mation
In a record linkage system, it is important to build a matching schema which can represent
information from different data sources in a common format, so that attributes can be
compared for equivalency. For identity resolution across online social networks, this
would mean creating a schema to map the essential attributes of online user profiles.
Some previous work has been attempted in this area, but the schemas so derived
are of questionable relevance. Chandler [38] provides a detailed discussion of identity
construction on personal web pages, along with a structured list of their key features, but
this feature set from 1998 does not fit well with the modern, service-defined user profile
pages and the updated set of media they make available. More modern efforts such as
the FOAF ontology [60] do better at reflecting certain aspects of modern profile pages,
but are both too domain-specific (identifying attributes for particular online services) and
fail to capture several important aspects of profile pages such as popularity information.
In a typical record linkage setting, a matching schema would be constructed between
two or more databases which are intended to be connected. The application area of
this chapter is not resolution between any particular set of online profile datasets, but
understanding identifiability across the range of possible online services. To support
such a goal, the model of user profiles presented in this section is constructed based on a
sample of online profile datasets such as online social networks.
The broadest possible support for this model would be a review of the structure
of all sites hosting public user profiles, but this standard is impractical for a manual
review. One alternative approach would be to focus on a selection of websites which
contain the greatest number of user profiles, but comparable information on the size of
online communities is difficult to obtain, perhaps in part because such information is
increasingly considered commercially sensitive.
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Instead, this section draws on websites selected for a high overall volume of web
traffic, based upon figures provided by Alexa4. The top 100 such domains were manually
examined (in 2014) for public user profile pages, with 65 unique domains found to contain
appropriate profile information. The Alexa rankings included many highly-ranked sites
which were effective duplicates of each other5, so such duplicates were resolved, the
domains representing a total of 39 distinct services, four of which proved difficult to
translate and were omitted, leaving a total of 35. It is important to note the limitations
of this selection procedure: in the case of social sites like Twitter, Facebook or Reddit,
traffic volume will usually correlate with user population, but this does not necessarily
hold for sites such as Wikipedia or the BBC, where typical traffic is consumption-oriented
and few visitors create public profiles.
Figure 4.1 lists the different sites examined, with categorisation according to their
function and the number of different information items found for each site. Different site
categories appear to carry profiles with similar levels of detail.
Clear leaders in information content are typical social networking sites such as
Google and Facebook, as might be expected. Pornographic sites also rank highly, with
detailed biographical pages for members, who seem to use these pages in a similar
manner to a dating site. Question-and-answer forums such as StackOverflow also seem
slightly above-average in the number of information items present.
Knowledge-building sites like IMDB and Wikipedia ranked low for user profile
content, as did news sites, blogs and video-sharing sites. Aside from blogs, these
categories are largely those where user profiles are less central to site functionality.
Blogs and Wikipedia user pages are notable in that both may carry more structured
information about the user in optional widgets, which have uneven adoption, and so were
not considered integral to the profile pages.
Following is a model of user profiles, based on the information which was structurally
and publicly available in the surveyed user profiles across these high-traffic sites [68].
4http://alexa.com (2014)
5For example, google.com and google.co.uk may differ in their user population, but the profile
service offered is the same at both domains
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Fig. 4.1 Sites plotted against number of public information items
The 50 profile attributes so derived are grouped into 10 categories. Figure 4.2 outlines
these categories, and the following subsections detail the contents of each category.
4.3.1 Contact
Contact information refers to profile attributes which are primarily of use for commu-
nicating with the profile owner, expressed as some form of technical address. Types of
contact information are noted in Table 4.1, along with a short description of each attribute
and the number of services surveyed which were visibly reporting this attribute on user
profile pages. Not included are means of contacting the user such as platform-integrated
messaging services, as these details cannot persist between nor aid in identification across
different platforms.
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Fig. 4.2 Outline of the categories of attributes in the schema
Web links – often titled as a ‘homepage’ – were the most broadly-available contact
identifier, perhaps due to being a particularly general and well-known method for ex-
pressing identity online. Links to profiles on other networks were also common, and
could be considered highly useful for re-identification purposes. Both email addresses
and phone numbers were found on relatively few platforms. This is likely due to the
sensitivity of these information items: while users can provide them to social networks
for identification and contact purposes, they are not revealed to the general public due to
privacy and security concerns.
Table 4.1 Contact information
Name Description #Services
Web links URL field designated for the user’s web
site or homepage.
11
Profile links Direct links to this person’s profile on
other services, explicitly particular to
those services.
9
Email address An email address for the user. Potentially
service-provided or partially anonymised.
5
Phone number A visible phone number for the user. 3
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4.3.2 Biographical
Various fields from services provide biographical information about users. This includes
the only feature common to all examined services — the username. In referring to
Bio→Username, no distinction is made between fields supposedly for ‘real’ names and
more typical online handles, any verified status being handled by the Bio→Verified
attribute. As Table 4.2 shows, usernames were rarely verified as the user’s actual name,
but in practice they may well be a useful identifying feature by themselves. The most
common field after Bio→Username were the Self-description areas, which contain
free text about the user, followed by fields for age or birthdate and fields for a number of
general-purpose descriptive tags.
Table 4.2 Biographical attributes
Name Description #Services
Username A human-readable identifier for the user. 35
Self-description A free text field for user self-identification. 21
Age The age or birthdate of the user. 10
Tags Short textual labels self-applied by the
user.
10
Education The user’s educational history, marked by
school names. (Sometimes dated).
8
Occupation The user’s current employment. 8
Gender An explicit marker for the user’s gender. 6
Relationship status A field denoting the user’s relationship sta-
tus.
6
Sexual orientation A field denoting the user’s sexual orienta-
tion.
4
Verified Whether or not the platform indicates if
the username given matches the user’s real
name.
3
Religion A field for the user’s faith. 3
Physical description An physical self-description of the user. 2
Habits Fields denoting other personal habits. 2
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4.3.3 Visual
Visual identification information is defined here as any image data useful for identifying
the user via a representation of themself (as opposed to e.g. interpolation from a
visual record of their surroundings). As outlined in Table 4.3, the use of Visual-
→Avatar images (also known as profile images) is widespread, but they are not always
photographic representations of the user. Nonetheless, a consistently-adopted avatar
may be identifiable even if it does not reflect the user’s actual appearance – there is
further discussion of the (lack of a) relationship between truthful and identifiably useful
information in Chapter 6.
Supplementary to avatars are Visual→Banner images, which are used as a heading
or background to a profile page. These again may reflect a consistent visual presentation
of the user across different platforms, perhaps even a photographic representation.
Images uploaded by the user (Section 4.3.9) may include photographs containing their
physical appearance, but this is not assured except where specific tagging is available.
This sort of specific identification of photographic subjects is as yet not widespread,
concentrated in only a few popular services.
Table 4.3 Visual identifiers
Name Description #Services
Avatar A user’s chosen photo or avatar represen-
tation.
23
Banner image A background or banner image, usually
chosen by the user to complement their
profile image.
13
Tagged photos Photographs labelled as containing the
user, usually as identified by the service or
other users, but accessible via the user’s
profile.
3
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4.3.4 Opinion
Opinion markers (e.g. favourites, star-ratings) are expressions of a user’s interests and
judgement about either other users’ content on a platform, brands represented within
the platform in some fashion, or off-platform content represented by URLs which a user
may express opinions on. Note that this is profile information about what a user has
expressed opinions on, rather than the networks’ opinions on content produced by the
user themselves (this popularity information is covered in Section 4.3.7). While some
opinion codification may be platform-specific, opinion markers may be combined to
identify a user by tabulating their expressed opinions about the same entities on different
platforms.
Textually expressed opinion is not included in this attribute set, as extracting opinion
from text requires additional inference, and this schema is only interested in structurally
supported attributes. As Table 4.4 shows, opinion markers are most common for within-
platform content, either that produced by other users or the social presence of various
brands. Brands themselves are less commonly available for approval information, and
off-platform content is least likely of all to have popularity with a user tracked on their
profile page. However, all opinion markers were comparatively uncommon, present
across at most a third of the surveyed sites.
Table 4.4 Opinion markers
Name Description #Services
Content This user’s opinion of on-platform user
content.
12
Brand This user’s opinion of a product, company
or item on the platform.
7
Other The user’s opinion of off-platform items. 2
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4.3.5 Temporal
As Table 4.5 shows, activity timestamps are common, with only two services not revealing
any of these. The two other information items in this category – join date and last activity
– are not as common but can be partially inferred from these activity logs. Not recorded
here is the specificity of time reporting – some sites present detailed timestamps, while
others provide vaguer information as items age (i.e. ’a minute ago’, ’3 hours ago’, ’a day
ago’, ’1 week ago’).
Table 4.5 Temporal information
Name Description #Services
Activity timestamps Date and time stamps for user posts and
activity, accessible via the profile page.
33
Membership date When a user created their account. 17
Last seen The date and time at which the user was
last recognised by the service.
9
4.3.6 Geographical
Geographical information seems more closely guarded by services than temporal infor-
mation. As Table 4.6 shows, the most common form is an indicator of the user’s location
in a city or country, with varying levels of specificity. In interpreting this table, note that
location history simply extends a location set with temporal information, so both are
counted where the first is available.
Table 4.6 Geographical Information
Name Description #Services
Current Location The user’s address or advertised location. 12
Location Set A set of locations associated with the user. 6
Location History A timestamped set of user locations. 3
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4.3.7 Degree
Degree information is information about the user’s popularity, dedication or influence
within a platform. Most commonly this is linked to social connectedness within a
network’s population, particularly Degree→Subscribers, the number of other users
following6 the profile owner. However, other measures track different kinds of integration
with the network.
The second most common degree information is the reflection of subscriber infor-
mation, Degree→Subscribed, which tracks the number of users the profile owner is
following. Equally prevalent is information about the number of contributions the profile
owner has made to the platform, in terms of e.g. posts made.
Trailing these markers are, jointly, Degree→Visibility, Degree→Reputation and
Degree→Trophies. The first reflects the number of times other users have viewed the
profile, the second aggregates opinion about the profile owner, and the third indicates
specific notable events or accomplishments. The final item, Degree→Rank, highlights
official membership level in a platform.
Table 4.7 Degree metrics
Name Description #Services
Subscribers The number of other users following this
user.
21
Subscribed The number of other users that this user
follows
16
Contributions The number of contributions that this user
has made to the network (links, posts,
videos, etc.)
16
Visibility The number of views of this user’s profile. 9
Reputation This user’s reputation, as rated by other
users or other performance metrics.
9
Trophies Markers for a user’s special achievements. 9
Rank The user’s rank within the community, as
one of a number of possible tiered levels.
5
6Following being where a user is publicly listed as receiving updates about the subject.
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4.3.8 Relationships
Relationship information is that which explains a connection to another entity within a
platform. The relationship information presented in Table 4.8 is broken down into two
components:
1. relationships the user has with other people in a platform’s network and
2. relationships that the user has with brands within the network;
where brands are either companies, products, or media items which are not uploaded by
other users.
Most available relations were simple interaction relationships – information that
reveals that a particular pair of users interacted in some way within the platform7.
The Relationships→FollowsUser was also widespread, with the Relationship-
→FollowedBy and Relationship→FollowsBrand relationship information significantly
less common.
In gathering data, where relationships in a platform’s network are bilateral friendships,
both FollowsUser and FollowedBy are considered fulfilled.
4.3.9 Content
Content consists of the available record of a user’s submissions or publications via the
service in question. Table 4.9 outlines the different categories of content which may
be published, whereas Table 4.10 shows the attributes which each item of content – of
whatever type – may have.
As can be discerned from these two tables, the most common attributes were temporal
and impact, and the most common content type was plain text. Structural support for
textual content is by far the most flexible, as it can easily carry URLs referencing
other content types within a text body. While temporal information is quite common,
geographic annotation on content was the least commonly available.
7For example, commenting on another’s content.




Interacted A user this user has interacted with. 26
Follows User A user following this user. 20
Followed By A user this user follows. 14
Grouped A user this user shares a group with. 10
Brands
Follows Brand A product, company or item this user fol-
lows.
13
Contributor A product, company or item this user has
interacted with or is marked as affiliated
with.
6
Table 4.9 Content types
Name Description #Services
Text Typed text content, not necessarily exclu-
sive of images or other media
29
Image Still images. 17
Video Video content. 11
Links Links to content from outside the platform 5
Table 4.10 Content attributes
Name Description #Services
Temporal Timestamp for a post. 31
Impact The content item’s popularity, in terms of
any of various vote or viewing measures.
31
Category A categorisation or tag for the content
item.
12
Spatial Geographical locator for the content 3
The following sections examine collected data and existing literature to calculate
various measures for each of the attributes listed in this schema.
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4.4 Availability
The availability of information attributes is the probability of finding an information
attribute in a record. In the field of identity resolution, this is the probability of finding a
profile which contains a particular information attribute.
Availability is highly important for understanding an attribute’s practical value for
identification. When a piece of information known from one profile is likely to be present
in a different online social networking profile, this provides comparable profile attributes
which can be used to establish a probability that the two profiles are in fact of the same
person. In the extreme case, if two social networks shared no overlap in the type of
profile content made available, it would be impossible to establish a direct connection
between profiles drawn from either of them. Proportionally, the greater the overlap in
profile content, the more opportunities for comparison between profile attributes, and a
greater wealth of data for any re-identification algorithm8.
There are two components to availability:
Structural Support for the attribute. The estimated proportion of a class of datasets
(such as social networks) which contain a given profile attribute. For example,
if an online social network does not include a gender field for users to fill out, it
does not have structural support for the gender attribute. If many networks do not
support gender fields, then this decreases the identification value of explicit gender
declarations.
Completeness of this attribute within profiles. The proportion of profiles which report
non-null values for this attribute within datasets which permit it. While structural
support indicates the possibility of finding a match, this is also affected by the
probability of users actually providing a value for this attribute. In many online
profiles, there are optional attributes which may or may not be given values. If
gender is structurally supported, but in practice few users report their gender, then
8Though the utility of this information also depends on how consistent and unique the attributes are, as
discussed in later sections.
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the availability of gender information is lower and thus the identification value of
gender information is lower.
These properties are derived independently in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 for each of
the profile attributes in the schema. The estimates are then combined and evaluated in
Section 4.4.3.
4.4.1 Support for profile fields
The property called structural support refers to how widely an attribute is likely to be
found within the reference class of datasets. For any class of datasets P and an attribute
a ∈ A, which an investigator is interested in understanding the identification value of,
structural support is E(Pa), the estimated proportion of P which contain the attribute a.
Within the realm of social networking profiles, this would be an estimate of the number
of online social networks P which can reveal the profile attribute a.
This structural support value is to be kept distinct from considerations of how likely
it is that any particular profile page within a network Pi will contain a, which is addressed
separately in Section 4.4.2.
The degree of structural support for various identity attributes is a topic which appears
to have attracted little specific research attention, though some studies [18, 37, 109] have
included data encompassing it as part of investigations into completeness or consistency
of profile attributes.
In gauging the degree of structural support for profile attributes, it is important to
consider the limitations within which the work takes place. It is not possible to anticipate
the internal structure of all the private datasets which may be combined with public
profile attributes, which could include datasets as varied as medical records, insurance
databases or job applications. Instead, support for the model is grounded in observations
of online social networks themselves.
For the most part, the measurement of structural support is grounded in the same
survey of 35 high-traffic unique sites which was used in constructing the schema of
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profile attributes itself. However, where possible this data can be reinforced with figures
from previous work.
Carmagnola et al. [37] report a core list constructed from the registration form data
of 25 user-adaptive systems from a number of domains. They identified Bio→Username
as the most re-occurring feature, closely followed by first and last name fields9, then
Contact→Email, birth date (Bio→Age) and finally birthplace, which can be considered
an item of Geographical→Locations.
Irani et al. [109] include some information on structural support in their study
of attribute completeness across 10 popular online social networks. The attributes
they report on are represented in our schema as Contact→Web, Bio→Username, Bio-
→Relationship, Bio→Relationship, Bio→Age and Geographical→Current.
Balduzzi et al. [18] reported on the vulnerability of online social networks to profile-
harvesting attacks based on large lists of email addresses. As part of their reporting, they
covered the availability of a number of different profile attributes across the eight social
networks targeted (Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, LinkedIn, Friendster, Badoo, Netlog
and XING).
While the methodologies and ontologies are not directly comparable, and many of
the profile attributes of interest are not considered, these additional studies do provide
some verification for the structural support figures collected in forming the schema. In
both, Bio→Username was nigh-universal, and less than half of sites reported Bio→Age.
Carmagnola et al. did report a notably higher proportion of services using Contact-
→Email, no doubt a result of their method of examining forms rather than publicly-visible
information. Email addresses can be used to locate profiles within services even where
the address is not made publicly visible, so adjusting structural support here to reflect
Carmagnola’s count would be justified.
Table 4.11 lists the profile attributes of the schema, along with the raw counts of these
attributes from the 35 top-ranked dataset from Section 4.3 and the three supplementary
counts from the literature [18, 37, 109]. For each attribute, a structural support score
9The schema used in this thesis considers these fragments of an alternative username
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Table 4.11 Quantified structural support for profile attributes
Attribute Bdzzi. (8) Carmag. (25) Irani (10) Edwards (35) Score
Contact→Web 5 - 5 11 0.40
Contact→Profile - - - 9 0.26
Contact→Email - 16 - 5 0.35
Contact→Phone 3 - - 3 0.14
Bio→Username 8 22 9 35 0.95
Bio→Description - - - 21 0.60
Bio→Age 5 8 4 10 0.35
Bio→Tags - - - 10 0.29
Bio→Education 7 - - 8 0.35
Bio→Occupation 7 - - 8 0.35
Bio→Gender 5 - 4 6 0.28
Bio→Relationship 6 - 2 6 0.27
Bio→Sexuality 4 - - 4 0.19
Bio→Verified - - - 3 0.09
Bio→Religion - - - 3 0.09
Bio→Physical 2 - - 2 0.06
Bio→Habits 8 - - 2 0.23
Visual→Avatar 8 - - 23 0.72
Visual→Banner - - - 13 0.37
Visual→Photos - - - 3 0.09
Opinion→Content - - - 12 0.34
Opinion→Brand - - - 7 0.20
Opinion→Other - - - 2 0.05
Temporal→Activity - - - 33 0.94
Temporal→Membership - - - 17 0.49
Temporal→Seen 3 - - 9 0.28
Geographical→Current 8 - 6 12 0.50
Geographical→Locations - 6 8 6 0.29
Geographical→History - - - 3 0.09
Degree→Subscribers - - - 21 0.60
Degree→Subscribed - - - 16 0.46
Degree→Contributions - - - 16 0.46
Degree→Visibility 2 - - 9 0.26
Degree→Reputation - - - 9 0.26
Degree→Trophies - - - 9 0.26
Degree→Rank - - - 5 0.14
Relationships→Interacted - - - 26 0.74
Relationships→FollowsUser 7 - - 20 0.63
Relationships→FollowedBy 7 - - 14 0.49
Relationships→Grouped - - - 10 0.29
Relationships→FollowsBrand - - - 13 0.37
Relationships→Contributes - - - 6 0.17
Content→Text - - - 29 0.83
Content→Image - - - 17 0.49
Content→Video - - - 11 0.31
Content→Links - - - 5 0.14
Attributes→Temporal - - - 31 0.89
Attributes→Impact - - - 31 0.89
Attributes→Category - - - 12 0.34
Attributes→Spatial - - - 3 0.06
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is calculated from the proportion of sites containing it out of all those examined for it.
Those attributes with a structural support score greater than 0.6 are highlighted in bold
font.
The most widely supported attribute was Bio→Username, which may have been
expected given its criticality to the concept of a profile page. This was followed closely
by Temporal→Activity, indicating a surprisingly widespread support for timestamp
information, and then temporal and popularity-related attributes of user-generated content,
both attributes being more widely supported than any particular form of user-generated
content, even Content→Text, which was itself widely supported. Some interesting
distinctions can be drawn between apparently related measures: Degree→Subscribers
corresponds to Relationships→FollowedBy, but the degree information is more widely
supported than actual user connections, and the reverse is true of Degree→Subscribed
and Relationships→FollowsUser.
The attributes most typically considered in database studies, such as Bio→Age and
Bio→Gender were not very widely supported, with only the biographical attribute Bio-
→Description, the freeform self-descriptive text, being supported on a significant
proportion of examined platforms. In contrast, visual information in the form of Visual-
→Avatar is widely supported in social networks. This highlights the domain-specific
differences between identity resolution in online social networks and record linkage in
different domains.
4.4.2 Completeness of profile information
The second component of availability is completeness. Complementary to structural
support, this measures the proportion of records which report non-null values for an
attribute, given that the dataset in question contains the attributes. In the field of identity
resolution, this means the proportion of user profiles where users have filled out (and
made visible) the information attribute in question. Certain profile items might be made
mandatory by a network which structurally supports them, but more often than not these
profile items are either optional or can be hidden from the public.
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Completeness of profile information is a component of availability which has been
given some attention in previous literature, including literature on identity resolution.
These prior estimates are gathered in Table 4.12.
One of the earlier studies, Dyer et al. [66] tabulates self-reports of disclosure from
69 Facebook members and 48 Myspace members, sampled on an availability basis.
These 2007 figures show notably higher availability of information than later studies,
reflecting either sampling bias or a general trend to less disclosure as privacy risks are
popularised. Notably, these figures are derived from questionnaire responses rather than
direct observation.
In later studies based on observation:
• Irani et al. [109] study the completeness of a few attributes across a range of online
social networks, including a total of 21,764 profiles across 10 of the most common
social networking sites, though some of their attributes were not structurally
supported across all 10 sites.
• Nosko et al. [162] present a study of information disclosure in 400 Facebook
profiles, reporting the number of profiles which filled in each profile attribute.
Their profile schema maps easily to the one presented in Section 4.3, and they
study the broadest range of attributes outside of this thesis.
• Balduzzi et al. [18] present attribute completeness information for a number of
attributes, based on a set of 1,228,644 profiles drawn unevenly from eight different
social networks. The proportions reported in Table 4.12 are derived by recombining
the figures per-attribute across networks where the attributes were supported.
• Chen et al. [45] present attribute completeness information for some optional
attributes within the English YouTube social network, based on a sample of some
26,562 profiles. Their presentation divides this into profiles which use real names
and pseudonyms based on identification from connected LinkedIn accounts – these
figures are merged by a 1:4 ratio. The figures reported in Table 4.12 are extracted
from a graph and may contain error in the 0.01 to 0.02 range.
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Table 4.12 Prior measurements of profile attribute completeness
Attribute Goga15 Bdzzi Dwyer Chen Goga13 Irani Noska Score
Contact→Web - - - - - - 0.08 0.08
Contact→Profile - - - - - - - -
Contact→Email - - 0.72 - - - 0.43 0.58
Contact→Phone - - 0.25 - - - 0.05 0.15
Bio→Username 1.00 - - - 1.00 0.99 - 1.00
Bio→Description - - - 0.30 - - 0.31 0.31
Bio→Age - 0.34 - - - 0.75 0.73 0.61
Bio→Tags - - - 0.17 - - 0.47 0.25
Bio→Education - 0.15 - 0.15 - - 0.83 0.38
Bio→Occupation - 0.27 - 0.29 - - 0.35 0.30
Bio→Gender - 0.30 - - - 0.84 0.82 0.65
Bio→Relationship - 0.06 0.81 - - 0.63 0.63 0.53
Bio→Sexuality - 0.04 0.77 - - - 0.55 0.45
Bio→Verified - - - - - - - -
Bio→Religion - - - - - - 0.32 0.32
Bio→Physical - - - - - - - -
Bio→Habits - - - - - - 0.37 0.37
Visual→Avatar 0.63 0.54 0.99 - 0.93 - 0.98 0.81
Visual→Banner - - - - - - - -
Visual→Photos - - - - - - 0.76 0.76
Opinion→Content - - - - - - - -
Opinion→Brand - - - 0.10 - - 0.51 0.31
Opinion→Other - - - 0.10 - - - 0.10
Temporal→Activity - - - - - - 0.98 0.98
Temporal→Membership - - - - - - - -
Temporal→Seen - 0.81 - - - - - 0.81
Geographical→Current 0.54 0.43 - - 0.46 0.77 0.08 0.46
Geographical→Locations - - 0.93 0.38 - 0.72 - 0.68
Geographical→History - - - - - - - -
Degree→Subscribers - - - - - - 0.88 0.88
Degree→Subscribed - - - - - - 0.88 0.88
Degree→Contributions - - - - - - 0.25 0.25
Degree→Visibility - 0.75 - - - - - 0.75
Degree→Reputation - - - - - - - -
Degree→Trophies - - - - - - 0 0
Degree→Rank - - - - - - - -
Relationships→Interacted - - - - - - 0.83 0.83
Relationships→FollowsUser 0.62 0.81 - - - - 0.88 0.77
Relationships→FollowedBy 0.62 0.81 - - - - 0.88 0.77
Relationships→Grouped - - - - - - 0.79 0.79
Relationships→FollowsBrand - - - - - - - -
Relationships→Contributes - - - - - - - -
Content→Text - - - - - - 0.26 0.26
Content→Image - - - - - - 0.70 0.70
Content→Video - - - - - - 0.13 0.13
Content→Links - - - - - - - -
Attributes→Temporal - - - - - - - -
Attributes→Impact - - - - - - - -
Attributes→Category - - - - - - - -
Attributes→Spatial - - - - - - - -
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• Goga et al. [85] also report on the completeness of three attributes of interest
(Bio→Username, Visual→Avatar and Geographical→Current) across Twitter,
Facebook, Google+, Myspace and Flickr.
• Goga et al. [84] later report on the completeness of Bio→Username, Visual-
→Avatar, Geographical→Current and Relationships→FollowsUser across a
collection Twitter, LinkedIn, Flickr and Facebook profiles. Their analysis focused
on paired network availability and a comparison of different collection methods,
so per-network totals were not available for merging and simple averages were
used to produce the summary figures reported here.
Table 4.13 complements previous research with novel measurements of availability.
There are two components to these original measurements. The first is an automatic
appraisal of profile content drawn from a sample of some 52,641 profiles across Facebook,
Google+, Twitter and LinkedIn, sampled according to the methodology explained in
Section 3. API access to user profiles can be incomplete, however, and as a result certain
attributes cannot be retrieved through this method. As a result, a manual appraisal was
made of a subset of 100 of these profiles, with 25 profiles drawn randomly from each
network, forming a second measurement.
The manual appraisal was conducted with the developer profile which authorised
API access for the automated data collection, which has no friendship relation to any
of the targeted profiles. The profile page for each member was loaded and examined
for all the profile attributes supported by the network. The proportions reported reflect
completeness within networks supporting the attribute.
These automatic and manual appraisal values are then combined with the prior
measurement information from the other studies detailed in Table 4.12 to provide a final
estimate of attribute completeness.
Table 4.13 highlights in bold font the attributes with an overall completeness estimate
exceeding 0.60. Notably, all Temporal→* attributes were highly complete, perhaps
due to being reported by default in networks, often without the user having to fill
anything out. This interpretation would be supported by the high completeness values
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Table 4.13 Original measurements of profile attribute completeness
Attribute Automated Manual Priors Score
Contact→Web 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.10
Contact→Profile 0.05 0.20 - 0.13
Contact→Email 0.00 0.01 0.58 0.20
Contact→Phone 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.05
Bio→Username 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Bio→Description 0.54 0.32 0.31 0.39
Bio→Age > 0.00 0.05 0.61 0.22
Bio→Tags 0.05 0.30 0.25 0.20
Bio→Education 0.12 0.53 0.38 0.34
Bio→Occupation 0.09 0.49 0.30 0.29
Bio→Gender 0.59 0.96 0.65 0.73
Bio→Relationship 0.02 0.10 0.53 0.22
Bio→Sexuality - 0.28 0.45 0.34
Bio→Verified 0.01 0.02 - 0.02
Bio→Religion - 0.03 0.32 0.16
Bio→Physical - 0.00 - 0.00
Bio→Habits - 0.15 0.37 0.22
Visual→Avatar 0.88 0.66 0.81 0.78
Visual→Banner 0.06 0.37 - 0.22
Visual→Photos - 0.04 0.76 0.40
Opinion→Content - 0.31 - 0.31
Opinion→Brand - 0.19 0.31 0.23
Opinion→Other - 0.05 0.10 0.07
Temporal→Activity 0.40 0.54 0.98 0.64
Temporal→Membership 0.99 1.00 - 1.00
Temporal→Seen - - 0.81 0.81
Geographical→Current 0.51 0.62 0.46 0.53
Geographical→Locations 0.51 0.65 0.68 0.61
Geographical→History 0.04 0.25 - 0.15
Degree→Subscribers 0.55 0.78 0.88 0.74
Degree→Subscribed 0.43 0.75 0.88 0.69
Degree→Contributions 0.66 0.80 0.25 0.57
Degree→Visibility - 1.00 0.75 0.92
Degree→Reputation 0.49 0.64 - 0.57
Degree→Trophies - 0.10 0.00 0.05
Degree→Rank - 0.01 - 0.01
Relationships→Interacted 0.28 0.53 0.83 0.55
Relationships→FollowsUser 0.39 0.67 0.77 0.61
Relationships→FollowedBy 0.34 0.62 0.77 0.58
Relationships→Grouped - 0.25 0.79 0.43
Relationships→FollowsBrand - 0.42 - 0.42
Relationships→Contributes - 0.30 - 0.30
Content→Text 0.32 0.46 0.26 0.35
Content→Image 0.05 0.38 0.70 0.38
Content→Video 0.04 0.19 0.13 0.12
Content→Links 0.23 0.29 - 0.26
Attributes→Temporal 0.39 0.52 - 0.46
Attributes→Impact 0.38 0.41 - 0.40
Attributes→Category 0.19 0.06 - 0.13
Attributes→Spatial 0.03 0.22 - 0.13
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for Degree→Visibility, which is also tracked by the platform rather than the user. In
contrast, Contact→* had poor completeness, with most users keeping private contact
details such as email addresses, phone numbers and other social media profiles as
well as many Bio→* attributes (though not Bio→Gender). However, Visual→Avatar is
highly complete, despite being user-provided, indicating that certain personalisations are
commonly completed.
No Content→* or Attributes→* were highly complete, suggesting a high propor-
tion of social media users who either keep private or do not submit content to their social
networks. The prior measurements from related work [162] do back up these unexpected
results.
4.4.3 Estimates of availability
The combination of the structural support and completeness components allows us to
attach an overall availability rating to the information items in our schema. Table 4.14
combines the results columns from Table 4.11 and Table 4.13 to produce the overall
availability scores for each of the measured attributes. This estimation assumes that
equal weight should be given to considerations of completeness and support, but in
certain situations this assumption should be reviewed. For example, in an application to
identity resolution in a specific target network, support becomes a binary variable and so
considerations of completeness should dominate the availability valuation of information
attributes.
There are important differences between the completeness and support information
for which analysis may be fruitful. To facilitate this, the terms very low, low, average
and high in the following discussion are mapped to the interquartile ranges of the data as
presented in Table 4.15.
Contact information is not very often available on social networks. The most available
attribute was Contact→Email, which still had low availability, while Contact→Profile
and Contact→Phone had very low availability. Contact→Email was the only contact
detail to have low rather than very low completeness, and this measurement can be
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Table 4.14 Estimates of profile attribute availability
Attribute Completeness Support Availability
Contact→Web 0.10 0.40 0.25
Contact→Profile 0.13 0.26 0.19
Contact→Email 0.20 0.35 0.28
Contact→Phone 0.05 0.14 0.10
Bio→Username 1.00 0.95 0.98
Bio→Description 0.39 0.60 0.50
Bio→Age 0.22 0.35 0.29
Bio→Tags 0.20 0.29 0.25
Bio→Education 0.34 0.35 0.35
Bio→Occupation 0.29 0.35 0.32
Bio→Gender 0.73 0.28 0.51
Bio→Relationship 0.22 0.27 0.25
Bio→Sexuality 0.34 0.19 0.27
Bio→Verified 0.02 0.09 0.06
Bio→Religion 0.16 0.09 0.13
Bio→Physical 0.00 0.06 0.03
Bio→Habits 0.22 0.23 0.23
Visual→Avatar 0.78 0.72 0.75
Visual→Banner 0.22 0.37 0.29
Visual→Photos 0.40 0.09 0.25
Opinion→Content 0.31 0.34 0.33
Opinion→Brand 0.23 0.20 0.22
Opinion→Other 0.07 0.05 0.06
Temporal→Activity 0.64 0.94 0.79
Temporal→Membership 1.00 0.49 0.75
Temporal→Seen 0.81 0.28 0.55
Geographical→Current 0.53 0.50 0.52
Geographical→Locations 0.61 0.29 0.45
Geographical→History 0.15 0.09 0.12
Degree→Subscribers 0.74 0.60 0.67
Degree→Subscribed 0.69 0.46 0.58
Degree→Contributions 0.57 0.46 0.52
Degree→Visibility 0.92 0.26 0.59
Degree→Reputation 0.57 0.26 0.42
Degree→Trophies 0.05 0.26 0.16
Degree→Rank 0.01 0.14 0.08
Relationships→Interacted 0.55 0.74 0.65
Relationships→FollowsUser 0.61 0.63 0.62
Relationships→FollowedBy 0.58 0.49 0.54
Relationships→Grouped 0.43 0.29 0.36
Relationships→FollowsBrand 0.42 0.37 0.40
Relationships→Contributes 0.30 0.17 0.24
Content→Text 0.35 0.83 0.59
Content→Image 0.38 0.49 0.44
Content→Video 0.12 0.31 0.22
Content→Links 0.26 0.14 0.22
Attributes→Temporal 0.46 0.89 0.68
Attributes→Impact 0.40 0.89 0.65
Attributes→Category 0.13 0.34 0.24
Attributes→Spatial 0.13 0.06 0.10
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Table 4.15 Term mappings for discussion of completeness, structural support and avail-
ability
Term “very low” “low” “average” “high”
Range 0 - 1st Q 1st - 2nd Q 2nd - 3rd Q 3rd Q - 1
Support 0 - 0.20 0.21 - 0.37 0.37 - 0.49 0.50 - 1
Completeness 0 - 0.17 0.17 - 0.37 0.38 - 0.57 0.58 - 1
Availability 0 - 0.21 0.22 - 0.37 0.38 - 0.54 0.55 - 1
traced back to prior research into profile completeness – the original measurements
by themselves would indicate a very low completeness. Contact→Web also had low
availability, but in this case the attribute’s average structural support is counteracting
a very low completeness – the option to link to a personal webpage is reasonably well-
supported, but users rarely take advantage of the opportunity.
Bio→Username is easily the most available profile attribute, with some form of
name field supported by a high proportion of all social networking sites and universally
completed within our observations. Other biographical attributes performed less robustly.
Bio→Description and Bio→Gender both managed average totals by combining one
high score with a low or average one, whilst the remaining attributes were had low or
very low availability, with the same for their support and completeness scores. Unless
the information carried by these latter attributes can be otherwise inferred from profile
content, identity-resolution methods which rely on them are not going to have broad
applicability. Most notably, these figures indicate a low availability of tag information,
an area where some previous identity resolution studies have focused [103, 214].
Amongst visual information, Visual→Avatar was the stand-out performer, with
high availability backed by high scores in both completeness and support, making it
a desirable feature. Visual→Banner images had low completeness and low support,
whereas Visual→Photos were estimated to have average completeness but very low
structural support. This suggests that the visual information most available to identity
resolution classifiers is un-annotated and potentially non-photographic.
Structural information about user opinion is not widely available in social networks,
with low availability, completeness and support for Opinion→Content and Opinion-
→Brand, dropping to very low when it comes to Opinion→Other. Given that the former
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pair refer to entities that only exist within the same online social network, finding equiva-
lences between sets of opinions in different networks seems unlikely to be profitable as
an identity-resolution method.
Temporal information as a class has a very strong showing, with uniformly high
completeness backing a range of support values. Temporal→Activity benefited from
the highest support score, rendering it a very available feature, whilst Temporal→Seen
suffered from low support which might hinder the general application of methods relying
on it.
Geographical→Current, a single location associated with the user, has average
availability based on average completeness and high support. In contrast, Geographical-
→Locations, a set of associated locations, has average availability based on high com-
pleteness and low support. Both are plausibly available enough to be of use in identity
resolution. However, Geographical→History, locations associated with timestamps,
are of very low availability, and so methods which rely on spatio-temporal rather than
purely spatial methods will struggle to apply to many use cases.
Degree information recovers from a mostly low or average support by several times
reaching high completeness. As a result, three degree attributes have high availability:
Degree→Subscribers, Degree→Subscribed and Degree→Visibility, supported by
strong average availability for Degree→Reputation and Degree→Visibility. Data
on trophies or in-network rankings were least available, being very low.
Amongst relationship information, the most available was Relationships→Interacted,
with a high availability backed by high support and completeness. This could be attributed
to online interactions being an inherent component of the usage of OSNs. The same
follows for the two following-related relationships, Relationships→FollowsUser and
Relationships→FollowedBy. Connections to brands were of a more average availabil-
ity, with low support, but relationships where the user reported an active contribution to
the brand were of low availability. Information tying users together via groups was also
of low availability, despite an average completeness.
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Content items suffer from low or very low completeness across all types, pointing to
users either keeping submissions private or not making any submissions to their social
networks. In the case of the very highly supported Content→Text, this is remedied
sufficiently to reach a high availability, while an average structural support score pitches
Content→Image at an equivalently average level of availability, whilst Content→Video
and Content→Link are of only low availability.
Counter-intuitively, some content attributes were more available than particular
content types, due to being able to cross the content type boundaries. Attributes-
→Temporal and Attributes→Impact had high availability due to high support and
average completeness. However, this was not a universal rule. Attributes→Category
was only of low availability, with very low completeness, and Attributes→Spatial
was of very low overall availability. That temporal annotations are widely available is
also reflected within Temporal→Activity and previous time-based profiling work, but
the high availability of popularity information for user content might suggest a viable
new method for identity resolution.
Figure 4.3 shows a comparison of completeness and support scores for all attributes.
There was a moderate positive correlation (r=0.57) between the two measurements,
indicating that more broadly-supported attributes are also more likely to be completed
on user profiles within networks which support them.
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Fig. 4.3 Comparison of completeness and stuctural support scores
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4.5 Consistency
Consistency, as given by Eq. 4.10, can be understood as a measure of how well an infor-
mation attribute remains the same across different datasets about the same entity. In the
case of online social networks, this becomes a measure of how closely matched attributes
(such as username or textual content) are across a user’s profiles on different networks.
Consistency is highly important for identity resolution, as commonly-mismatched in-
formation items are less valuable and thus should be given less weight, even if they are
highly available and can contain many unique values.
It may be worth asking why the same field, about the same user, should be expected
to be anything other than consistent across datasets. Consistency can vary for different
reasons. In referent-defined fields, consistency may vary due to any of intentional
misreporting (as when a false identity is constructed), novelty in self-expression (as
when asked to describe themselves), considerations of format (a Tweet may necessarily
be shorter than a blog post) or even a changing truth value (as when the user ages, or
changes address, and does not update an old profile). In fields which are not completed
by the referred individual, values may be entered incorrectly (as when a name is misheard
or misspelt) or simply stored in a manner which is lossy compared to another instance of
the field (a dataset which records only year of birth compared to one which records a full
birth date).
4.5.1 Measuring consistency
In measuring consistency of profile attributes or record fields, domain-specific similarity
functions need to be defined to complement the matching schema. Below, such similarity
functions are presented for each of the attributes in the schema developed in Section 4.3.
Where appropriate, similarity functions which have been used in previous literature are
reused here, to allow previous measurements to be integrated into the estimates.
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Contact comparison
The consistency of contact information does not appear to have been addressed in
previous work. All contact information consists of a set of unique identifiers, and so a
natural approach in this case would be to standardise each contact attribute value to a
standard format and then compare the set overlap between contact information on two





|A|+ |B|− |A∩B| (4.17)
In the case of Contact→Phone, phone numbers were standardised by removing all
non-numeric characters and replacing any international country code prefixes with a
single “0” (the standard national access code) except in the case of US and CA numbers.
For Contact→Web addresses, values are standardised by stripping the protocol
(http:// or https://) and any query parameters from addresses, leaving only the
domain/path information. The same applies for Contact→Profile addresses. Finally,
Contact→Email addresses are standardised by reducing all characters to lowercase and
stripping any protocol information (mailto://).
Biographical comparison
Of all biographical information, Bio→Username is the most well-studied. There are
a number of suitable string similarity functions which may be applied to comparing
names and usernames, but previous studies [84, 139, 178] have mostly used Jaro-Winkler
string similarity to compare both username and real-name similarity, based in part on
experimental evidence that it is the better performing method [52], and so this is the
measure adopted in this study. The best name similarity rating is calculated as the average
Jaro-Winkler similarity over the best pairs between the different name tokens in each
profile. The same approach is applied to Bio→Education and Bio→Occupation, as both
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attributes are also fields with (potentially multiple) names. String similarity is also used
to compare Bio→Religion fields, after standardising case.
For measuring the consistency of Bio→Description, this study follows the tf-idf
vector space model approach of Malhotra et al. [139]. All description fields from
one profile are merged, punctuation and words from the NLTK list of stop words are
removed10, and terms are lemmatised using the Lancaster stemming algorithm [167].
The Jaccard similarity is then computed between the two resulting token sets. The same
could be done for Bio→Physical, but data is not available for this attribute. A similar
approach is however taken for the tokens Bio→Tags and Bio→Habits, without the need
to strip stopwords.
Bio→Verified is standardised to a binary variable, similarity also being binary. Bio-
→Gender is standardised as a trinary value (male, female, other), and Bio→Sexuality is
standardised to one of a combination of genders (male-male, male-female, male-other,
etc.) or ‘any’ and ‘none’ values (male-any, male-none, etc.), leading to a total of 15
possible values. Both attributes can also be compared in a binary manner.
Finally, the similarity between two Bio→Age values ai and a j is calculated as 1−
|ai−a j|
max(ai,a j)
, giving the proportion of the difference in reported ages.
Visual comparison
Previous work has often examined the consistency of Visual→Avatar images. The
approaches trialled by Malhotra et al. [139] were all based on detecting simple image
equality based on an edit distance between a normalised thumbnail. Goga et al. [84]
combine two more advanced algorithms in the same general perceptual hashing approach.
This study makes use of the fixed-length Discrete Cosine Transform hash employed
by default in the pHash library of perceptual hashing techniques used by Goga et al.
Like all perceptual hashes, this is designed to identify and compare essentially identical
images which have been cropped, resized or superficially altered, as may happen between
different social media presentations of the same base image. The same method is
10http://www.nltk.org/book/ch02.html
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used for calculating the similarity of Visual→Banner and aggregated across the set of
Visual→Photos.
Opinion comparison
Due to the difficulties in automatic harvesting and ontological mapping between different
social networks, the consistency of Opinion→* information is not measured in this study.
Theoretically, the problem can be approached as the Jaccard distance between the two
sets of positively-rated items (negative opinions being less commonly expressed). For
Opinion→Brand this might be managed by finding equality between set members based
on a string comparison of their names. In the case of Opinion→Content, however, there
is no necessary mapping to be found between user content on two separate networks. It
may be possible to instead aggregate opinion of content into opinion of content owners,
using this additional layer to augment similarity metrics based on topological comparison
of friend networks. It may be possible to directly compare overlap in the network-
independent Opinion→Other ratings between profiles, but its low availability makes this
ineffective.
Temporal comparison
As Temporal→Membership and Temporal→Seen are both single dates, both can be
compared as a function of the difference δ between two values. In this study, comparisons
are made at the day level, and differences of greater than 366 days are rated as a similarity
of 0. For values of δ between 1 and 366, the following logarithmic ratio is used:
sim(δ ) = 1− log(δ )
log(366)
(4.18)
For Temporal→Activity, where multiple dates can be expected, a temporal fin-
gerprinting method developed by Atig et al. [13] is used. This method converts each
timestamp to its UTC time value, and divides each day into six activity periods. Times-
tamps are then allotted to the activity period into which they fall and threshold values are
used to identify each activity period as high or low activity based on the percentage of all
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activity allotted to it. The comparison of which activity periods are high or low between
profiles is then used to gauge the similarity of temporal activity.
Geographic comparison
Following the approaches in previous literature [45, 84, 139], this study identifies geo-
graphic similarity by the geodesic distance between latitude and longitude coordinates
returned by Google’s Geocoding API11, normalised by the maximum possible distance
(sim= 1− distmax ), which can be called the geodesic similarity. For Geographic→Current
this measure is sufficient. For Geographic→History, distance is calculated as the aver-
age geodesic similarity between pairs of locations, where pairs are constructed according
to the highest temporal similarity as defined in 4.18. For Geographic→Locations, the
same approach is used, but pairs are constructed based on the highest geodesic similarity.
Degree comparison
Information about node degrees is susceptible to a range of problems in comparison.
Raw counts are dependant in part on the size and nature of network in which they were
generated, so it may be, for example, that numbers of friends on Facebook are an order of
magnitude greater than numbers of friends on Twitter. This can be addressed by scaling
all counts from a network into the [0,1] range according to the highest value observed
for that network, but under this method unusually high values can compress the scale,
losing important information for most values. This study follows the solution applied by
Malhotra et al. [139] in dividing the sorted vector of observed values from a network into
k equally-sized bins and then comparing the distance in terms of bins traversed between
values, such that similarity is:




where bi and b j are the bin indices for degree values i and j. This measurement
is applied for Degree→Subscribers, Degree→Subscribed, Degree→Contributions,
11https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/geocoding/
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Degree→Visibility and Degree→Reputation, as all are measured as a numeric quan-
tity. Degree→Trophies and Degree→Rank are too rarely available and difficult to map
across networks, and so consistency was not calculated for these attributes.
Relationships comparison
For each of the Relationships→* attributes, comparisons are made according to the
method used by Goga et al. [84] and other related work [156]. Each relationship’s
similarity is measured as the Jaccard similarity of so-related users between the two
profiles, where friend equality across networks is determined by the string similarity of
their usernames at a threshold.
Content comparison
The approach for determining consistency between user content is twofold. Firstly,
Content→* similarity is determined by the Jaccard similarity of each category of content,
where equality between content is determined differently for each content type:
Content→Text items are reduced to the same standardised word-vector form as is used
for Bio→Description, and equality determined by a similarity threshold between
the two vectors.
Content→Image items are compared according to the perceptual hashing approach also
used for Visual→* comparisons.
Content→Video items are compared according the perceptual hashes of initial frames.
Content→Link items are compared by first un-shortening any shortened URLs and then
comparing the domain/path information of the two links to determine equality.
Following the equivalence construction between Content→* items, the Attribute→*
similarity is determined as the average similarity for each paired content item which has
the attribute in question in both profiles, where:
• Attributes→Temporal similarity is determined by the logarithmic ratio given in
Eq. 4.18.
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• Attributes→Impact similarity is calculated similarly to the Degree→* similarity
method, with k equally-sized bins for the popularity of each user’s posts on each
network, and with similarity for each pair quantified as given in Eq. 4.19.
• Attributes→Category similarity is determined as the average Jaro-Winkler
string similarity between category labels.
• Attributes→Spatial similarity is the geodesic similarity measure used for
Geographical→* comparisons.
Additionally, there are a range of stylometric techniques which may be applied to
the comparison of Content→Text corpora to identify and compare the writing style of
authors. Consistency of expressed writing style is examined through comparison of the
patterns of function-word usage across the two corpora, following previous work finding
function words highly indicative of writing style [125]. The proportional usage of each of
a set of N function words is calculated for each profile based on the total collected corpus,
forming a fingerprint, and similarity is quantified by the Euclidean distance between the
two fingerprints, proportional to the greatest possible difference.
4.5.2 Estimates of consistency
Table 4.16 summarises known estimates of attribute consistency from identity-resolution
literature addressing online social networks. In general, information examining the
consistency of Bio→Username and Geographical→Current was most prevalent, with
other attributes being studied more sparsely. In more detail:
• Irani et al. [109] investigate the consistency of a range of profile fields within
21,764 matched profiles crawled from an identity management service. Their
coverage includes Contact→Web Bio→Age, Bio→Relationship and Bio→Gender
as well as Bio→Username and Geographical→Current. Figures reported are
extracted from a graph and may contain error in the 0.1 to 0.2 range. In addition,
some figures are aggregates of categories reported.
4.5 Consistency 165
Table 4.16 Prior measurements of profile attribute consistency
Attribute Irani Goga13 Goga15 Malhotra Score
Contact→Web 0.53 - - - 0.53
Contact→Profile - - - - -
Contact→Email - - - - -
Contact→Phone - - - - -
Bio→Username 0.63 0.42 0.84 0.81 0.68
Bio→Description - - - 0.32 0.32
Bio→Age 0.74 - - - 0.74
Bio→Tags - - - - -
Bio→Education - - - - -
Bio→Occupation - - - - -
Bio→Gender 0.98 - - - 0.98
Bio→Relationship 0.43 - - - 0.43
Bio→Sexuality - - - - -
Bio→Verified - - - - -
Bio→Religion - - - - -
Bio→Physical - - - - -
Bio→Habits - - - - -
Visual→Avatar - - 0.21 0.22 0.22
Visual→Banner - - - - -
Visual→Photos - - - - -
Opinion→Content - - - - -
Opinion→Brand - - - - -
Opinion→Other - - - - -
Temporal→Activity - 0.13 - - 0.13
Temporal→Membership - - - - -
Temporal→Seen - - - - -
Geographical→Current 0.33 0.52 0.70 0.52 0.52
Geographical→Locations - - - - -
Geographical→History - - - - -
Degree→Subscribers - - - - -
Degree→Subscribed - - - 0.01 0.01
Degree→Contributions - - - - -
Degree→Visibility - - - - -
Degree→Reputation - - - - -
Degree→Trophies - - - - -
Degree→Rank - - - - -
Relationships→Interacted - - - - -
Relationships→FollowsUser - - 0.49 - 0.49
Relationships→FollowedBy - - 0.49 - 0.49
Relationships→Grouped - - - - -
Relationships→FollowsBrand - - - - -
Relationships→Contributes - - - - -
Content→Text - 0.08 - - 0.08
Content→Image - - - - -
Content→Video - - - - -
Content→Links - - - - -
Attributes→Temporal - - - - -
Attributes→Impact - - - - -
Attributes→Category - - - - -
Attributes→Spatial - - - - -
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• Malhotra et al. [139] report on the consistency of Bio→Username, Bio→Description,
Geographical→Current, Visual→Avatar and Degree→Subscribed between
29,129 paired Twitter and LinkedIn accounts. They report consistency as measured
via information gain between the distributions.
• Chen et al. [45] investigate profile consistency between 179,188 profiles across ten
social networks. As well as measuring the consistency of information revelation
patterns (the availability of attributes in a user’s profile on different networks), they
also investigate the consistency attribute values for several attributes, and report
on the consistency of the Geographical→Current attribute across profiles of the
same user, based on the different levels of representation available in Google’s
Geocoding API.
• Goga et al [83] investigate the consistency of Bio→Username, Temporal→Activity,
Geographical→Current and Content→Test in the form of accuracy at a 1% FPR
between Twitter, Flickr and Yelp profiles.
• Goga et al. [84] investigate profile consistency between 28,211 profiles across five
different social networks, looking at Bio→Username, Visual→Avatar, Geographical-
→Current and Relationships→FollowsUser. These figures were calculated us-
ing similarity thresholds based on the evaluation of human annotators (i.e. figures
are the proportion of matches with both attributes which pass a manually-defined
threshold)
Table 4.18 complements the aggregated prior estimates of consistency with original
measurement. An automated analysis of consistency was performed on a dataset of 476
pairs of profiles, these being the ground-truth pairings from the same dataset used in
Section 4.4.2. For each attribute, the appropriate similarity function was selected and the
similarity averaged over the matching profiles.
The attributes with a consistency value > 0.6 are highlighted in bold text in Table 4.18.
Note that the measures reported here are very dependent on the similarity functions
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Table 4.17 Term mappings for discussion of consistency values
Term “very low” “low” “average” “high”
Range 0 - 1st Q 1st - 2nd Q 2nd - 3rd Q 3rd Q - 1
Completeness 0 - 0.28 0.29 - 0.50 0.51 - 0.75 0.76 - 1
selected in Section 4.5.1. Following the system from the previous section, terms are once
again mapped to interquartile ranges, as delineated in Table 4.17.
Regarding Contact→* items, only Contact→Web was available enough in the dataset
to provide an estimate of consistency, and this consistency being quite low, pulled up from
very low status by a more middling prior in the literature. This perhaps surprising result
suggests that different contact information may be found even on declared connections,
perhaps highlighting different social strategies for different networks.
Bio→* attributes were comparatively well-represented in previous literature. Of these,
Bio→Gender was by far the most consistent, with Bio→Age trailing at an average rating
and Bio→Relationship having only low consistency. Our own automated measure-
ments failed to find enough overlap to independently measure the consistency of all these
attributes, but these were achieved for Bio→Username, which had high consistency, and
Bio→Description which had very low consistency.
Of Visual→* attributes, only Visual→Avatar was measurable. The consistency here
was low, suggesting that the reuse of the same or highly similar images across profiles is
not all that widespread, though the original measurements place a more average weight,
suggesting some value which may not be captured in prior work. Opinion→* consistency
was not measured via automated means or in prior literature.
Temporal→Activity registered a low consistency, somewhat greater than the very
low level reported in previous observations. Temporal→Membership showed very low
consistency, indicating that date of membership is not a strong predictor of identity.
Temporal→Seen was not available enough for comparison in the sampled data.
Geographical→* showed very high similarity values across the board. The degree to
which these exceed prior measurements is likely due to the scale by which the geodesic
distances are normalised. In this data, the scale is set by the maximum distance between
antipodes on Earth, whereas it has been more common to use the maximum distance
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Table 4.18 Original measurements of profile attribute consistency
Attribute Automated Manual Priors C( fi)
Contact→Web 0.28 0.18 0.53 0.33
Contact→Profile - - - -
Contact→Email - - - -
Contact→Phone - - - -
Bio→Username 0.84 0.88 0.68 0.80
Bio→Description 0.11 0.07 0.32 0.17
Bio→Age - - 0.74 0.74
Bio→Tags - - - -
Bio→Education - 0.57 - 0.57
Bio→Occupation - 0.58 - 0.58
Bio→Gender - - 0.98 0.98
Bio→Relationship - - 0.43 0.43
Bio→Sexuality - - - -
Bio→Verified - - - -
Bio→Religion - - - -
Bio→Physical - - - -
Bio→Habits - - - -
Visual→Avatar 0.58 0.57 0.22 0.46
Visual→Banner - 0.44 - 0.44
Visual→Photos - - - -
Opinion→Content - - - -
Opinion→Brand - - - -
Opinion→Other - - - -
Temporal→Activity 0.45 0.60 0.13 0.39
Temporal→Membership 0.20 - - 0.20
Temporal→Seen - - - -
Geographical→Current 0.96 0.98 0.52 0.82
Geographical→Locations 0.91 0.62 - 0.77
Geographical→History 0.99 - - 0.99
Degree→Subscribers 0.74 0.74 - 0.74
Degree→Subscribed 1.00 0.83 0.01 0.61
Degree→Contributions 1.00 - - 1.00
Degree→Visibility - - - -
Degree→Reputation - - - -
Degree→Trophies - - - -
Degree→Rank - - - -
Relationships→Interacted 0.02 - - 0.02
Relationships→FollowsUser 0.12 - 0.49 0.31
Relationships→FollowedBy 0.12 - 0.49 0.31
Relationships→Grouped - - - -
Relationships→FollowsBrand - - - -
Relationships→Contributes - - - -
Content→Text 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.03
Content→Image 0.01 - - 0.01
Content→Video - - - -
Content→Links 0.02 0.02 - 0.02
Attributes→Temporal 0.72 1.00 - 0.86
Attributes→Impact 0.86 0.80 - 0.83
Attributes→Category 1.00 - - 1.00
Attributes→Spatial 0.67 - - 0.67
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between any two points in the dataset. Nonetheless, there appears to be high similarity in
locations of matched profiles, a similarity which increases as locations are matched by
associated time values.
Degree→* information, where measurable, was highly consistent between matched
profiles, indicating that a user is likely to have proportionally similar numbers of friends
for each network on which they have a profile, and the same for the number of contribu-
tions they make.
Relationships→* information was of either low or very low consistency. Much of
a person’s social graph in one network is not present in another according to name-based
profile matching, and measurements for some other relationships were not available.
The consistency of Content→* and Attribute→* items presents an interesting pat-
tern. Although very few of any content items were found to have exact matches in the
corresponding profile, the attributes of those content items which were matched were of
high or upper average consistency. This is intuitive, as already-matched content should
be mostly expected to share attributes – when a user posts the same message on two
networks, you expect them to do so at roughly the same time and from roughly the same
location, to use similar categories for it and for it to garner proportionally similar levels
of attention.
4.6 Uniqueness
The uniqueness of information items explores what is typically considered their entropy
– how much variation do you see between different users’ profile values for a given
information attribute? Uniqueness has direct value for linking profiles – consider the
example of a profile attribute like gender, which can be highly available and accurate, yet
not very identifiable due to the expected proportion of the population which will share a
gender value with a particular individual.
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4.6.1 Measuring uniqueness
There are two approaches which can be taken when measuring the uniqueness of informa-
tion carried by an attribute. The first is empirical: to compare the similarity of the attribute
between non-matched profiles within a large dataset, and use this internal uniqueness
measure as an approximation of this attribute’s uniqueness in the domain-general case.
The second approach is to approach the attributes theoretically: to identify the expected
variation in attribute values, and thus how much information can be represented by this
attribute in terms of bits. In this section a combined approach will be taken.
Firstly, an automated comparison is made of the similarity of attribute values across
100,000 non-matched profiles drawn from real-world social network profiles, using the
similarity metrics defined in Section 4.5.1. These profiles are drawn from the sampling
process that found true matches in the previous section, and described fully in Chapter 3,
but comparison is now made between a profile and the specifically-sampled plausible
candidate set, excluding the correct match. Secondly, a random subset of 50 non-
matching profile pairs are compared in a semi-automated fashion, to include uniqueness
estimates for attributes which were not automatically retrieved. Finally, theoretical values
are backed by previous literature or understanding of the attribute.
Contact uniqueness
Contact→* details are all intended to uniquely identify an individual, and as such should
be expected to have the maximum possible uniqueness.
Biographical uniqueness
Biographical details carry varying levels of information, often heavily influenced by
the sample size under consideration and the means of gathering said sample. The most
well-studied attribute for uniqueness purposes is Bio→Username. Perito et al. [178]
give a thorough analysis of the identifiability of usernames, and find high precision for
the Jaro similarity measure in a dataset of some 100,000 non-matched Google profiles,
with graphs indicating precision as high as 0.95 at the threshold level of recall they find
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optimum for other methods. However, one can expect collisions to be much more likely
within our study, due to the sampling method relying on a relatively small number of
surnames.
Bio→Gender information should be binary with a expected equal distribution, so the
probability of matches across the population would be 0.5, making the likelihood of a
correct match only 1/N2 , which quickly approaches 0 for datasets of any size.
The range of options for Bio→Religion could be highly variable if considering
free-form selection from all possible religious doctrines, but in practice, four major
world religions (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism) cover 77% of the world
population. Leaving an option for atheism, and a catch-all category for the remainder,
a very rough estimate would suggest a 1-in-6 chance of a false match, though this is
unadjusted for the relative populations of these religions in online accounts, and is likely
an overestimate.
The number of Bio→Verified users is very low compared to non-verified users, but
verified status is still common enough that it is not particularly identifying: estimates
from Twitter alone suggest some 187,000 distinct identities (though this is still below 1%
of Twitter’s userbase).
Visual uniqueness
The erroneous similarity level for the perceptual hashing methods used is expected to be
below at most 0.212. Accepting this as a bound, a uniqueness estimate can be determined
by its complement for Visual→Avatar and Visual→Banner. Where multiple Visual-
→Photos are available, this tends towards highly uniquely identifying.
Opinion uniqueness
As a set of ratings for potentially highly distinct sets of names, all opinion information
can be expected to be highly unique in aggregate.
12Based on observations recorded at http://phash.org/docs/design.html
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Temporal uniqueness
Under the similarity function defined for Temporal→Activity, the possible values are
6 different binary options (high or low activity). Under a uniform assumption, this would
result in a 2−6 probability that profiles coincidentally match. This is almost certainly an
underestimate, as user activity patterns will be heavily influenced by common timeframes.
Temporal→Membership can be expected to be relatively unique, as there is no particular
reason to expect many users to share an exact date of joining a site, whereas Temporal-
→Seen can be expected to have a higher probability of collisions, with active users likely
interacting with the site between a certain period of activity.
Geographic uniqueness
The similarity of randomly chosen users’ locations should be very low overall, with
Geographical→Current the most likely to overlap, followed by the other attributes,
which are more unique due to their multiplicity.13
Degree uniqueness
The method for comparing most Degree→* information, given in Section 4.5.1, divides
the dataset into n equal portions, so the probability of a false match should in each case
be approximately 1n , where n in this case is 6.
Relationship uniqueness
The pattern of relationships to similar names, which is expressed by all Relationships-
→* attributes, is highly uniquely identifying.
Content uniqueness
The rate of exact duplication of user content items (Content→*) should be expected to
be near-nil, with some small allowance for the replication of popular images or slogans.
Content attribute similarities can be expected to be more variable. Attributes→Impact
13This is complicated in measurements by the way the values are normalised.
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follows the expected uniqueness of Degree→* attributes due to the shared similarity mea-
surement approach, as Attributes→Temporal follows Temporal→Membership and
Attributes→Spatial follows Geographical→Current. Attributes→Category, as
a single-word free-text field, could be expected to follow high-uniqueness templates such
as Bio→Tags but at a lower degree.
4.6.2 Estimates of uniqueness
Based on the dataset from Section 3 and the methods discussed in the previous section,
Table 4.19 presents estimates of uniqueness which can be made for the information
attributes in the schema.
Focusing on the results which have been empirically validated, it can be seen that
Contact→*, Relationships→* and Content→* items are highly unique, as is the sin-
gular biographical item Bio→Description, which uses a similarity function which
is related to that of Content→Text. These qualities are all notable in that they are
a combination of multiple exact comparisons between profile attributes – contact de-
tails, network connections, and content items. The timestamps associated with matched
content (Attributes→Temporal) can also be established to be highly unique.
It is worth remarking on the comparably low uniqueness of username data, when
considering to the theoretical values grounded by Perito et. al. The sampling methodology
used makes particular use of the username feature, so that randomly-matched profiles
might be expected to be unusually non-unique in their name values. For usage where a
different sampling methodology is being applied, Perito’s value should be preferred, but
as is argued in Chapter 3, the task solved in the present case more realistically reflects an
important identity-resolution challenge.
Other attributes of middling uniqueness values include a smattering of measurable bi-
ographical variables (Bio→Age, Bio→Education, and Bio→Occupation). The observed
values for occupation and education were less unique than predicted, suggesting that there
is a notable bias in reporting of education and occupation, or that the string comparison
function used is unduly influenced by similarity of institutional titles. Visual information
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Table 4.19 Original measurements of profile attribute uniqueness
Attribute Automated Manual Theory U( fi)
Contact→Web > 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Contact→Profile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Contact→Email - - 1.00 1.00
Contact→Phone - - 1.00 1.00
Bio→Username 0.47* 0.50 0.95 0.64
Bio→Description > 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Bio→Age - - 0.80 0.80
Bio→Tags - - 0.99 0.99
Bio→Education 0.56 0.48 0.95 0.66
Bio→Occupation 0.54 0.46 0.95 0.65
Bio→Gender 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bio→Relationship - - 0.33 0.33
Bio→Sexuality - - 0.45 0.45
Bio→Verified - - 0.01 0.01
Bio→Religion - - 0.17 0.17
Bio→Physical - - 0.99 0.99
Bio→Habits - - 0.95 0.95
Visual→Avatar 0.47 0.46 0.80 0.58
Visual→Banner - 0.50 0.80 0.65
Visual→Photos - - 0.99 0.99
Opinion→Content - - 0.99 0.99
Opinion→Brand - - 0.99 0.99
Opinion→Other - - 0.99 0.99
Temporal→Activity 0.59 0.53 0.98 0.70
Temporal→Membership 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.98
Temporal→Seen - - 0.60 0.60
Geographical→Current 0.41 0.42 0.90 0.58
Geographical→Locations 0.40 0.82 0.95 0.72
Geographical→History 0.44 - 0.99 0.72
Degree→Subscribers 0.24 0.29 0.17 0.23
Degree→Subscribed 0.00* 0.07 0.17 0.08
Degree→Contributions - - 0.17 0.17
Degree→Visibility - - 0.17 0.17
Degree→Reputation 0.17 - 0.17 0.17
Degree→Trophies - - 0.60 0.60
Degree→Rank - - 0.46 0.46
Relationships→Interacted > 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
Relationships→FollowsUser > 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
Relationships→FollowedBy > 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
Relationships→Grouped - - 0.99 0.99
Relationships→FollowsBrand - - 0.99 0.99
Relationships→Contributes - - 0.99 0.99
Content→Text > 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
Content→Image 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
Content→Video 1.00 - 0.99 0.99
Content→Links > 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
Attributes→Temporal 0.88 - 0.99 0.94
Attributes→Impact 0.16 - 0.17 0.17
Attributes→Category 0.67 - 0.90 0.79
Attributes→Spatial - - 0.90 0.90
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also falls into this bracket, with some notable low uniqueness of avatar images. Similarly,
Geographical→* information produces low uniqueness, perhaps due to the similarity
function embedding an overbroad scope of similarity relative to the typical locations of
social network users.
Least unique of all were the Degree→* attributes and the Attributes→Impact
attribute. These all use the same grounding similarity function, which sorts degrees such
that they are assigned to a small number of ranked bins covering the spread of observed
values, and as such it is unsurprising that there is a high chance of matching to randomly
selected users in the empirical measures.
4.7 Interrelation of Metrics
This chapter has outlined a schema for online user profile information, and calculated
estimates for the availability, consistency and uniqueness of profile attributes from that
schema. This final section will explore the options for combining these measurements,
and discuss how the resultant ranking of information attributes corresponds to how
attributes are being used in the literature.
Firstly, it is important to note that the measurements in the above sections were
unable to provide some consistency estimates for certain attributes, due to the impact of
low availability of those attributes. Similarly, some values for uniqueness have been only
theoretically estimated. As such, in what follows a curtailed selection of attributes will
be considered, covering only those for which all three of availability, consistency and
uniqueness are measured. Table 4.20 below lists these attributes and their values. The
estimated availability of the removed items was an average of 0.25, compared to 0.49 for
the remaining.
It is of interest whether attributes generally perform better across categories, or
whether they are orthogonal dimensions. The correlations between the measures, given
in Table 4.21, seem to indicate the latter conclusion. No notable correlation exists
between an attribute’s availability and its uniqueness or consistency. A middling-strength
inverse correlation does appear to exist, however, between uniqueness and consistency.
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Table 4.20 Attributes for which all measurements are available.
Attribute Availability Uniqueness Consistency
Contact→Web 0.25 1.00 0.33
Bio→Username 0.98 0.64 0.80
Bio→Description 0.50 0.99 0.17
Bio→Age 0.29 0.80 0.74
Bio→Education 0.35 0.66 0.57
Bio→Occupation 0.32 0.65 0.58
Bio→Gender 0.51 0.00 0.98
Bio→Relationship 0.25 0.33 0.43
Visual→Avatar 0.76 0.58 0.46
Visual→Banner 0.29 0.65 0.44
Temporal→Activity 0.79 0.70 0.39
Temporal→Membership 0.75 0.98 0.20
Geographical→Current 0.51 0.58 0.82
Geographical→Locations 0.45 0.72 0.77
Geographical→History 0.12 0.72 0.99
Degree→Subscribers 0.67 0.23 0.74
Degree→Subscribed 0.58 0.08 0.61
Degree→Contributions 0.52 0.17 1.00
Relationships→Interacted 0.65 0.99 0.02
Relationships→FollowsUser 0.64 0.99 0.31
Relationships→FollowedBy 0.55 0.99 0.31
Content→Text 0.59 0.99 0.03
Content→Image 0.44 1.00 0.01
Content→Links 0.22 0.99 0.02
Attributes→Temporal 0.68 0.94 0.86
Attributes→Impact 0.65 0.17 0.83
Attributes→Category 0.24 0.79 1.00
Attributes→Spatial 0.10 0.90 0.67
As both measures make use of the same similarity function on an attribute-by-attribute
basis, one can connect this correlation to the discriminative ability of these similarity
functions.
This correlation is explored visually in Figure 4.4. Attributes clustering at high con-
sistency and low uniqueness are from the Degree→* and Attribute→Impact grounding.
The similarity function used for these is a six-bin system based on the observed ranges
of possible values. This function would appear to be poorly discriminative, matching
easily to non-matched and matched profiles alike. At the other end of the range, one sees
attributes which rarely match to either matched or non-matched profiles – i.e. they pose
too high a bar for similarity. These include exact matching methods for profile content.
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Table 4.21 Correlations between estimates
Availability Uniqueness Consistency
Availability - -0.13 -0.09
Uniqueness -0.13 - -0.56
Consistency -0.09 -0.56 -
Notably, though, when content is matched, the similarity of attributes of that content is
both unique and highly consistent.
Fig. 4.4 Attribute consistency plotted against attribute uniqueness.
4.8 Summary
The ACID framework of Goga et al. [84] provides a basis for understanding the value of
profile information, but parts of the framework are not necessary or difficult to measure.
The ACU model is described, relating the properties of availability, consistency and
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uniqueness to the overall identification value of a profile attribute, and to Bayesian and
classical statistical approaches to identity resolution.
A survey of online user profiles is carried out in order to define an appropriate
matching schema for online profiles from the top-ranked websites by traffic measurement
rates. A schema of 35 profile attributes is defined as a reference point.
Using previous literature, and ground truth data sampled according to the method pre-
sented in Chapter 3, estimates of availability, consistency and uniqueness are calculated
for these 35 profile attributes, and the relative rankings of attributes under each measure
are discussed, along with potential implications and interrelations of measures.
Chapter 5
Feature Selection under Missing Data
Conditions
The ACU model derived and grounded in Chapter 4 provides a means for understanding
the quality of data available for identity resolution. In Eq. 4.16 a formula is presented for
the conditional probability of matches based on similarity functions for particular fields,
in terms of estimates of the availability, consistency, and uniqueness components of the
model. This chapter covers how this model can be deployed within identity resolution to
select features which are likely to be both identifying and available.
Identity-resolution attacks are a range of different methods for automatically linking
online social network (OSN) profiles and other personal information datasets. Security
and privacy researchers use identity-resolution attacks to understand the privacy impact
of information-disclosure on the part of social networks, users or third-parties, helping
calibrate risk in online social networks.
Some previous attacks in the security and privacy literature have focused on the
identification value of individual features, including: usernames [109, 178]; network
properties [128, 156]; user annotation information [103, 214]; group membership [235];
writing style [154, 222]; and time activity profiles [13]. Other attacks have taken joint
approaches which merge multiple such features [23, 85, 139], using a selection of
classifiers such as binomial linear regression, support vector machines (SVMs), decision-
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tree classifiers and Naive Bayesian approaches, as well as more probabilistic methods
drawn from statistical literature [50].
More recently, the reliability of these methods in practice has been called into ques-
tion [84]. Problems arise from discrepancies between the filtered profile datasets used
in initial evaluations and the sparse data revealed in profiles from more representative
samples of OSNs. The most important issue after sampling bias is the handling of missing
data. Improper treatment of missing data can transform an unbiased representation of so-
cial networking data into a highly skewed sample, analysis of which can give misleading
results about the practical application and effectiveness of an identity-resolution attack.
Recall that in a typical identity-resolution situation, there are some identities repre-
sented by profiles I = [i1 . . . in] each of which contain a set of attributes F = [ f1 . . . fm].
When two profiles are compared, the result is a comparison vector which relates how
similar each of the attributes in the two profiles are, according to appropriate predefined
similarity functions:
sim(i1, i2) = [sim(i1 f1, i2 f1) . . .sim(i1 fm, i2 fm)]
The case of interest is when the data for some field fi is missing for i1 or i2 (or both),
and as a result the similarity function for this field is also undefined. How should this
missing data be handled? Take for example the first motivating scenario from Chapter 1,
in which an officer is attempting to match online profiles of an individual of interest
to an investigation. Inevitably, the known profile and many of the candidate profiles
will be missing some of the attributes which the host OSN allows them to display. How
the officer works with this partial data will be important to determining whether they
manage to locate matched profiles for their target. In a one-to-many case, the missing
data might entirely prevent certain comparison schemes, as the singular starting example
does not contain the necessary values to employ them. Consider in comparison the
second motivating example from Chapter 1, of a community administrator attempting to
match profiles of known disruptive elements. Here it may be possible, if not desirable, to
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use a broader range of comparisons and accept that there may be missing data on both
the source and target end.
A common approach to handling missing data is listwise deletion, whereby any
profile with any missing attribute would be removed from consideration. This approach
appears to have been used in the identity-resolution literature several times, in different
ways [128, 139, 154, 222]. While this approach can be appropriate for demonstrating
performance of a technique with particular requirements, there are two major issues with
applying this process to identity-resolution data. Firstly, most missing data in identity
resolution is missing not at random (MNAR), as missing data comes from optional
profile attributes which were either never provided by the user, or which are intentionally
restricted from public access. Treating MNAR data as missing at random (MAR), or
the even more unreasonable missing completely at random (MCAR), creates a bias in
the resulting analysis. As listwise deletion is only valid for MAR data, this is a serious
violation.
Secondly, as was explored in more detail in Section 4.4, most attributes used in
identity resolution are missing for a significant proportion of real-world profile data. As
such, listwise deletion combined over all attributes will result in deletion of a majority of
the gathered data. The combined effect will be that a dataset gathered to be representative
of a real-world identity-resolution problem is instead constrained to a small subset of
the most willing-to-share individuals, whose revealed information can be expected to
be significantly different from the population as a whole. A different approach known
to statisticians, pairwise deletion, is equivalent to listwise deletion for most identity-
resolution purposes, and assumes missing data is MCAR [88].
An alternative to deleting rows of data (removing profiles) would be to delete columns
(remove attributes from profiles). This approach is not without merit in some cases, such
as where a low-value attribute presents difficulty due to a high proportion of missing
values. However, it does not solve the modal case, where a highly identifying attribute
such as geographic location can be expected to be missing for a significant proportion
(>5%) of the dataset. Removing all attributes with a significant proportion of missing
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data would limit classification to only a few mandatory attributes such as usernames, and
prevent intelligent use of incidental profile data such as is most valuable in adversarial
conditions.
5.1 The Missing Data Problem in Identity Resolution
A dataset drawn from the method in Chapter 3 is used here to demonstrate the issues
raised by missing data in identity resolution.
The entire dataset consists of 9,447 comparisons between potentially matching pro-
files, where potential matches are blocked based on the profile display name, and there
are 187 correct matches (2%). A wide range of profile features can be extracted for these
profiles, but the present discussion focuses on three features used in previous literature.
Three standard similarity metrics are used to compare the username (Levenshtein dis-
tance), profile picture (Hamming distance of the perceptual hash) and location (geodesic
distance between inferred coordinates) of profiles – a solid scheme drawn from a recent
approach to identity resolution [85].
This dataset is a clear example of the explosive costs of deletion. For username
alone, all comparisons are possible. Adding in the profile image feature, however, would
reduce the dataset to 4,276 comparisons (45%) under listwise deletion, as profiles without
images are removed from consideration. None of the correct matches are removed at this
stage, so a false base-rate is already being established (from 2% to 4.4%). Adding in
location similarity even more dramatically shrinks the dataset to just 96 comparisons (1%
of the original data), with 20 positive examples (21% of the revised dataset) establishing
an even more distorted base-rate.
The implications here for performance on test data are obvious: for large populations
of real data, classifiers which have no means of coping with missing data can make no
prediction. However, handling missing data also affects the training of models. Figure 5.1
demonstrates the impact that deletion schemes have on final classifier performance.
Removing useful features or large proportions of training data from the cases where
comparisons are complete causes underperformance.
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(a) Removing informative features greatly
harms classifier performance where those
values are present.
(b) Removing training examples as in list-
wise deletion also results in degraded classi-
fier performance.
Fig. 5.1 ROC charts a tenfold cross-validation of a binomial regression model (a standard
approach with well-understood performance) trained on the data subset for which all
three features are available, under different deletion schemes.
5.1.1 Limitations of imputation
Where deletion is not appropriate, an alternative sometimes suggested is imputation
of some standard value to replace the missing data [85]. However, the application of
imputation for identity-resolution purposes is dubious, for a number of reasons:
1. At the level of individual profile content, imputation methods are not sufficient
to produce viable text, image or complex network attributes, and are generally
contra-indicated for even simple categorical variables due to the risk of violating
hidden normality assumptions.
2. Assuming instead that similarity values between paired profile attributes are im-
puted, good imputation methods are not readily available.
• Imputation with default scores like 0 or 1 can skew a classifier’s valuation of
that attribute.
• Imputation with the mean value for the attribute can be similarly highly
misleading for classifiers, as identity resolution usually suffers from highly
imbalanced classes.
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• Imputation with the mean value for the outcome class necessarily begs the
question, leaking information from the outcome variable.
• Regression-based estimation, which predicts the missing value based on other
attributes of the profile, could theoretically prove suitable, but is practically
hampered by a nested variant of the original issue: the attributes being used
to predict a missing value may themselves be missing in many cases. Other
similarity values may not be strongly predictive of missing scores.
3. Most applications of imputation are suggested for cases where relatively small pro-
portions of data (<5%) are missing, but attributes in identity resolution commonly
have data missing for >50% of cases, as is detailed in Section 4.4.
Even where possible, it should also be noted that imputation does not offer a great basis
for comparison. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the significant gap in performance between
a classifier exactly like those in Figure 5.1 when trained on actual values and when
trained on imputed values. Different simple imputation approaches are trialled: replacing
missing values with 0 or 1, and simple mean imputation (SMI), which replaces missing
values with the mean of all observed values. Imputed performance is little better than
chance, unlike that of the classifier trained on full data.
5.1.2 Mitigating low availability
As discussed above, traditional data deletion approaches are insufficient for identity
resolution data due to a combination of imbalanced classes and content sensitivity.
One approach which allows for these issues to be sidestepped is to employ a Bayesian
inference approach to similarity scores, as opposed to a logistic regression, SVM or
similar machine learning approach. These approaches are resilient to missing data by
virtue of including each attribute similarity score for a profile as a distinct piece of
evidence. Each piece of evidence is then used to update a prior probability, rather than
as dimensions or components of an expression. Missing data items can thus be omitted,
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Fig. 5.2 Binomial logistic regression performance under different imputation schemes,
applied to the same proportion of known data as was observed missing in the larger
sample, introduced as MAR. Each of these approaches produces significantly poorer
models, demonstrating the gap between imputed and real data.
necessarily reducing the evidence base for a prediction, but still producing a grounded
probability.
An alternative approach is to use some form of imputation to complete missing data,
excluding the outcome variable from imputation calculations to prevent data leakage
(which could easily render a classifier more effective than on real complete data). There
are a number of viable methods for imputing missing data. The forms of imputation
trialled here are summarised in Table 5.1.
To examine how well these imputation methods perform, data was removed at random
from our comparison vector where a true value was known, imputation was performed
on this missing data, and then the imputed values were compared to the true values.
Table 5.2 shows the mean distance between imputed values and true similarity scores for
the location and image similarity data, where proportions removed reflect the real rates
of loss observed in our comparison vector. The differences observed in this small dataset
would suggest that linear regression of missing values is the most accurate scheme, and
0-imputation the least successful, but it is important to note that LIN, PMM and RF were
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(a) Comparison of methods on
complete data (1% of total),
with proportionate MAR data
introduced.
(b) Missing data methods ap-
plied to the full dataset, which
contains data which should be
MNAR.
(c) Missing data methods ap-
plied to the full dataset, mea-
suring precision and recall to
account for class imbalance.
Fig. 5.3 Comparison of classification performance under different missing data mitigation
strategies.
Label Method
ZER Assume missing similarities are 0.
SMI Impute missing data as column means from training
data.
NB Naive Bayesian handling of training and test data, no
imputation.
LIN Impute missing data as result of chained linear regres-
sion on other columns.
SMP Imputation via random sampling from observed data.
PMM Imputation via predictive mean matching (select real
values closest to those predicted by linear regression).
RF Imputation of values by a Random Forests classifier.
Table 5.1 Trialled data-robustness methods.
unable to make imputation on the extremely sparse location similarity data. Imputation
with the observed mean was the best performer given the need to always produce a value.
Figure 5.3a shows the results of applying the Naive Bayes approach to complete
data with missing data introduced at random. Naive Bayes performs comparably to a
regression model on the complete data and matches performance with an imputation-
grounded regression on the constructed missing data1.
Figure 5.3b would appear to suggest that most imputation methods, including simple
mean imputation and imputation of values suggesting the majority class (0-imputation)
outperform a Naive Bayesian approach when applied to a larger MNAR dataset. However,
1More advanced imputation methods failed to fit to cross-validation sets on this small subset of data
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Table 5.2 Mean absolute error rates for imputation schemes
ROC plots can be misleading about performance when classes are heavily imbalanced,
as can be seen by comparison with Figure 5.3c, wherein the NB approach has a greater
precision profile than any of the regression-on-imputed-data approaches.
The failure of advanced imputation strategies to outperform 0-imputation on this
data is surprising, given the previous indications in Table 5.2 that this method least well
reflects the true similarity values. However, this can be explained with reference to (a)
the large proportions of missing data which leave advanced inference strategies with
insufficient information for accurate predictions and (b) the class-imbalance inherent
to the data, and the bias of available data toward positive-class examples. Imputation
models fit to the available data are likely to overestimate the values of missing similarity
measures because the available data is skewed towards positive classes.
These results suggest that choosing a missing-data-robust classifier such as Naive
Bayes is generally more advisable than imputing missing data and using another classifier.
Where data is available, classifiers are comparable, but Naive Bayesian classifiers degrade
more gracefully than the imputation methods required for other classification approaches
in the face of missing data. Where imputation needs to be carried out, care must be taken
to avoid biasing imputed data due to MNAR effects.
For further improvements of the handling of missing data, it becomes more important
to model the patterns of data availability, and the underlying causes. It is here that the
measurements in Section 4.4 become instrumental.
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5.2 Availability-Sensitive Feature Selection
The previous section addressed how to mitigate the issue of missing data where it appears.
This section, in contrast, focuses on how estimates of availability, alone or in combination
with other information, can be used to select attributes which are as available as possible,
or else of such identification value that their low availability needs to be ignored. In
a one-to-many identity-resolution problem, the feature selection is constrained by the
binary availability of features in the source profile, but selecting the best features for
comparing with candidate profiles may still help deal with missing data arising amongst
candidates.
The estimates given in Section 4.4 for the availability of particular attributes are
particularly useful in attribute selection for an appropriate matching schema. This can be
approached in two ways: in an a-priori manner, using only availability information, and
in an a-posteriori fashion, as part of a supervised feature selection process on labelled
data.
5.2.1 A-Priori model
An attacker building identity-resolution solutions for general-purpose application can
constrain her selection to those attributes which have high support. These are the
attributes which are most likely to exist across different profile networks, and so the
inclusion of other attributes will at best limit a method’s applicability to a more specific
subset of online profile networks. Focus on use of well-supported attributes makes a
method generalisable.
Secondly, high-support attributes can be filtered to exclude low or medium complete-
ness attributes, thus reducing missing data to a smaller number of cases, which may even
successfully be imputed based on regression from other profile attributes. Table 5.3 takes
this approach to refine Table 4.14, and lists the top attributes by these availability-only
criteria, ranked by their completeness.
These figures are based on a combination of prior literature and our own measure-
ments of a dataset, as given in Section 4.4. An attacker can adopt the same approach by
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Completeness Structure Availability Attribute
1.00 0.95 0.98 Bio→Username
0.80 0.72 0.76 Visual→Avatar
0.74 0.60 0.67 Degree→Subscribers
0.64 0.94 0.79 Temporal→Activity
0.64 0.63 0.64 Relationships→FollowsUser
Table 5.3 Most available attributes under an a-priori approach.
averaging the values given in Table 4.14 with her own domain estimates of completeness
and support and selecting features through this process so that their attacks generalise
well in the face of missing data.
5.2.2 A-Posteriori model
The a-priori approach may be most useful in domains where labelled data is not available.
Where labelled data is available, it can be used to attempt to balance the demands of
availability and identification value. The derivation given by Eq. 4.16 combines these
concerns, weighting the expected identification value of an attribute in accordance with
its expected availability.
This then provides an implicit attack model, whereby an attacker attempts to maximise
their combined E or expected identification value, by selecting features which maximise
Eq. 4.16 to use in an identification attack on social networking data.
Estimates of C( fi) and U( fi) for our dataset were used in combination with the A( fi)
estimates in Table 4.14 to create an a-posteriori availability-adjusted ranking of the
supported profile attributes, presented in Table 5.4.
These values, which take into account the identification value of attributes as well as
their availability, paint a somewhat different picture of the desirability of various profile
attributes to that given in Table 5.3.
The highest weight is given to Contact→Web information, which is very consistent
between matched profiles and moderately available and identifiable.
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Attribute A U C I
Contact→Web 0.25 1.00 0.33 6.37
Relationships→FollowsUser 0.64 0.99 0.31 4.17
Relationships→FollowedBy 0.55 0.99 0.31 3.95
Attributes→Temporal 0.68 0.94 0.86 3.26
Bio→Description 0.50 0.99 0.17 2.95
Temporal→Membership 0.75 0.98 0.20 2.84
Content→Image 0.44 1.00 0.01 2.14
Bio→Username 0.98 0.64 0.80 1.12
Content→Text 0.59 0.99 0.03 0.69
Geographical→Locations 0.45 0.72 0.77 0.30
Relationships→Interacted 0.65 0.99 0.02 0.24
Attributes→Category 0.24 0.79 1.00 0.19
Bio→Age 0.29 0.80 0.74 0.09
Temporal→Activity 0.79 0.70 0.39 0.03
Geographical→Current 0.51 0.58 0.82 -0.01
Visual→Avatar 0.76 0.58 0.46 -0.27
Attributes→Spatial 0.10 0.90 0.67 -0.59
Attributes→Impact 0.65 0.17 0.83 -0.62
Degree→Subscribers 0.67 0.23 0.74 -0.64
Degree→Contributions 0.52 0.17 1.00 -0.68
Bio→Education 0.35 0.66 0.57 -0.77
Bio→Occupation 0.32 0.65 0.58 -0.92
Bio→Gender 0.51 0.00 0.98 -1.00
Geographical→History 0.12 0.72 0.99 -1.24
Content→Links 0.22 0.99 0.02 -1.32
Degree→Subscribed 0.58 0.08 0.61 -1.38
Visual→Banner 0.29 0.65 0.44 -1.46
Bio→Relationship 0.25 0.33 0.43 -2.64
Table 5.4 Ranked availability-adjusted estimates of the identification value of profile
attributes for our dataset, where supported.
Network relationships, being highly unique and moderately available and consistent,
are promoted as the next most desirable, a result which is aligned with successful
large-scale de-anonymisation methods from the literature [154].
Timestamp information, an often-overlooked feature, performed well across each
measure. The strongest signal is given when matched content has the same timestamp,
but user membership dates for social networks are often highly consistent, and the
information is readily available.
In this dataset, usernames are weighted lower than may be expected from previous
work due to particulars of the sampling approach used (see Chapter 3).
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Similarly, despite ranking highly on availability, profile pictures are considered less
useful features overall due to mediocre consistency and uniqueness.
Other good performers were matched text and images from profiles, which balance a
low general consistency with high uniqueness and moderate availability. The availability
and uniqueness of forms of user text may be considered the driving forces behind
authorship attribution methods, which aim at improving consistency over that of the
simple measure (function-word distance) used in the reported estimate.
Geographic features showed high consistency across profiles, but were not highly
available and of poor uniqueness, degrading their practical value. Gender information
was predictably consistent, but just as predictably of low identifying value.
Content attributes as a class were highly consistent, though it should be noted that
measurement was only made between the attributes of known content matches. The
usefulness of attributes such as categorical matches as they are considered on top of (for
example) strong textual matches between status updates might be minor.
These rankings suggest a direction for identity-resolution methods which must bal-
ance the needs of general application (high availability) with performance (high identifia-
bility) in terms of features and combinations of features which should be investigated.
5.2.3 Performance impact
Figure 5.4 compares the performance of a Naive Bayes classifier using the literature-based
feature set used in Section 5.1.2 (labelled as REF) with that of other Naive Bayes classifiers
using features drawn from the recommendations of the a-priori and a-posteriori models
(labelled PRI-N and POS-N) respectively, where N is the number of features used
counting from the top of the recommended list.
The comparison shows that the a-priori features match performance with those
recommended from the literature (as expected, two of the features being the same),
while the a-posteriori features, selected based on expected identification value as well as
availability, perform much better, with an AUPRC difference of 0.1 for the same number
of features and 0.22 for increased feature counts.
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Fig. 5.4 Comparison of performance under feature selection.




Table 5.5 Rates of missing data and proportion of affected comparison cases under
different feature selection schemes (3 features each).
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The value of the a-priori feature selection is demonstrated in Table 5.5, which
compares the proportions of missing data. The a-priori feature selection scheme results
in signficantly fewer missing data items, whether examined on the basis of comparisons
affected or overall missing value proportions. This means that the a-priori model’s
selection is far more workable for classifiers which are not robust to missing data.
The a-posteriori system manages to reduce the number of affected cases slightly in
comparison to the reference scheme, but does this using an overall greater proportion of
missing data values, suggesting that missing-data-robust classifiers such as Naive Bayes
should still be preferred under this model.
5.3 Summary
This chapter has shown a practical application of the ACU model, and of domain-general
estimates of measures for all attributes. The feature selection approach demonstrated
here (in conjunction with existing mitigation efforts) is neither the limit of the application
of the ACU model, nor a complete solution to the problem of missing data, but it does
advance a means for balancing availability and identification in mitigating missing data
issues. The next chapter will move on to discuss extensions of the ACU model, and how
they might be applied in a real application area case study.
Chapter 6
Data Quality Measures for Applying
Identity Resolution
The ACU model presented in Chapter 4 reflects data quality measurements which are cen-
tral to the understanding of identity resolution systems’ performance. The measurements
of availability, consistency and uniqueness provide a means for understanding the value
of profile attributes for identity resolution within a domain. As Chapter 5 shows, this
allows for the design of more effective identity-resolution systems within said domain.
However, identity resolution is not a task to be understood as a goal in and of itself.
In a police investigation, the goal is finding evidence of involvement in a crime, in a
study of meme-sharing the goal is identification of memes and a user’s cross-posting
behaviour. What value an information item has in such an application domain depends
on the investigator’s end-goals, and there are many types of investigation which could
benefit from linking personal profiles. Different attributes will gain greater weight in
such investigations for reasons beyond their strictly identifying properties. Data quality
measurements which relate to these applications are useful in identity-resolution work
even if they do not contribute to understanding the core process of identity resolution.
This chapter presents and discusses three possible attribute quality measurements
which are useful for understanding the value of attributes within a specific application of
identity resolution: The novelty of information against an existing collection of attributes
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about a subject, the relevance of information to the investigative context, and the veracity
of profile attributes to the real attributes of the profile subject. These properties each
come from disciplines closely aligned with identity resolution, and speak to different
dimensions of application. In brief, these measures assume that most purposes of identity
resolution reduce to the search for at least one of new, useful and/or true information
about a profile subject. This chapter thus seeks to understand how one might judge these
properties of profile attributes for a given task.
These task-specific data quality measures form a complement to the ACU model
detailed in Chapter 4. Where the ACU model breaks down the important considerations
of data quality for the purposes of identity resolution, the novelty, relevance and veracity
measures described in this chapter provide a means to value information that may
be obtained through, rather than for the purposes of, identity resolution. By better
understanding which profile attributes are valuable to such a system, and why, insights
can be drawn for the development of systems in the application domain.
6.1 Novelty
In a majority of identity-resolution situations, the intended purpose of resolving two
identities is to make available new information about the data subject. For example,
a police investigator may wish to link a suspect’s social media identity to an identity
they hold on an underground forum, to learn about criminal activity not recorded in one
account which can be traced to a real name and image held on another. Alternatively,
a people-search service may wish to learn new contact details for a subject, or an
advertising agency may wish to learn more about a subject’s interests and preferences, or
a company may want to learn about their employees’ social media behaviour in order to
protect themselves from possible social engineering attacks. In each case, some profile
of the user is being augmented by identity resolution.
One form of novelty measurement has already been presented in this thesis. In
Chapter 3, the evaluation of the sampling method included the application of the Kullback-
Leibler divergence, also known as information gain between distributions. By finding the
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information gain between a relevant distribution on two profiles connected by identity
resolution, a post-hoc value can be gathered for the accrued novelty of the information.
This definition is useful for certain applications – such as identifying when the level
of novelty is decreasing over iterations when performing iterative identity resolution in a
potentially unbounded database space like the internet (such as in the system proposed
by Bennacer et al. [26]) – but does not allow for predictive statements to be made about
the value of profile attributes. For such an understanding, novelty can be viewed as being
in part a particular conditional case of availability.
For all databases in which the subject is present, one wishes to know the probability
that new information is available, given current observations of the subject’s records from
prior databases. One means of understanding this possibility is through the structural
support for possible attributes within a candidate database. Databases with high structural
support for attributes not currently known are likely to contain novel types of information.
Complementarily, the possibility of new values for already-observed attributes (such
as new text posts, new location updates) should be anticipated with reference to the
completeness of fields within a database.
In the case of unobserved attributes, the potential for finding new attributes in some
possible datasets is the average completeness of all currently unobserved attributes from
the schema, amongst the unexamined databases which have structural support for that
attribute.
In the case of new values for an attribute, the above still applies, but must also be
moderated by the conditional probability of new values. Specific conditional probabilities
could be calculated for the given set of observations and each target database, in an
environment where these probabilities can be learned, or the inverse of the attribute’s
consistency can be used to approximate this probability – being already conditional on
availability. Thus novelty for an attribute fi could be formalised as
N( fi) = A( fi)(˙1−C( fi)) (6.1)
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6.2 Veracity
Information about the truthfulness of information on social network profiles (i.e. whether
they reflect the nature of the real person making the profile) is relevant to many end-tasks.
Consider the previous example of the company looking for social engineering pathways:
information they obtain through linking two online accounts would only be useful to
the imagined attacker if it is true information about the holder of the account or their
employer. Novel location information is useful in establishing the potential whereabouts
of the account holder’s employer, but only so long as that location information is a
reliable indicator of the account-holder’s actual location.
Veracity can be expected to be both correlated and causally related to consistency,
but it is important to understand that this is a sufficient but not necessary condition – a
person’s online accounts may be highly consistent even for attributes which do not relate
to their offline existence. For example, friends lists online could be entirely populated
with online-only contacts, with no representation from the people the account holder
interacts with offline.
Coming to an estimated weight for the veracity of profile attributes is an uncertain
process. The work of Rowe & Ciravegna [189, 190] proceeds by comparing the val-
ues declared in online profiles to those elicited through interview. Their discoveries
include that, for example, the majority of each participant’s real-world social network
is represented in certain of their online social networks. This is an interesting general
phenomenon, but for security purposes it may not be sufficient – it is of course possible
for certain information to be provided falsely, or even copied from another person’s
account to imitate them. One solution might be to rely upon explicit social verification,
as implemented by Bahri et al. [16] in their COIP system, whereby profile attributes
can be assessed for verification as part of a light workload spread across the social
network around a profile. Goga et al. [84] attempted to cover this through their term for
“non-Impersonability”, though they did not produce a means for estimating its value for
an attribute. The insight is nonetheless useful – veracity in a security context should
focus on the locus of control for an attribute.
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In the case of many values, such as profile image or username, the control over the
veracity lies entirely with the profile author. In situations where the author must be
considered adversarial, the weight placed on general levels of veracity in these attributes
must be lower. Some values are recorded by the social networking platform to reflect
the profile owner’s activity, such as the timestamping of status updates. While there
are methods to manipulate the interpretation of these values (e.g., using an automated
method to post a status update as an alibi whilst otherwise engaged), there is greater
effort and less payoff from the action, as the value can only be manipulated in advance,
and not at will. Finally, other values require the collaboration of others to achieve – the
networks of friends and followers attached to a profile are beyond the ability of a single
profile author to control, as are impact ratings on content they post, and other measures
of their degree within a platform. These values could still be manipulated, but the cost of
doing so is significantly higher.
On this basis, a three-level categorisation can be applied to profile attributes: a)
editable by owner, b) produced by owner and c) produced by network. Within
these categories, it may also be possible to use empirical measurements of the general
population to rank attributes by their expected veracity, relying on comparisons such as
that of Rowe & Carmagnola.
6.3 Relevance
A final important quality measure comes from considering identity resolution under the
domain of information retrieval. Relevance in information retrieval settings refers to
the degree to which gathered information meets a user’s needs [147]. Continuing the
example of the company investigating their employees’ exposure: when looking at which
information would be most valuable to recover, it is not sufficient to find only new (high
novelty) and true (high veracity) information, if said information has no bearing on the
employee’s work behaviour or susceptibility to attack.
The relevance of any particular profile element is necessarily defined by the applica-
tion to which an identity-resolution system is being applied, and as such an application-
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independent estimation method is not possible. However, once profile attributes in a
domain are assigned relevance weightings, this value can be used alongside the ex-
pectation of novelty to select optimal datasets to query in an iterative identity search
system.
6.4 Example Application: A Social Engineering Vulner-
ability Detection System
Social engineering attacks pose a major risk to the security of organisations. Attackers
use a range of tactics to get targeted employees to disclose sensitive information or enable
compromise of business systems. Basic approaches may be as simple as a phishing email
targeted at all staff members, but current research suggests that the effectiveness of such
attacks is greatly increased through the use of open source intelligence (OSINT) which
refines the target group and personalises the payload [96, 111].
The information to enable such customised attacks is now widely available, with
individuals using social networks to release volumes of personal information to the
general public. Even more worryingly, organisations themselves are engaging with social
media and publishing employee rosters, activities which allow attackers to easily identify
their data-harvesting targets amongst the millions of social media users.
Existing research has demonstrated the social engineering risks posed by such OSINT
data [20]. However, this normally relies on labour intensive manual identity resolu-
tion [55], which is impractical to replicate in defensive manoeuvres. Other techniques
rely on “active” engagement with potential targets to elicit information — through zombie
profiles or misleading friend requests [194] — and hence attackers would risk detection
prior to an attack being launched.
The authors of [67], including the author of this thesis, demonstrate that is it possible
to use identity-resolution techniques to automatically identify the employees of an
organisation amongst individuals within its online footprint. The author of this thesis
developed the identity resolution and employee detection segments of that publication,
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demonstrating, firstly, that it is possible to automatically resolve employee identities
across multiple online social networks, for large-scale harvesting of information pertinent
to launching social engineering attacks. Secondly, that such harvesting can be undertaken
“passively” without resorting to invasive measures, enabling vulnerability assessments
which do not rely on exercising deception during social engineering penetration tests.
And finally that through automated identification of OSINT that may be used to conduct
or enhance a social engineering attack against an organisation, it is possible to highlight
potential risks to the target, allowing appropriate mitigation techniques to be selected.
Most relevantly for this thesis, the authors of [67] sought to identify the most valuable
online profile attributes for building social engineering attacks. Interview participants
from accredited penetration testing companies were solicited for research into the use of
open-source intelligence in social engineering engagements1.
Six professionally qualified penetration testing experts, with knowledge and experi-
ence in social engineering engagements, were questioned on the importance of OSINT
data items for each attack vector. This included identifying the essential data needed
to bootstrap an attack or payload, and the non-essential OSINT data which can still
contribute to the effectiveness of an attack. The goal of the interviews was to determine
the attack vectors and OSINT data that are used in the real world, and filter out the
outliers that are rarely deployed effectively or are embellished in literature as to their
effectiveness.
Participants were first asked to discuss their experience of social engineering attack
methodologies. At this stage of the study, the aim was to determine the real-world attack
vectors used by social engineers, and understand their practicality for deployment. This
allowed identification of which techniques were used more often, and which would be
preferred. The social engineers consistently identified the following as the attack vectors
used in real-world engagements:
1These interviews were designed and conducted, and the initial results organised, by co-authors Robert
Larson and Benjamin Green in the original paper. The following discussion details their methodology as
background to the information items given in Table 6.1, but is not the work of the author of this thesis.
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Table 6.1 Level of contribution of OSINT data to attack impact. B = Required to bootstrap
an attack; A = accentuates an attack.
Item Email Phone Onsite
Name B
Name of person with job title B B B
Identity and position in company
structure
B B B
Name linked to employment by com-
pany
B
Name of new employees A A
Format of email (e.g. ini-
tal.lastname@company.com)
B
Specific Email address B
Group / generic Telephone number B
Direct phone number with name B
Cell phone number A
Social media posts A A
Social media connections / friends A
Social media photos A A
Social media hobbies / sports /
groups
A
Email footer / communications sam-
ple
A
Company supplier / partner informa-
tion
A A B
Employee availability / daily routine A B
Absence indicators (e.g. out of office
reply, Facebook)
B
Files shared on corporate website
(PDF, XLS, DB etc)
B
Identity of facilities manager B
• Email: phishing / spear-phishing emails that were used to manipulate a target into
visiting a malicious website, or opening a malicious file.
• Telephone: voice phishing or ‘vishing’, used to extract information directly or
persuade a target into interacting with a previously delivered payload.
• Physical: gaining physical access to an organisation’s site or systems, through use
of a deceptive pretext, or delivery of physical media (e.g., drop of a USB stick).
In addition to these attack vectors, the six experts were questioned about the use of
online attacks, such as strategic compromise of websites used by targets, and the use of
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social network sites as an attack vector. Such attack vectors were considered by most to
be out of bounds in a contract penetration test, due to reliance on services external to the
customer, risk of collateral damage, and invasion of employee privacy. It was noted by
the experts that such concerns were not considered by criminals.
Experts were asked to evaluate each individual attack method against criteria of:
• Frequency of use: rate of use in real-world engagements.
• Effectiveness: rate of success and detection.
• Efficiency: time requirement and level of automation.
Responses were largely consistent in the frequency of use and effectiveness of attack
methods used, in terms of rates of success and detection of these attacks. However, it
was clear from discussions that success was often interpreted as an overall objective of a
penetration test, rather than an individual attack; e.g., from 100 phishing emails sent, 10
may be opened, but 1 may result in a successful compromise of the organisation.
For email-based attacks, all interviewees stated that these were frequently used (more
so than any other attack vector), and all but one claimed the method to be successful in
the majority of cases, with low detection rates. The level of automation and time frame
varied, ranging from almost completely manual to almost fully automated, and from a
few hours in one afternoon, to waiting weeks for a response. This reflects the wide range
of engagements social engineering penetration testers are involved in.
For telephone-based attacks, 3 interviewees often employed this as an attack vector,
2 did around half of the time, and 1 not all. It was agreed that this was a successful
method the majority of the time, with at least one set of credentials (or some other target
information) gained in most engagements. Detection rates reported varied dramatically,
again depending on the exact nature of the attack and the information sought. This was
always done entirely manually, with each call normally lasting 10-15 minutes (except for
one interviewee using much shorter phone calls of less than a minute).
Physical access attacks were part of less engagements according to our experts, but
still used quite commonly (over 80% of engagements) in most cases (4/6). Success rates
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ranged from 50% to above 90%, with detection rates reported as being low (except for one
report of USB key drops). This was always done entirely manually, with engagements
taking at least a day, and sometimes up to a week.
The main focus of the interviews was the use of OSINT data for the attacks discussed.
Following discussion of each attack vector, experts were asked to detail OSINT items that
facilitate it, highlighting whether they are essential to the attack process (i.e. an attack
cannot occur without this OSINT item), or non-essential. For non-essential items, experts
were asked to discuss the degree to which each item contributed to, or accentuated,
the success of an attack. Where possible, experts were asked to rate their perceived
importance of non-essential items, so as to provide a point of reference relative to the
contribution of other pieces of OSINT data.
In addition to the perceived importance of each item, experts were asked to discuss
the process of obtaining the OSINT data items, focusing on time required and level of
automation of the process. In this manner we gained an understanding of the resources
required to extract each OSINT data item. To understand the rank of importance of
OSINT data items, perceived importance to the attack process was compared to the
resources required to extract the data, in terms of time and level of automation. In
this manner, OSINT data that is easy to obtain (i.e. fast and automated) was ranked
more highly, than on requiring increased resources to extract. Furthermore, we are able
to identify the level at which OSINT data contributes to individual or multiple attack
vectors; flagging those items which bootstrap multiple attack vectors as more useful to
an attacker.
The various OSINT items identified by the experts and their nature (bootstrap or
accentuator) are shown in Table 6.12. Bootstrap (B) items are shown in red, whilst
Accentuators (A) are shown in yellow.
2Replicated from [67]
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6.5 Case Study: Improving Vulnerability Detection
The above highlights the information which can be judged important for social engineer-
ing vulnerability. To move from this to an automated vulnerability scanner, the authors
of [67] described two components – a classifier to identify social media accounts which
belong to employees, and an identity-resolution classifier to gather more information on
each target by iteratively selecting target networks – of LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook and
Google+ – in which to attempt identity resolution with the current target profile.
Our discussion in Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 provide a basis for understanding the
value of information in this application. The domain of interest being online social
networks, the schema presented in Chapter 4 can be used as a guide, and the general
identification values of attributes can be understood as identical to that presented in
Table 5.4. The sections below detail how application-specific measures of Relevance,
Veracity and Novelty can be constructed and integrated into an automated vulnerability
scanner.
6.5.1 Relevance
The bootstrap and accentuator information detailed in Table 6.1 provides a good basis
for understanding which data can be considered relevant to the task of social engineering
vulnerability detection. However, this information does not all map directly to the domain
schema. In Table 6.2 the portions of the schema which appear to map to the relevant
social engineering information are presented, along with a relevance score based on the
number of bootstrap items (×0.2) and the number of accentuator items (×0.1) which
each attribute might provide.
This mapping reveals some things which are already intuitive, such as that the name
and occupation are the most relevant portions of an online profile – revealing the identity
and employment status of the target – but also some less immediately clear takeaways,
such as that timestamping information associated with the account can be very valuable
to social engineers.
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The high performance of this, and Bio→Description is notable, as these attributes
are also shown to have comparatively high general identification value under the ACU
model. Attributes with high identification value and high relevance will be of particular
interest to an application domain.
6.5.2 Veracity
Taking the three-level categorisation from Section 6.2, each of the profile elements
considered relevant from Table 6.2 are assigned a rank weight for veracity, with the
mapping (simply preserving ranks as equidistant) as follows:
• produced and editable by owner – 0.3
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• produced but not editable by owner – 0.6
• produced by network – 0.9




























In Table 6.3 the values are given for the general status of these profile attributes across
the LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter and Google+ networks which were used to inform other
portions of this thesis, as well as within [67]. While this scope is somewhat limited, it
has general applicability due to these being some of the largest online social networking
platforms.
The least controlled element amongst those given nonzero relevance was Relationships-
→FollowedBy, which is an artefact of the user’s social network presence. It is of course
possible that this attribute could be influenced by the user, by indirect methods or dif-
ferent forms of impersonation, but generally speaking the problem of causing a specific
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user to follow your profile is far less tractable than superficially related problems such as
increasing follower counts (which Degree→* information was not judged relevant).
Temporal activity is again a strong contender, being generally only modifiable in
advance and thus requiring premeditation for any attempts at disguise. Geographical
history also falls under this umbrella, being partially temporal in nature. Other network
activity is similarly hard to edit retroactively, particularly simple public interactions
which are likely to be recorded on both the originating and receiving profile.
The majority of relevant profile attributes, however, were produced and editable
by the owner of the profile, and thus have low veracity. This includes many otherwise
relevant attributes such as BioDescription and VisualAvatar, all of which should be trusted
little under this approach.
6.5.3 Novelty
As discussed in Section 6.1, novelty estimates will change based upon the information
available at a particular stage in an iterative identity resolution operation. However, for
a general a-priori estimate of the likely novelty of an attribute, a linear combination of
availability and the inverse of consistency can be used. Table 6.4 shows these (normalised)
values for the relevant attributes.
These novelty estimates reflect the general possibility of finding new values for
these attributes. The most plausibly novel attribute is Relationships→Interacted,
indicating that there is a high probability of finding new associates of a target profile. Two
Content→* items are the next-highest in novelty, suggesting new text and image updates
from a person are likely possible through identity resolution, followed by self-descriptive
text, other relationship and images, other names and then temporal indicators. Note the
high availability and consistency of time updates means that new observations of time
activity are probably correlated with existing observations, so there is only a mediocre
value to collecting more of them.
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Table 6.4 Novelty ranking of profile attributes
Attribute Availability 1 - Consistency Novelty
Relationships→Interacted 0.65 0.98 0.82
Content→Text 0.59 0.97 0.78
Content→Image 0.44 0.99 0.72
Bio→Description 0.50 0.83 0.67
Relationships→FollowsUser 0.62 0.69 0.66
Visual→Avatar 0.75 0.54 0.65
Relationships→FollowedBy 0.54 0.69 0.62
Bio→Username 0.98 0.20 0.59
Temporal→Activity 0.79 0.30 0.55
Temporal→Seen 0.55 - 0.55
Attributes→Temporal 0.68 0.14 0.41
Bio→Relationship 0.25 0.57 0.41
Relationships→FollowsBrand 0.40 - 0.40
Bio→Education 0.35 0.43 0.39
Bio→Occupation 0.32 0.42 0.37
Relationships→Grouped 0.36 - 0.36
Geographical→Current 0.51 0.18 0.35
Contact→Email 0.28 - 0.28
Visual→Photos 0.25 - 0.25
Relationships→Contributes 0.24 - 0.24
Bio→Habits 0.23 - 0.23
Attributes→Spatial 0.10 0.33 0.22
Opinion→Brand 0.22 - 0.22
Content→Video 0.22 - 0.22
Contact→Phone 0.10 - 0.10
Geographical→History 0.12 0.01 0.07
6.5.4 Summary
Each of the above tables demonstrates one measure of the value of online profile attributes
to this specific task – detecting social engineering vulnerability. Table 6.5 combines all
three measures to rank profile attributes such that the top-ranked are attributes most likely
to produce relevant, true and novel information for this goal.
Three different combinations of these metrics are given in the table, the mean, the
product, and the geometric mean. These Importance measurements are ones which gives
equal weight to all concerns, which may not be appropriate for all situations – it is likely
that a higher weight should be assigned to the defined relevance score, for example,
rather than considering new and true information to be as important.
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Table 6.5 Combined task-importance ranking of profile attributes
Attribute Relevance Veracity Novelty µ ∏ 3
√
∏
Bio→Username 0.90 0.30 0.59 0.60 0.16 0.54
Temporal→Activity 0.50 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.17 0.55
Relationships→FollowedBy 0.10 0.90 0.62 0.54 0.06 0.38
Relationships→Interacted 0.10 0.60 0.82 0.51 0.05 0.37
Bio→Description 0.40 0.30 0.67 0.46 0.08 0.43
Temporal→Seen 0.20 0.60 0.55 0.45 0.07 0.40
Relationships→FollowsUser 0.10 0.60 0.66 0.45 0.04 0.34
Content→Text 0.20 0.30 0.78 0.43 0.05 0.36
Bio→Occupation 0.60 0.30 0.37 0.42 0.07 0.41
Attributes→Temporal 0.20 0.60 0.41 0.40 0.05 0.37
Content→Image 0.10 0.30 0.72 0.37 0.02 0.28
Contact→Email 0.50 0.30 0.28 0.36 0.04 0.35
Visual→Avatar 0.10 0.30 0.65 0.35 0.02 0.27
Attributes→Spatial 0.20 0.60 0.22 0.34 0.03 0.30
Geographical→History 0.30 0.60 0.07 0.32 0.01 0.23
Contact→Phone 0.50 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.02 0.25
Relationships→FollowsBrand 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.02 0.29
Geographical→Current 0.20 0.30 0.35 0.28 0.02 0.28
Bio→Relationship 0.10 0.30 0.41 0.27 0.01 0.23
Bio→Education 0.10 0.30 0.39 0.26 0.01 0.23
Relationships→Contributes 0.20 0.30 0.24 0.25 0.01 0.24
Relationships→Grouped 0.10 0.30 0.36 0.25 0.01 0.22
Visual→Photos 0.10 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.01 0.19
Bio→Habits 0.10 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.01 0.19
Opinion→Brand 0.10 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.01 0.19
Content→Video 0.10 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.01 0.19
Nonetheless, these baselines provides some insight into the social engineering vul-
nerability task. Generally speaking, the ranking by product or geometric mean is less
forgiving of low values than the arithmetic mean (by which the table is ordered). This is
particularly critical for attributes given low relevance, such as relationship information,
which typically drop several places.
Taking the top results, it can be seen that Bio→Username is suggested as a critical
value, reflecting its heavy relevance from expert judgement and a respectable novelty
score due to its wide availability across sites making it possible for other names to be
found.
Temporal→Activity is the second highest-scoring attribute under the arithmetic
mean, and the highest under the other two measures. Activity logs can be useful for social
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engineers in identifying business activity and staff absences and are not retroactively
editable. With reasonable novelty due to different revelation patterns across different
social networks, this attribute would appear to be generally of high value for collection.
The Temporal→Seen, as a singular data point of a similar nature, also ranks respectably.
The Relationships→FollowedBy and Relationships→Interacted are only ac-
centuator values for social engineering attacks, allowing attackers to refer to plausible
context when delivering ploys, but are hard for a target to disguise and can present a
range of new values in an iterative identity search system. They rank lower than other
attributes under the measurements which more heavily penalise their low relevance in
expert opinion, but still perform moderately, and are notable for high veracity.
These task-importance measures form an important complement to the ACU model
for improving the identity-resolution system described in [67]. The approach taken
by that paper is broad. A wide variety of attributes are included to capture possible
identification value – these might now be more judiciously selected based on attribute
availability, weighted by the consistency and uniqueness of methods operating on those
attributes. This would reduce development effort and increase performance. Validation
of this approach through user trials and/or expert review would be a useful direction for
further work.
For the purposes of linking together online profiles, the ACU model describes which
online profile attributes will be most useful. For the purposes of deciding which OSNs
to investigate, however, the combination of relevance, novelty and veracity is most
instructive – by first identifying the most important attributes to the purpose of social
engineering vulnerability detection, OSNs providing these attributes can be included in
identity resolution attempts. The results for this case are not necessarily limiting – expert
social engineering advice most values an employee’s Bio→Username, which is broadly
available on most social networks. However, the importance of Temporal→Activity
does highlight that platforms which encourage regular updates are preferred targets,
whereas the low importance of Content→Video suggests video-sharing sites should
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be among the last sources searched. These measures demonstrate value by imparting
guidance for the development of identity-resolution applications.
Chapter 7
Conclusion & Future Work
This thesis has defined the ACU data quality measurement framework for the process
and application of identity resolution. Throughout, the focus has been on methodological
contributions to identity resolution as applied in online social networks.
By tying the central theory developed in Chapter 4 to clear methodological issues
faced in building identity resolution classifiers, this thesis has aimed to ensure that data
quality measurements can be connected with practical benefits for the development and
application of identity resolution in online contexts.
7.1 Thesis Objectives Revisited
A solution to the ground-truth problem in identity resolution
Data collection and scientific replication of identity resolution results has been hampered
by ethical and legal prohibitions against sharing personally identifiable information.
Chapter 3 outlines and evaluates a method which would allow researchers to sidestep
these issues, from the perspective of sampling theory. A method for drawing comparable
datasets from online social networks is described, and realised in a publicly-available
implementation. The results show that identity resolution performed on these samples
performs similarly enough for the replication and validation of methods.
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A model enabling comparative assessment of the identification value
of all common profile attributes
The previous understanding of which online information items hold value for identity res-
olution was patchy and incomplete. Chapter 4 presents the ACU model for understanding
the three dimensions of information value in identity resolution: availability, consistency
and uniqueness, along with a well-grounded schema of online profile attributes and
estimates of values based on prior literature and original observations. The insights
drawn from these estimates are suggestive of areas of exploration for future identity
resolution methods.
The purposes of an identity-resolution system are also paramount to evaluating its
performance. Positing the use of online identity resolution as a form of search system,
Chapter 6 outlines data quality measures which can be applied to understand the value of
revealed attributes to a particular task, with a case study in a real application domain of
social engineering vulnerability detection.
Improving the reliability of identity resolution methods on real datasets
The issue of missing data is often overlooked in the extant literature on identity resolution
in online social networks, despite the widespread nature of this issue. Chapter 5 details
the particular impact of missing data values and naive coping strategies, before applying
the estimates for ACU model components to improve the situation through feature
selection.
7.2 Implications for Preservation of Privacy
This thesis has so far focused on methodological issues for identity-resolution researchers
and investigators seeking to apply such methods. However, these results also hold
meaning for individuals seeking to protect their privacy on and between social networks
and similar profile networks.
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The attribute rankings provided in the tables of Section 5.2 isolate those profile
attributes which are most open to identification attacks. These attributes are ones which
should be targeted for defensive measures, and the ranking of identification value sug-
gests a priority ranking for any defensive approaches. Our model also suggests three
dimensions by which privacy protection may be approached on any attribute:
Availability The work in Section 4.4 produces general availability estimates for a
range of profile features, while the combined model in Section 4.3 also reveals valuations
weighted by estimates of the consistency and uniqueness of certain attributes. By not
filling in these fields, or otherwise protecting access to profile fields wherever this is
possible, users can effectively hamper the application of identity-resolution techniques
to their own profiles, as demonstrated by the performance penalties of classification in
Section 5.1. Moreover, users can intelligently focus their efforts to reduce availability
on the more consistent and unique attributes, depriving attackers of their most valuable
features.
However, social networks can hinder users in these efforts by making fields mandatory
(or practically mandated for ordinary operation of the service) or else by recording data
without the user being directly aware of or able to control its collection. Users have
long been advised not to reveal personal information publicly online, and while this
may still prove effective with critically identifying information, the consistent uptake of
social media indicates that there is a real desire to share certain incidental information
in public. As such, alternative defences should be explored and employed alongside
availability-reduction, as is discussed next.
Consistency Where it is not possible or desirable to omit features, a user can alternately
attack the consistency of their profile information across different networks by creating
contradictory values for the same attribute in each profile. With dissimilar values in
the fields most expected to be consistent, such as username, gender or location, most
identity-resolution approaches will fail. Consistency is hard for social networks or other
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interested parties to affect, as it regards a property that exists between what are by
definition unlinked data records.
The most troublesome areas for consistency-based defences are inferential attacks
based on data over which a user has at best limited control, such as their writing style, or
the times at which they interact with social networking services. The ability of the user
to make these properties inconsistent is limited. This might be mitigated through the use
of technological aids which filter user output to disguise identifying traits.
There is a potential usability obstacle to consistency-based privacy preservation.
Users who are maintaining separate accounts but not entire separate identities may find
the requirement to use names, locations or genders other than their own in their online
account is socially or otherwise disadvantageous. This fundamental tendency towards
veracity could present a limit to the applicability of the principle for any users who are
not strictly adversarial in their intentions.
Uniqueness Alternatively, a user can choose to avoid outlandishly inconsistent profile
attributes by “blending in with the crowd” and adopting highly non-unique values for
usually-unique attributes. This can be a more difficult approach for some attributes (such
as network connections), but for more biographical details, selecting from the modal
choices can effectively reduce the identifiability of a user.
The primary challenge for implementing such defences is practical difficulties for
an individual attempting to learn a property of the entire network. Systems that could
automate a sampling process to gather up-to-date attribute value modes for a particular
network could form a technical solution to this hurdle. A more social solution could
require the collusion of the social network in ploys such as replacing any ‘private’
with the platform’s own measure of the least-informative value, or a randomised value.
Introducing this unreliability instead of more identifiable missing data would contribute
to active defences against identity-resolution attacks on a particular platform.
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7.3 Future Work
All the developments reported in this thesis reveal areas where further research could be
directed.
7.3.1 Reproducibility of identity-resolution results
There are two key strands of work which could form significant benefit to the repro-
ducibility of identity-resolution results.
Firstly, the methodology tested in Chapter 3 was realised in a particular implemen-
tation centred on the Google+ social network. This network is becoming dated as a
relevant source of profile connections. Finding an alternative source for realising this
data collection method, particularly a more high-volume or current source, could provide
immense practical benefit to the field. One avenue here is the use of Twitter URL fields,
which are not explicitly marked as identifiers, but often practically used as such. Other
sources, such as blogging platforms, might also prove useful. More broadly, future
work in this area might focus on improving this approach by finding other practical
search methods than name-based searches to use for random sampling, such as content
or network-based search.
Moving beyond data collection, the establishment of an appropriate means of sharing
standardised data transformations – such as a library of competitive similarity functions
that operate over the range of data types available in OSNs – would help standardise the
field. A common evaluation framework based on current practices in machine learning
could also greatly improve the comparability of state-of-the-art methods, and one such
as that provided by Köpcke et al. [124] could be used for the organisation of competitive
events to spur development and comparison of new methods
7.3.2 Validating the ACU model
With regard to the ACU model developed in Chapter 4, whilst the profile schema was
grounded in a broad survey of online profile information, the original measurements
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leading to attribute-level estimates of availability, consistency and uniqueness were
drawn from data sampled according to the method from Chapter 3, and as such these
estimates relate mostly to a few of the more dominant social networks at the time of
publication. Drawing comparable measurements from identity-resolution data collected
by other means would provide valuable perspective on the generalisability of these
estimates.
More broadly, constructing a profile schema and associated availability, consistency
and uniqueness measurements for an identity-resolution domain outside of online social
networking (such as bibliometrics) would be a valuable test of the generalisability of the
ACU model.
7.3.3 Application to adversarial cases
The ACU model could in general be applicable to adversarial scenarios, but the data
sampling methodology in Chapter 3 does not speak to adversarial profiles, and so the
estimates given in Chapter 4 do not apply to adversarial profiles. It may also be the
case that the ACU model lacks elements which are important for adversarial usage, and
that e.g., veracity information should be integrated. Missing data issues such as those
explored in Chapter 5 are also affected, as information revelation patterns are likely
distinct in adversarial datasets.
The primary hurdle for any research into adversarial identity resolution will be
constructing a suitable database of intentionally-disconnected profiles at a volume and
under sampling criteria suitable for machine learning. Once this is overcome, modelling
the information value of attributes under ACID, ACU or an adjusted construction is
enabled, and information revelation patterns can also be studied.
7.3.4 Missing data in identity resolution
With regard to the challenge of missing data, ongoing research might focus on the result
that classifiers which are robust in the face of missing data are often more effective than
statistical imputation in these types of high-dimensional datasets. Replication of this
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result in classification problems across different domains should establish how generally
this may apply.
It is possible that classification problems under missing data conditions could benefit
from a dual-classifier approach – using a robust method such as Naive Bayes to handle
cases where data is missing, and using a more fragile but more powerful classification
system for complete cases. Exploration of this angle could build upon the results in
Chapter 5.
7.3.5 Validating application-specific measures
Finally, regarding application-area quality measurements, trials could be made of the
predictive power of the novelty metric as conditional on an accumulating body of at-
tributes on a subject. This would require an intensive iterative search process against
a ground-truth dataset across many social networks, building on the designs of Ben-
nacer [26]. Keeping such a result up to date with the social networking landscape is also
a challenging problem for the area.
The veracity estimation method described in Chapter 6 could be tuned to include the
suggested adjustments based on observed values rather than relying solely on a judgement
of the locus of control for an attribute. Surveying the truthfulness of attribute reports as
Rowe et al. did is probably the most reliable method for this, but does not permit great
scale or particularly diverse sampling, so an alternative methodology may have to be
developed. This result would likely be of interest to sociologists and psychologists using
OSN data, outside of its relevance to identity resolution.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
The internet provides investigators with a glut of data which may or may not be of aid
to their work. In many situations, this overabundance has a paralysing effect – some
law enforcement departments are unable to properly handle the volume of information,
and are forced to ignore it all for fear of being overwhelmed. But as traces of crime
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increasingly appear – perhaps solely – online, this approach cannot be maintained. To
enable investigations, technologies must be developed which can retrieve from the data
the information which is useful to a case, and present it appropriately to investigators.
For this to be possible, a theoretical understanding of what useful means for inves-
tigators is required. This thesis has sought to address this question within the narrow
domain of identity resolution, which seems to be a problem of much relevance for online
investigation. Data quality measures for the identifiability of online profile data have
been developed, and some benefits from them demonstrated. The results are no doubt
incomplete – this is the scientific process – but, hopefully, will contribute meaningfully
to the cohesion and reliability of ongoing research. .
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